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Abstract 
This thesis provides a structure for understanding the various issues in the 
design and implementation of a petroleum tax system.  Its main objective is to 
examine whether the Nigerian petroleum tax system is appropriately designed 
to achieve the benefits the country desires from its petroleum contractual 
arrangements.  
Informed by the literature reviewed, economic rent theory was adopted as a 
theoretical framework in the thesis. While other theories could have been 
applied as a framework, economic rent theory was deemed to be most 
appropriate because taxes levied on economic rent are not generally perceived 
to act as a disincentive to the initiation or continuation of business operations.  
Informed views on the petroleum fiscal system used in Nigeria were sought 
from a range of ―experts‖ in the field via a large scale questionnaire. The 
empirical data collected were then subjected to statistical analysis to determine 
the overall response patterns of the respondents for each of the 58 variables 
surveyed. This analysis enabled tentative conclusions to be drawn about the 
validity of various hypotheses developed in the thesis. Further analysis was 
carried out to determine and critically assess statically significant responses 
between respondent groups.  
The study revealed that the Nigerian petroleum taxation system was viewed as 
being well-designed, insofar as it protects the interests of both the government 
and the international oil companies operating within Nigeria. Furthermore, the 
―expert‖ respondents were of the view that a majority of the measures put in 
place to ensure compliance with the petroleum taxation system have been 
effective. However, the study revealed differences in views amongst the 
various groups of ―experts‖ to some questions which suggests that some 
groups may have articulated views based on partisan values. The differences 
suggest that the different groups may have vested interests in the petroleum 
taxation system. Given the role these groups play in the petroleum fiscal 
system in Nigeria, it is argued that these vested interests may well have 
negatively affected the design and operation of the petroleum fiscal system. 
This finding may have important implications for the future design and 
operation of the Nigerian petroleum taxation system. 
The literature reviewed and survey data analysed resulted in a number of 
conclusions. First, it is argued that it is very difficult to make a single 
petroleum tax system that serves the needs of different countries. Second, it is 
suggested Nigeria‘s petroleum tax regime is predicated upon a desire to 
capture as much revenue as possible for the government. Third, the thesis 
concludes that the implementation processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system are fundamentally weak and require further improvement. Fourth, it is 
also the conclusion of this thesis that the Nigerian petroleum tax system lacks 
the capacity for timely review. Finally, it is shown that the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system is sensitive to changes in tax regulations across oil producing 
countries. 
Keywords: Petroleum, tax, design, appropriate, implementation, Nigeria. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
1.1 Background to the study 
The discovery of oil1 in Nigeria in 1956 has radically changed the 
structure of the Nigerian economy from agriculture to oil dependency 
(Atsegbua, 1999). In 1960, agriculture contributed 49.8% to Nigeria‘s 
GDP while oil contributed only 1.1% (Ogunleye, 2008). Since then, the 
contribution of oil to the GDP has been rising steadily. For example, 
between 1970 and 1980 the share of agriculture in GDP declined from 
47.6% to 30.8% while that of oil rose from 7.1% to 22% and by 2004, 
oil accounted for 37% of GDP, 70% of government revenues and 95% of 
foreign exchange earnings, making the country relatively much more 
dependent on oil than many oil-producing countries, including Norway, 
Indonesia, Algeria, Venezuela and Mexico (ESMAP, 2004). This trend 
continues unabated, and by 2008, oil accounted for 39% of GDP, 83% of 
government revenues and over 95% of foreign exchange earnings (CBN, 
2008).  
Like any other host developing country, Nigeria had entered into 
petroleum exploration and production agreements for the exploitation of 
its oil resource.  Through its national oil company, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has been in production 
partnerships with major Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs) via joint 
                                                          
1 Henceforth the term ―oil‖ and ―petroleum‖ will be used interchangeably. 
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venture (JV) agreements (Nwokeji, 2007) and production sharing 
contracts2.  
The central features of a nation‘s petroleum tax regime3 are determined, 
in the main, by the circumstances, needs and objectives of that nation 
(Otto and Cordes, 2002). Thus, the fiscal policy and regime of one nation 
cannot simply be copied from that of another nation since tax regimes 
are the product of specific circumstances (Clark, 2001). Although the 
bottom line behind the adoption of any petroleum arrangement - 
concessionary or contractual - is a financial issue that is centred on how 
costs are recovered and profits divided, which is at the heart of taxation 
and economic rent theories (Johnston, 1994), host countries are 
expected to make the tax system attractive for the MOCs in order to 
encourage inward investment. Thus, the effectiveness of any petroleum 
arrangement depends largely on the attractiveness of its underlying tax 
regime which, in turn, depends on the effectiveness of its design and 
implementation (ESMAP, 2004).    
Designing an appropriate petroleum tax system under today‘s 
competitive conditions4 is a difficult task that requires the recognition and 
accommodation of many diverging interests (Otto and Cordes, 2002). In 
                                                          
2 This is in line with a resolution at the OPEC Conference in 1968, which enjoined its 
members to acquire participation in the ownership of the concession-holding companies. 
3 The term tax regime refers to the various taxes that are imposed in a particular country 
in a specific period of time. It is synonymous with the term tax system and hence used 
interchangeably throughout the course of this study.  
4 The global production of oil during the 1970s and early 1980s was dominated by OPEC 
member countries (see Kaufmann et al., 2008). Triggered by the Middle East conflicts, 
the prices of crude oil jumped up during these periods allowing OPEC to boost prices 
several times by cutting supply needed to cope with the increase in global energy 
demand (Tussing and Leask, 1999). This OPEC behaviour led to the search for oil in non-
OPEC countries, and after two decades of search ―oil is coming into the market from new 
sources in every corner of the globe‖ (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998). Today, because oil is 
being produced in many countries across the globe, inward FDI becomes so competitive 
that producing nations offer special petroleum tax incentives to attract investors (Tordo, 
2007).  
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particular, the tax system‘s objectives must capture the interests of the 
host government and those of the MOCs. Considering this, the Nigerian 
government specifically identified, among others; escalating country 
share of project rents, early and stable revenues, administrative 
simplicity, and adequate incentives to the MOCs as its petroleum tax 
objectives (NEITI, 2005).  
However appropriate these objectives may be, they can only be realised 
if the interests of the MOCs are also met. Therefore, Nigeria, being one of 
the world‘s richest oil-producing countries (UNRISD, 2007), needs an 
appropriate upstream petroleum tax system that is capable of attracting 
more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for the exploitation of its vast 
petroleum resources without compromising any of its tax objectives 
which it designed to achieve. 
1.2 Statement of petroleum taxation issues 
Notwithstanding the above stated Nigerian petroleum tax objectives, 
recent events unfolding in the Nigerian oil industry have called to 
question the appropriateness of the country‘s petroleum tax system. A 
petroleum tax system that is appropriately designed is expected to 
attract to the host government an appropriate level of FDI. From the 
perspective of MOCs, it may not be inappropriate to suggest that their 
much needed investments have been stationary, if not decreasing, in the 
last decade. For example, if we were to use oil reserves as indicator of 
MOCs‘ investment, Nigeria‘s oil reserve stands at 34 billion barrels as at 
2004 only to increase to 37.2 billion barrels by 2011, even though 
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Nigeria had an ambitious of 40 billion barrels target by 2010 (CIA 
Factbook, 2012).   
Lack of adequate investment by MOCs, and the attendant consequences 
on reserve growth, may not be unconnected with the years of 
uncertainty in the Nigerian operating environment. These uncertainties 
may also not be unconnected with the MOCs  concerns with the nation‘s 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), currently being debated by National 
Assembly, that seeks to reform the entire Nigerian petroleum sector and 
to increase government‘s share of revenue, and greater share of revenue 
to producing communities as well (EIA, 2012).This development has 
caused  Nigeria  massive investment in the sector for over five years, as 
evidence suggests new investment decisions have been put on hold, with 
MOCs relocating their investments to neighbouring Ghana, Angola and 
Libya pending the passage of the bill (ThisDay, 2012).  
Similarly, government agencies entrusted  with the responsibilities of 
regulating operations in the Nigerian oil industry appear to have been 
ineffective (Ameh, 2005) and this has led to the disclosure of certain 
weaknesses such as low revenue reporting with billions of naira reported 
as being unremitted to the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) by the 
NNPC (Ezigbo, 2010). This is an issue that further questions the 
administrative effectiveness of the tax system.    
Furthermore, it has been asserted that Nigeria‘s recent trend toward PSC 
agreements, as noted above, is simply for the generation of money to 
finance its JV cash call obligations as most of the contracts are with the 
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existing MOCs (Anthony, 2005; Asiodu, 2009). If this assertion is valid 
then it raises ethical questions about the process.  
Nigeria, according to Igbikiowubo (2010), currently has one of the lowest 
government take5  in the world for PSCs of 42% which is far below the 
international average of 75%. If a country such as Angola receives 78% 
and Ghana targets a take of 80% (Igbikiowubo, 2010), then it is worth 
investigating why Nigeria settles for just 42%.  
Moreover, the MOCs have been permitted to operate the Liquefied 
Natural Gas project located in Bonny Island of the Niger Delta oil region 
of Nigeria without paying any tax to the government for 10 years in the 
name of tax holiday just to encourage investment (Igbikiowubo, 2010). 
The rationale for this position is, prima facie, difficult to understand given 
the needs of its population of 158 million people. 
Lack of transparency in the oil sector is also an issue of concern. At 
present, the local subsidiaries of the MOCs operating in Nigeria do not 
publish their annual reports. In its nearly five decades of oil production, 
Nigeria has not recorded accurately how much oil was being produced by 
the MOCs (Ezigbo, 2010). This, by implication, implies that the country‘s 
stated earnings from crude oil production may be problematic. 
Moreover, and most importantly, reported cases of tax avoidance and 
evasion by the MOCs (see Oduniyi, 2004) have exposed loopholes in the 
tax system. For example, it has been suggested by NEITI that there has 
been an under-calculation of $243 million of royalties and an 
                                                          
5 Government take refers to the total amount of revenue a host country receives under a 
petroleum arrangement. It includes revenue from taxes and royalties.  
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underpayment of $340 million petroleum profit tax (PPT) by the MOCs 
(Ezigbo, 2010). All these issues may call into question the 
appropriateness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. 
Currently, there is no evidence of empirical research having been carried 
out to test the appropriateness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. 
This thesis, therefore, examines the extent to which the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system achieves the objectives it was designed to meet. 
1.3 Objectives and research question of the study 
The aim of the study is to critically examine whether the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is appropriately designed and effectively 
implemented to achieve the benefits the country desires from its 
petroleum taxation arrangements. 
The specific objectives of the study are: 
1. To critically review the characteristics of petroleum taxation 
systems in general; 
2. To critically review the specific petroleum taxation system that is 
operating in Nigeria; 
3. To critically assess the suitability of the objectives and instruments 
of the Nigerian petroleum taxation system;  
4. To critically examine the effectiveness of the implementation 
process relating to the Nigerian petroleum taxation system;  
5. To critically assess the extent to which the Nigerian government 
and the Multinational Oil Corporations (MOCs), as well as other 
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stakeholders perceived how the requirements of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system have been complied with; and  
6. To critically assess the degree of flexibility that is built into the 
design of the Nigerian petroleum tax system and to assess if that 
flexibility allows it to react appropriately to changes in global and 
local circumstances affecting the oil industry. 
These objectives emerged from the following research question: 
―How well does the Nigerian petroleum taxation system serve the 
needs of Nigeria?‖  
1.4 Hypotheses to be tested in the study 
Guided by the objectives and research question above, the following 
hypotheses are developed for the study6 
H11:  Nigeria‘s petroleum taxation system is a fair
7 representation of the 
interests of the government and the MOCs. 
H12: Nigeria‘s petroleum taxation instruments are suitable for achieving 
the objectives set for the petroleum taxation system. 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound administrative system for petroleum 
taxation matters. 
H14: The implementation processes for Nigeria‘s petroleum taxation 
system are effective.  
                                                          
6 See Section 5.3  
7Fairness is a subjective term. What is considered fair by any particular country may differ 
from the view held by others. Countries ultimately, define, through political institutions 
what an acceptable fair or equitable tax system is.    
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H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating to the Nigerian petroleum 
taxation system are adequate.  
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is positively reactive to 
changes in factors that significantly affect taxation matters.  
1.5 Significance and contribution of the study 
There are a number of reasons why this study is important. First, the 
economy of Nigeria largely depends on revenue from the sale of crude 
oil. As noted above, over 70% of government revenue comes from the 
sale of oil and there is no strong commitment on the part of the 
government to diversify its revenue base8. Oil is and will remain vital to 
the economy for the foreseeable future. This thesis, which examines the 
appropriateness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system, should be of 
interest to the Nigerian government. 
Second, the study also examines the adequacy of the objectives and 
instruments of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. This review may 
encourage policy makers to reconsider the tax system and make 
necessary adjustments that will better facilitate the attainment of 
government policy objectives without necessarily jeopardising the 
interest of the MOCs. 
Third, the MOCs may find this study useful. The findings of the study 
may enable the MOCs to understand the significance of balancing their 
self-interest with that of the interests of Nigeria.  
                                                          
8 In 2002 non-oil revenue accounted for 20.84% of total government revenue. This 
percentage has dropped to 9.23% in 2008 (National Bureau of statistic, 2011).  
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Fourth, the study adds to the existing literature on petroleum tax design 
and implementation. In this way, it may serve as useful reference 
material for those who want to undertake research on the design of 
petroleum tax systems that will balance the interests of the parties - 
government and MOCs - in all contractual agreements signed. 
Finally, the general public may obtain a better appreciation of how the 
activities in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil sector, particularly 
with regard to the tax system, works to the benefit of the country and 
the industry.   
1.6 Theoretical framework  
Property rights are often transferred to industry players in exchange for 
economic rents. These rents are simply a financial surplus created by the 
exploitation of natural resources over and above the costs of exploitation 
which include normal profits (Warnock, 2006). Rents in the petroleum 
industry are extracted in a number of ways including, among others, 
prospecting fees, bonus bids for exploration, discovery and exploration, 
royalties‘ fees, minimum tax, progressive profits tax and resource rent 
tax. 
In order to understand and make judgement about the facts of the issue 
being studied, consistent with the views of Al-Quarni (2004), this study 
adopts economic rent theory as a theoretical framework. While 
acknowledging the fact that there are other theories that can be applied 
as a framework in the design of a petroleum tax regime (see Chapter 4), 
the rent theory is found appropriate because taxes levied on economic 
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rent do not act as a disincentive on firms as it is not a requirement for 
the continuation or initiation of business operations (Nakhle, 2008)9.  
1.7 Research methodology and methods  
The methodology a researcher adopts is determined by the sets of 
assumptions he or she makes when carrying out research. These 
assumptions are collectively referred to as a ―paradigm‖ which is a 
mental window through which a researcher sees the social world (Bailey, 
1978). A number of frameworks have been developed to define what 
constitutes a paradigm within the context of social and organisational 
theory. Of these frameworks, that of Burrell and Morgan (1979) has 
received wide acceptance (White, 1983). The Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
model is framed on two independent dimensions based on assumptions 
relating to the nature of social science and society. These two dimensions 
are later subdivided into four different but related assumptions of 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology. By intersecting 
the subjective-objective debates in the theory of social science with the 
consensus-conflict debates in the theory of society, Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) produced four paradigms, viz; functionalist, interpretive, radical 
humanist and the radical structuralist.  
In this study, Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) interpretive paradigm is 
adopted.  Burrell and Morgan (1979) interpretive paradigm has 
nominalism, anti-positivism and voluntarism as ontological, 
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 4 for others reasons that informed the choice of the economic rent theory. 
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epistemological and human nature assumptions which lead to the 
adoption of ideographic methodology10.  
The data for this study were gathered through a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was constructed and administered personally to the 
respondents by the researcher. Over 60% of the administered 
questionnaires were returned filled. Respondents‘ did not agree to be 
interviewed and the analysis is conducted only on their responses to the 
questionnaire, which is a limitation of the study.  
1.8 Plan of the study 
The study is broken down into seven chapters (see Figure 1.1). The 
present chapter presents a brief account of issues relating to petroleum 
taxation and goes further to explain the reasons for undertaking this 
research. The aim, objectives and the significance of the study are also 
discussed in the chapter. The chapter also discusses the theoretical 
framework as well as the methodology and methods used in the study. 
Chapter two presents a general review of petroleum taxation highlighting 
the general characteristics for an effective tax system as well as the 
special features of the petroleum industry that call for a separate 
petroleum tax regime. The general factors influencing the design of 
petroleum taxation as well as the objectives and instruments of 
petroleum tax are also discussed in the chapter. The chapter similarly 
explores alternative petroleum tax regimes and the choice therefrom. A 
review of three different areas - policy, functions and institutions - as 
                                                          
10 See Chapter 5 for the justification of the adoption of the Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) 
functionalist paradigm. 
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they relate to petroleum tax administration were also discussed in this 
chapter. This review is used to meet objective 1.  In addition the chapter 
informs the review process relating to Chapter 3. 
An overview of the Nigerian petroleum tax system is presented in chapter 
three. The chapter gives a thorough review of the development of the 
Nigerian petroleum policy highlighting the various reforms that have 
taken place in the nation‘s oil sector since the discovery of oil. This is 
followed by a general discussion of the Nigerian petroleum tax objectives 
and instruments. The laws governing petroleum taxation in Nigeria as 
well as the Nigeria‘s main petroleum fiscal regimes are also reviewed in 
this chapter. The chapter concludes by reviewing Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
functions and agencies. The chapter helps meet the second objective set 
for the study. It also informs the content of the questionnaire to be used 
in the study. 
Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework adopted for the study. 
The chapter begins by an in-depth review of the adopted theory (i.e. 
economic rent theory) highlighting its meaning, types, and application in 
the petroleum industry. This is followed by the reasons for the adoption 
of the theory as a framework into the design and implementation of 
petroleum tax regime. Justification for not adopting other theories that 
could be applied as a framework for petroleum taxation is equally 
discussed in the chapter. 
Chapter five presents the research methodology and methods of the 
study. The chapter begins with a general review of the assumptions 
made and methods employed in the research. Informed by the general 
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review, the chapter discusses the philosophical assumptions as well as 
the research methods and instruments chosen for the study. The data 
analysis methods and statistical package used in the study are also 
discussed in the second part of the chapter. 
The analysis of the questionnaire based data collected is presented in 
chapter six. Using the descriptive statistics, the overall view of the 
respondents on each of the variables were analysed and interpreted 
accordingly. Follow up Mann-Whitney tests were run in order to 
determine the differences between the respondent groups.  
The seventh chapter concludes the thesis by giving a summary of the 
thesis, conclusions, the major limitations of the study and a suggestion 
for possible future research on petroleum taxation.   
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  Figure 1.1: The structure of the thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO 
An Overview of Petroleum Taxation 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews literature relating to the characteristics of petroleum 
taxation in general. The justification for such review is that it may give 
essential insights into alternative systems applied across the world. 
These insights may then inform the petroleum fiscal system that might or 
should be applied in Nigeria. It may also help with the formulation of the 
research instruments to be applied later in the study.  
Governments across oil producing states face the challenge of designing 
a tax system that meets both their needs and those of the MOCs. In 
other words, governments try to design tax systems that ensure a fair 
share of oil revenue for them while at the same time providing sufficient 
incentives to the MOCs to encourage them to invest in the country. As 
these objectives are competing rather than complementary, a 
compromise is required between the government and the MOCs (Stauffer 
and Gault, 1985). It is this compromise that informs the selection of an 
appropriate tax system.        
A taxation system that is appropriate for a particular country might not 
be good for another because there is no single taxation system that can 
meet the requirements of every country (Bird and Zolt, 2003). What is 
an appropriate taxation system for any country is determined by its 
circumstances, needs and objectives (Otto and Cordes, 2002; Bird and 
Zolt, 2003). For example, Bird and Zolt (2003) noted that a country‘s tax 
regime should be determined by taking into consideration its economic 
structure, tax administration capacity, public service needs, and many 
16 
 
other factors. Countries differ in all these aspects but have generally 
incorporated into the design of their regime taxes that are similar in 
character such as personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, excise 
taxes and value added taxes. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into six sections. Section 2.2 discusses 
the general characteristics for an effective tax system with emphasis on 
the petroleum tax system. This is followed by section 2.3 which reviews 
the justification for having a special petroleum tax regime. The general 
approach for the design of petroleum tax system is discussed in Section 
2.4. Section 2.5 discusses different types of petroleum tax regimes. The 
administration of petroleum taxation is the subject of Section 2.6, and 
Section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 The characteristics of an effective tax system 
The effectiveness of a taxation system depends on the presence of 
certain basic characteristics or principles (see Nakhle, 2009). In 1776, 
Adam Smith outlined equity, certainty, convenience and economy as the 
only four principles of an ideal tax system (Clinton and Duncan, 2005). 
While the adoption of these characteristics has arguably impacted 
positively on the effectiveness of tax regimes across oil producing 
nations, their adoption is, nevertheless, not a necessary condition for a 
regime‘s effectiveness. Moreover, because every country has its unique 
characteristics, it is not always likely that these characteristics are 
suitable for all countries. This argument is consistent with McGee‘s 
(1997) assertion that some of the principles are better than others and 
some conflict with others.  Furthermore, the various contributions made 
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over the years as to what constitute the principles of an efficient tax 
system further justify the limitations on the applicability of these 
characteristics in all countries (see Table 2.1 below).  
Table 2.1: Principles for an efficient tax system 
Author Criteria Title 
Carter Report 
(1966) 
 
Equity, Neutrality, Transparency and 
Accountability, Certainty, Simplicity 
Flexibility  
The use of the tax system 
to achieve economic and 
social objectives 
Asprey Report 
(1975) 
Fairness, Efficiency, Simplicity, Growth, 
Stabilisation 
Criteria for Tax Systems 
Meade Report 
(1978) 
Incentives and Economic Efficiency, 
Distributional Effects, International Aspects, 
Simplicity and Cost of Admin. and compliance, 
Flexibility and Stability 
Transitional Problems 
Characteristics of a Good 
Tax Structure 
 
HMSO Report 
(1981) 
Practicality, Fairness, Accountability, Cost of 
Administration, Fiscal Dimensions, Financial 
Control 
Requirement of a Local 
Tax System 
O‘Brien Report 
(1982) 
Equity, Efficiency, Simplicity, Low Admin. and 
Compliance Costs 
Criteria for a Tax System 
Ridge and Smith 
(1991) 
Administrative Feasibility, Economic 
Efficiency, Equity and Accountability 
Criteria for Local Tax 
Jackson (1994) Equity or Fairness, Certainty, Convenience of 
Payment, Economy in Collection and 
Compliance Transparent  
Characteristics of an 
Efficient Tax System 
OECD (1998) Neutrality, Certainty and Simplicity, 
Effectiveness and Fairness, Flexibility 
Taxation Framework 
Conditions (for Electronic 
Commerce) 
ICAEW Report 
(1999) 
Statutory, Certainty, Simplicity, Easy to 
Collect and Calculate, Properly Targeted, 
Constant Consultation, Regular Review, 
Competitive 
Principles for a Better Tax 
System 
James and Nobes 
(1997) 
Efficiency, Incentives, Equity, Macroeconomic 
Considerations 
Principles of Taxation 
AICPA (2001) Equity and Fairness, Certainty, Convenience 
of Payment, Economy in Collection, Simplicity, 
Neutrality, Economic Growth and Efficiency, 
Transparency and Visibility, Appropriate 
Government Revenues 
Guiding Principles of Good 
Tax Policy 
 
 
   Source: Mansur et al (2005) 
Notwithstanding the above argument, Alley and Bentley (2005) maintain 
that the principles are so important to the creation of tax policy that they 
should be upheld in order to ensure successful implementation of various 
taxes in a manner that satisfies the purposes for which a tax system is 
designed. Some of these characteristics are discussed below:   
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1. Efficiency: This refers to a regime‘s capacity to minimise the 
impact of tax on private agent‘s decisions on such things as saving, 
investing and working (Fitoussi, 2005). The less it distorts these 
decisions, the more efficient the system is. Thus, an efficient tax regime 
encourages the productive capacity of the economy and minimises 
distortions in the allocation of resources. While it is acknowledged that 
efficiency is a requirement for an effective tax system, the identification 
and evaluation of areas that require refinement is arguably neither 
simple nor entirely comprehensible. 
2. Neutrality: Garnaut & Clunies Ross (1983:26) defined a neutral tax 
as one that "would reduce disposable income but not affect decisions on 
consumption, trade or production". It thus has the advantage of 
minimising the economic loss due to any given level of taxation as it 
minimises the misallocation of resources caused by the interference of 
state treasury in the market processes (Bracewell-Milnes, 1976). He 
further argues that it does exhibit more fairness between taxpayers than 
a discretionary tax system which favours one taxpayer relative to 
another. A tax that is not neutral has the potential of adversely affecting 
decisions relating to the development of marginal fields in the petroleum 
sector (Nakhle, 2008). However, since marginal fields do not generate 
economic rent, they do not generate revenue for the state, and hence 
many researchers, including Mommer (1999), argue that, under a neutral 
tax, companies exploit petroleum resources without paying any tax to 
the government.  
3. Equity: This characteristic can be assessed in various ways. First, 
equity is broadly classified into horizontal and vertical equity. Nakhle 
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(2008) refers to horizontal equity as the same tax treatment being 
applied to firms in the same economic conditions or to oil fields having 
the same characteristics and vertical equity as the same treatment being 
applied to firms having different characteristics. A tax system that is 
likely to satisfy this criterion is the progressive tax system in which firms 
or oil fields with high profitability are taxed heavily relative to firms or 
fields with low profitability. Second, there is the concern that the current 
pace of resource extraction might endanger future availability. Equitable 
tax discourages rapid depletion of resources when prices are low (Nakhle, 
2008) and in this sense assures future generations of a fair share of the 
resources or compensation for those resources that have been depleted. 
It is noteworthy, however, to emphasise that what is considered fair or 
equitable by any particular country may differ from the view held by 
others. Eventually, countries, through political institutions define what an 
acceptable fair or equitable tax system is.   
4. Simplicity: An ideal tax regime is ―simple to understand and 
inexpensive to administer‖ (Nakhle, 2009:405). Complexity of a tax 
regime encourages noncompliance which is a serious problem that 
fosters a climate of disrespect, antagonism, and selfishness in the 
relationships among citizens and between them and the government and 
at the same time distorts the distribution of the tax burden and wealth in 
society (Carroll, 1989; Cowell, 1990; Slemrod, 1992; Kaplow, 1996). 
Thus, a simple tax system makes it easier for taxpayers to judge the 
consequences of their actions.  
5. Stability: A tax system that changes more often is likely to deter 
development of projects (Devereux and Morris, 1983). Stability is 
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important, particularly in oil producing nations, as it affects investors‘ 
confidence in government commitment towards petroleum contracts. 
Moreover, stability allows government to predict its revenue flow with 
greater certainty (Muriithi and Moyi, 2003). While stability is a desirable 
characteristic, it cannot be fully achieved in practice. A certain level of 
flexibility is required to allow the tax system to respond to unexpected 
changes in external factors such as significant fluctuations in the price of 
oil.  
While acknowledging the fact that upholding these tax principles is an 
important requirement for successful implementation of the tax system, 
it is equally worthwhile to recognise that some of these features are 
mutually in conflict. Below are some examples. 
First, a conflict could arise between simplicity and neutrality. A simple tax 
system is one that is easy to understand and less expensive to 
administer as discussed earlier. This attribute, however, conflicts with a 
neutral tax system which is too complex to administer particularly in the 
petroleum industry where the government is expected to compute 
different levels of rent and expected return for each oil field (Nakhle, 
2008).  
Second, there could also be conflict between equity and efficiency. Oil 
fields have different economic importance and are broadly classified into 
two: commercial fields and marginal fields11. In consideration of the tax 
burdens on oil fields, governments provide tax allowances and reliefs to 
                                                          
11 Within the context of petroleum extraction, commercial fields are oil fields capable of 
producing enough net income and worth developing while marginal fields are fields that 
lack the capability of producing sufficient net income that make it worth developing at a 
given time. 
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marginal oil fields in order to ensure equity. While the provision of these 
allowances can address the relative tax burden of marginal fields, it can 
as well lead to misallocation of resources which in turn creates 
inefficiencies.  
Third, neutrality and revenue generation is yet another possible area of 
conflict of the tax characteristics. A neutral tax system does not influence 
a company from choosing one investment over the other (Kahn, 1990). 
It, thus, implies that in petroleum extraction a neutral tax encourages 
the exploitation of marginal fields. However, since marginal fields do not 
generate economic rent, under neutral tax system, companies can 
engage in E&P activities without paying tax to the government.  
2.3 Special fiscal regime for petroleum taxation 
The basic idea behind a petroleum tax regime is to ensure that a fair 
share of the petroleum resources accrue to the host government, bearing 
in mind the interest of the investors (Nakhle, 2008). While it can be 
argued that all tax policies address this basic objective, in the case of 
petroleum taxation such an objective assumes a different dimension 
because of the peculiar features of the petroleum sector. The features of 
the industry have made petroleum taxation not only especially important 
for many countries but also challenging (Boadway and Keen, 2008). A 
review of some of these features is given below.  
1. The relative importance of the industry is one of the main features 
considered. This is argued to be a valid reason for a special petroleum 
tax regime especially where the sector generates a large portion of a 
country‘s foreign exchange earnings and government revenue (Evelyn et 
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al., 2009). With most of the oil producing nations depending heavily on 
oil revenue (Boadway and Keen, 2008), it is therefore not surprising that 
most of these countries have a petroleum tax regime separate from the 
general tax regime. However, justifying a separate tax regime on the 
basis of the relative importance of oil sector should not be seen as the 
most viable option as it is not clear whether those few countries that 
adopted the unified taxation system are not doing better.     
2. The industry is characterised by huge sunk costs and long 
production periods. The discovery, development, exploitation, and 
decommissioning of oil fields costs billions of dollars and in most cases 
take decades (Boadway and Keen, 2009). Most of these costs, Boadway 
and Keen (2009) further noted, are incurred in the early life of projects 
prior to the generation of any cash flow and are thus sunk and 
irreversible. Moreover, the time it takes, for example, between oil 
discovery and first production is so long that it makes the design of an 
appropriate tax challenging. 
3. The potential for substantial economic rent to be generated is also 
another feature of the industry that may support the desirability of 
establishing a separate petroleum tax system. The scope for the 
existence of such rents is created by the fixity and diverse quality of the 
petroleum resource (Boadway and Ken, 2009). The importance of the 
existence of economic rents for the design of petroleum tax system 
stems from the fact that they can be taxed at a very higher rate without 
causing changes in behaviour and thus providing a platform for a non-
distorting tax (Boadway and Keen, 2009). While it is acknowledged that, 
generally, taxing economic rent is non-distortionary, the administration 
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of a tax system based on economic rent may present many difficulties 
(see Guj, 2012). 
4. It is a certain feature of oil rich states that the host government, 
everything else being equal, will try to increase the income it receives 
from the petroleum industry and this in turn may fuel the demand for a 
separate petroleum tax regime. Government revenue from petroleum 
resources can be substantial not only in absolute terms but also as a 
percentage of all other revenues (see Table 2.2). If such a revenue 
stream exists then it may enable the government to reduce borrowing 
and increase social spending without having to resort to raising income 
by introducing more general distorting-taxation instruments. 
Furthermore, oil-rich countries exploit this advantage by making less use 
of apparently less efficient non-resource tax instruments (Bornhorst et 
al., 2008). The implication of having a separate tax system on the 
relatively important oil sector is that governments‘ neglect of the non-oil 
sectors is likely to be exacerbated as it does not rely on the expansion of 
these sectors for future revenue. With the uncertainty that surrounds the 
global oil market, any significant drop in oil prices is likely to cause a 
negative impact on the economies of these nations.     
5. Uncertainty is yet another marked feature of the petroleum 
industry. Uncertainty in the petroleum industry surrounds project life 
from exploration through development to decommissioning, and comes in 
many forms including: i) geological uncertainty which relates to the 
questions of quantity, quality and method of extracting crude oil; ii) 
volatility of output prices which is, perhaps, the most marked feature of 
the industry; and iii) policy uncertainties which might arise from broader 
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political risks in dealing with potentially unstable regimes (see Woods, 
1970). All these impact on the decision of the MOCs on where to invest 
their funds and which arguably influence government decisions relating 
to establishing a separate petroleum fiscal regime.  
6. There is also the issue of information asymmetry. It is a genuine 
problem applicable to most taxation and regulatory circumstances, but its 
impact is higher in petroleum taxation because of the special nature of 
the petroleum industry especially with respect to technological 
complexity and volume of intra-group and transnational economic 
transactions (Osmundsen, 2008, 1998). With the MOCs having better 
knowledge about their incomes and costs, and income opportunities in 
other countries than the host government, there is the chance that the 
tax paid by the MOCs would be lower than what it should have been 
(Osmundsen, 2005). These information asymmetries make the extraction 
of rent difficult as the MOCs are not interested in sharing their superior 
information with the government (Boadway and Keen, 2009). Although 
policy makers can mitigate, to some extent, the information asymmetries 
by, for instance, undertaking geological surveys and using industry-
specific consultancy services, such asymmetries, as noted by Boadway 
and Keen (2009),  are likely to remain especially in countries with limited 
domestic capacity to match against the well established MOCs.   
These characteristics, however, do not unequivocally justify the adoption 
of special fiscal terms and therefore the arguments for special petroleum 
tax regimes are not conclusive. Where, for example, a country‘s 
administrative capacity is weak, the creation of different tax structures 
within the same country might run counter to the argument of 
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maintaining a simple tax system. There is also the possibility that the 
stability of the special tax system might be at risk should governments 
become discontent with revenue outcomes. Similarly, there are 
suggestions that MOCs usually prefer to be taxed under a general tax 
system which incorporates specific characteristics relevant to the 
resource industry (see Evelyn et al., 2009). 
Despite the arguments presented above, a petroleum tax system that is 
designed in consideration of the special features of the petroleum 
industry may carry with it certain advantages. Robinson and Morgan 
(1978) identified one such advantage which is the ability of the tax 
regime to capture as much economic rent as possible for the government 
from the production of crude oil.  
Similarly, another advantage might be the creation of the facility to 
easily and transparently distribute revenue generated from the petroleum 
resources to society as a whole; the revenue distributed should more or 
less equate to the taxation extracted. Many of the tax instruments, 
Nakhle (2008) noted, have been designed almost entirely on 
distributional bases. Petroleum resource is mainly distributed between 
the government and the MOCs and the manner in which the resource is 
distributed is spelt out in the agreement signed between the two parties. 
Furthermore, the desire to mitigate petroleum-related economic 
problems such as the Dutch Disease, which negatively affects the global 
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competitiveness of non-oil sectors, is another function that a well-
designed petroleum tax system may achieve12.  
A special tax for petroleum operations is also used to manage demand. 
Where there is a variation between domestic and international price of 
energy, for example, indirect oil taxation can be used to manage the 
effects of such variations. Government may step in by increasing point of 
sales tax on petroleum products to discourage wasteful behaviour. 
Finally, a petroleum tax regime can also be used to control pollution 
emissions from energy use. Various environmental taxes are used as 
tools to get competitive petroleum prices and at the same time create 
market-based incentives for encouraging environmentally friendly 
behaviours (EU, 1992).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 The Dutch Disease is a term that describes a decline in a country‘s exports due to 
appreciation of the exchange rate after the discovery of natural resources such as oil 
(Barder, 2006). In other words, it is simply the effects of a shift in factors of production 
away from other sectors as a result of discovery of a natural resource, which ultimately 
leads to decline in overall productivity growth and reduction in long term welfare. Using 
the tax system, a Dutch Disease can be mitigated through a tax on sales or exports. This 
will shift the supply curve of the good so as to approximate its marginal cost to the level 
of other goods (Bresser-Pereira, 2008). 
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Table 2.2: Petroleum receipts as a percentage of 
 Government revenue 
   Source: Boadway and Keen, 2008. 
2.4 General approach to the design of petroleum taxation 
The general approach to the design of a petroleum tax system involves: 
i) the consideration of broad industrial factors influencing tax design; ii) 
the objectives against which the tax system is judged; and iii) the ranges 
of tax instruments necessary for meeting such objectives. These 
processes are discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.1 Industry factors influencing tax design  
Daniel (2004) identified three important factors in the petroleum industry 
that inform the design of a petroleum tax regime. These factors are 
discussed below: 
The first factor to consider is the fiscal regimes prevailing in other 
countries with similar prospects. Designing a tax regime that is far out of 
line with what is obtained in other countries has the potential of making 
the MOCs diverting their investments elsewhere (Daniel, 2004). This 
position is consistent with Bird and Bolt‘s (2003:5) assertion that ―one 
way to get an idea of what matters in tax policy is to look at what taxes 
Countries  % 
Algeria 72 
Angola 76 
Bahrain 74 
Congo, Republic of 73 
Iran 65 
Iraq 97 
Kuwait 79 
Libya 77 
Nigeria 78 
Oman 83 
Qatar 68 
Saudi Arabia 72 
United Arab Emirate 69 
Yemen 72 
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exist around the world‖. While it is understandable that tax systems 
around the world may influence a country‘s choice of fiscal regime, they 
should not, however, be seen as an inviolable yardstick against which to 
measure its success. What matters most are the underlying issues that 
inform the nature of taxation system. For example, a country that 
charges a seemingly high tax rate of 80% but is politically stable may be 
more acceptable for the MOCs rather than an unstable country that 
charges a tax rate of 40%. 
A country‘s tax structure is the second factor, according to Daniel (2004), 
which is worth considering when designing a petroleum tax system. 
Investors are interested in the overall impact of the tax regime relating 
to both the share the government takes as taxes and the way in which 
the tax is imposed over the life of a petroleum field. The ability of a 
government to carefully structure its tax system to reduce the likely risks 
affecting the MOCs has the advantage of securing, in the long run, more 
FDI as well as larger tax revenue over the life of petroleum fields (Daniel, 
2004). However, structuring a tax system that reduces the risks to the 
MOCs is not that easy. The presence of high geological risks in the 
exploration stage incentivises the government to structure their tax 
systems in a way that mitigates the risks to MOCs. However, when 
exploration becomes successful the possibility for ex-post renegotiation 
of contracts by the host governments increase (Manzona, 2000).  
The pursuit of tax neutrality with respect to petroleum activity vis-à-vis 
other sectors is the third factor to consider. Government, according to 
Daniel (2004), should realise, in its pursuit for a neutral tax structure in 
29 
 
respect of petroleum activity, that it is not simply a matter of setting the 
same overall taxes as with other sectors. Under a neutral petroleum tax 
regime the tax base equates to petroleum rent and has no distorting 
effects on development and operational decisions (Osmundsen, 2008). 
Thus, host governments should strive to ensure that their tax regime is 
neutral in order to achieve their goal of attracting and maintaining FDI. 
Although the attraction of FDI in the oil sector is a desire for host 
governments, tax neutrality has the implication of discouraging 
investments in other sectors of the economy as it involves allotting 
special tax incentives to the oil sector (Daniel, 1995).    
2.4.2 Objectives of petroleum taxation system  
With the above factors in mind, the design process is rolled up by clearly 
specifying the objectives against which the taxation system is judged. As 
Nakhle (2008:5) stated the broad objective of petroleum taxation system 
is to capture for the state: 
―a fair share of the wealth accruing (from the extraction of the 
resources) whilst encouraging investors to ensure optimal economic 
recovery of those hydrocarbon resources‖ 
A number of specific objectives are referenced in the literature. Some of 
these, as identified by ESMAP (2004), are discussed in the paragraphs 
that follow. 
First, achieving a fair share of revenue for the state is one of the main 
objectives of petroleum taxation. It is generally agreed, according to 
ESMAP (2004), that a major share of the project economic rents should 
go to the owner of the resource, in most cases the government. What is 
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an appropriate share to the government, however, depends on a number 
of considerations, which include the resource base and prospects of the 
host country, perceived or country specific risks, and the levels of 
revenue take in other countries (ESMAP, 2004).  
Second, a petroleum tax system should aim to be non-distortionary in 
nature. This implies it should be a neutral tax system and is arguably the 
foundation for successful investment in petroleum activities. A neutral 
petroleum tax system, in line with the discussions in section 2.2, 
suggests that taxes imposed on petroleum projects do not change the 
pre-tax commercial decisions and production processes of the MOCs. Tax 
neutrality can be approximated through the imposition of taxes such as 
resource rent tax (RRT), income taxes and sliding scale technique, ring 
fencing, and cost uplift, among others. 
Third, provision of adequate incentives for investors to contain costs of 
their E&P activities. Where costs are high, the profit available for 
distribution between the host government and the investor will be low. 
The tax system should, therefore, be designed to give every incentive 
possible to the investors to contain costs.  
Fourth, adequate provision of how the oil revenue should be shared 
among the different levels of government and indeed the oil producing 
community. Where, for example, the petroleum resources are 
concentrated within one or two regions of a country, the tax system 
should be designed in such a way that allocation of revenue from 
petroleum taxes is in the best interest of the entire country. 
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Fifth, there should be accuracy of the timing and stability of revenues. 
Governments may place a premium on receiving early revenues in order 
to enable them, for example, to address some urgent budget issues. 
Against this background, governments are more likely to favour tax 
systems that will guarantee a minimum level of stability in tax revenue. 
Depending on factors such as budgetary constraints and the stage of 
maturity of the oil sector, governments may need to decide on the types 
of incentives to offer that will ensure they receive tax revenue within the 
desired timeframe whilst maintaining reasonable stability in the system.  
Sixth, a petroleum tax system should be progressive. This implies that 
the government take may vary as a progressive function of project 
profitability. Many producing nations attempt to make their petroleum 
tax systems progressive. A progressive regime has the advantage of 
increasing government revenues without negatively impacting on 
incentives to undertake exploration and production activities.   
Goldsworthy and Zakharova (2010:7) present a summary of these 
objectives in a tabular form as seen in Table 2.3 below: 
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Table 2.3: Objectives of Petroleum Taxation 
Objectives Description 
Neutrality Avoids investment and production distortions. The fiscal regime should 
not alter the order in which the projects are undertaken; nor should it 
change the speed of extraction, decisions about reinvestment, etc. 
Capture of Rents Satisfies the neutrality criterion, enables the government to share in the 
upside of projects, and supports the government‘s role as owner of the 
oil 
Stability and timing 
of revenue 
Provides a stable revenue stream to government. Government favour 
stable and early revenue. However, the counterpart to this goal is a 
transfer of risk to the investor and delayed payback. This objective 
should be less of a concern when there are multiple oil fields at different 
stages of development.  
Progressivity and 
adaptability 
Ensures progressivity. A progressive regime yields a rising government 
take as the project‘s profitability increases. A system that responds 
flexibly to changes in prices and costs might be perceived as more 
stable, lowering the investor‘s perceived risk of regime stability and 
avoiding the rent-seeking behaviour associated with discretionary 
changes. It also ensures a low tax burden on marginal projects 
Administrative 
simplicity and 
enforceability 
Support ease of administration. To the maximum extent possible, given 
other objectives, the regime should be transparent and simple to 
administer. It also be designed to avoid leakages through abusive 
transfer pricing and other tax  
International 
competitiveness 
Supports competitiveness. Adjusting for investor‘s perceptions of country 
risk, the regime should be competitive with those of other countries in 
order to attract investment 
   Source: Goldsworthy and Zakharova, 2010 
 
2.4.3 Petroleum tax instruments  
In order to meet the above objectives, countries across the world apply a 
wide range of tax instruments (ESMAP, 2004; Goldsworthy and 
Zakharova, 2010). These instruments are variously classified because 
different jurisdictions apply different names to the same or similar 
instrument. Conrad (1980), for example, classified them into three broad 
categories: output related taxes, profit taxes and property taxes. Otto 
and Cordes (2002), on the other hand, also give three classifications, 
namely: indirect taxes, direct taxes and quasi-taxes. Evelyn et al. (2009) 
suggests the two broad classifications of profit-based taxes and 
production-based taxes.   
A general description of these instruments on the basis of Otto and 
Cordes‘ (2002) classification is made in the sub-sections that follow. The 
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choice of this classification is simply based on the ground that it has been 
the most common way of classification in the tax literature (Evelyn et al., 
2009). Otto and Cordes (2002) classified petroleum tax instruments into 
three categories with each based on a different rationale and impacting 
in a different way on a company‘s decision.  
2.4.3.1 Indirect taxes  
This is the first of the three categories and is imposed against the 
petroleum deposit or the input. According to Otto and Cordes (2002), the 
common types of indirect taxes imposed are those that impact on a 
project‘s variable costs and include, inter alia, royalty taxes, import 
duties, and value-added taxes. 
Royalty is an amount paid for the use of someone‘s property for the 
purpose of economic gain (Nakhle, 2008). Royalty can also be considered 
as a factor payment for mineral resource extraction that is similar to 
factor payments in respect of capital and labour inputs (Conrad et al, 
1990). Royalties, according to Evelyn et al. (2009), are classified into 
three types; unit-based, value-based and profits-based. Unit-based 
royalties are those that are assessed on either volume or weight and are 
measured on a predetermined point in time. Royalties based on 
production output are termed value-based. These types of royalties are 
assessed in many different ways at different stages of the production 
process. A profit-based royalties system is similar to the concept of 
economic rent and is charged against the profit of a project. Similarly, 
royalties can be calculated on a gross basis or a net basis, with the latter 
being common for petroleum projects.  
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As a price for resource extraction, royalty plays a role in determining the 
pace of investment. A country‘s petroleum resources should be left in the 
ground if the MOCs are not ready to pay this price which is the 
opportunity cost of extraction. Since oil producing nations depend heavily 
on oil revenue, there is no reason to provide the resource to the MOCs 
for free. However, under some neutral profit-based royalty regimes, 
governments stand the risk of receiving little or nothing from the 
ownership of its petroleum resource (Nellor, 1995).  
Despite the argument above, the conservative suggestion in the 
literature is to discourage the employment of royalties. Advocates of this 
argument are of the view that royalties raise the marginal cost of 
resource extraction and this has the implication of discouraging the 
development or otherwise marginal projects (Nellor, 1995). 
An Import duty, on the other hand, is employed by most governments 
because it is an attractive way of securing an up-front revenue flow. 
Given the substantial import needs during project development revenue 
from this source is more front-loaded than royalty payments (Sunley et 
al., 2002). However, given the massive import needs of the MOCs during 
the exploration and development stages of projects, import duties 
payment on materials and equipments has a direct impact by lowering 
the net present value of projects and increasing their risk profiles (Tordo, 
2007). The desire to attract more investments, Baunsgaard (2001) 
noted, has made many oil producing nations provide import duty 
exemptions for the MOCs. These exemptions are sometimes given with 
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conditions. For example, exemption will be given on condition that the 
imported equipment will be re-exported back after its use. 
Value Added Tax (VAT) in the petroleum sector is most often influenced 
by administrative issues rather than tax policies (Sunley et al., 2002). 
This is particularly the case in developing countries where the desire for 
large investment in the oil sector is large and at the same time most of 
their petroleum output is exported (Sunley el al., 2002). VAT, just like 
import duties, has a negative impact on projects‘ net present values and 
risks profiles. Hence, the MOCs prefer exemptions for at least specialised 
inputs of materials and equipment used in E&P activities.   
A summary of the concepts, merits, and demerits the indirect tax 
instruments as well as their effects on investment decisions of the MOCs 
is presented in Table 2.4 below  
Table 2.4: Summary of indirect petroleum tax instruments 
 Royalties Import duties Value added taxes 
Concept  Commonly used 
 Based on volume of 
production or value of 
export 
 Calculated on a net-back 
basis  
 
 Applied to all imported 
materials/equipments  
 Limited use as a fiscal 
instrument 
 Most producing nations 
provides for import 
duties exemptions 
 Normally charged on 
destination basis 
(import are taxed and 
export zero rated) 
 Exemptions provided 
on projects that export 
Merits   Ensures an upfront 
revenue stream as 
production starts 
 Can be estimated with a 
degree of certainty  
 Easy to calculate, collect 
and administer 
 Ensure an upfront 
revenue stream as 
production starts 
 Ensure imported 
materials and 
equipments are re-
exported after use 
 Help to improve tax 
compliance and 
enforcement 
 More transparent and 
has less burden on the 
investors 
Demerits   Regressive in nature 
 Distort investment 
decisions if high 
 
 Goods processing is 
delayed 
 Lists of exempted 
materials and 
equipments increase 
administrative burden 
 Timely payment of 
refund may be difficult 
if administrative 
system is weak 
 Complex to administer  
Effects on 
investment 
decisions  
 Distort the levels of oil 
discovery if it the most 
instruments used 
 Deter investments since 
it is payable whether 
profit is made or not 
 Reduce economic life of 
project if economic cut-
off rate is increased  
 Reduce projects‘ net 
present value 
 Increase projects‘ risks 
profile 
 Reduce projects‘ net 
present value 
 Increase projects risks 
profile 
  Source: Based on Section 2.4.3.1 
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2.4.3.2 Direct taxes  
These taxes are imposed on a company‘s profits in its position as a 
separate legal entity13. In order to accommodate the risk in the 
petroleum industry and to attract more investments, many jurisdictions 
make provisions in their petroleum tax regime that modify the timing of 
direct taxes. For example tax holidays, depletion allowances, accelerated 
capital allowances, permission to carry losses forward or backward and 
many other tax credits as among the most used of these provisions (see 
Otto and Cordes, 2002). Direct taxes imposed in the petroleum sector 
include, inter alia; income taxes, resource rent taxes and withholding 
taxes on dividends. 
Daniel (2004) asserts that an income tax is levied on companies engaged 
in petroleum operations at a relatively higher rate than companies in 
other sectors in order to enable the host governments to capture a larger 
share of the economic rent. In order to guard against postponement of 
tax revenue from direct taxes, governments‘ often ring-fence tax 
accounts14. However, because ring-fencing is considered as a disincentive 
by the MOCs, the extent of ring-fencing, according to Sunley et al (2002) 
depends upon two factors: i) government preference for short term 
modest revenue against long term greater revenue. By allowing the 
MOCs to deduct the costs of developing fields from the revenues of 
producing fields, more exploration and development activities may come 
                                                          
13 A company is said to be a legal entity if it can sue and be sued  
14 Ring-fencing, in relation to upstream petroleum taxation, is the accurate drawing of 
boundaries around projects, or sets of projects, such that fiscal calculations are 
performed in the proper sequence and honour the proper interrelationships among the 
various fiscal components (Smith, 2005). Ring-fencing, Smith (2005) further asserts, is 
either directly or indirectly provided for in every petroleum tax system across the world. 
Such provisions specify the level of portfolio (e.g. field, block) at which tax instruments 
are calculated.   
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up in the long run thereby increasing the taxable base which leads to the 
generation of more taxes to the government and ii) the bargaining 
powers of the governments which may depend on the maturity stage of 
the industry and the financial needs of the host government.  
Where income taxes are progressive, they tie the level of taxation to 
factors that are linked either to the level or price of crude oil which in 
turn enables the government to take part in the upside of projects if 
economic conditions are favourable. The problem, however, is that the 
normal parameters used in determining progressive rates of tax are not 
fully related to project‘s rate of return. Accordingly, this type of income 
tax may not be neutral for investment purposes. 
Petroleum resource rent tax is a direct tax which is defined as ―the value 
of the product of a petroleum resource minus all the necessary costs of 
production, including the minimum returns to capital required, prior to 
the investment decision, to induce investment‖ (Daniel, 2004:7). This tax 
has a zero rate up to the point where a threshold rate of return is earned 
on investment. In other words, the tax becomes applicable only when a 
project‘s cumulative cash flows exceed its cumulative costs.  
This tax encourages MOCs to shift income into tax haven countries15 or 
engage in wasteful practices which would have been avoided by a 
properly designed ordinary income tax (Jenkins, 1974). Therefore, for a 
resource rent tax to be efficient each contract area needs to be ring-
                                                          
15 Tax haven countries are those countries in which some types of taxes are either 
imposed at a very low rate (relative to what is obtained elsewhere) or are not being 
levied at all. In the words of Assogvabi‘s (2008:2) tax haven ―is any country whose laws, 
regulations, traditions and in some cases, treaty arrangements, make it possible to 
reduce one‘s overall tax burden.‖ 
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fenced to curtail the practice of off-setting the costs from one field 
against the revenues of other fields. 
Withholding taxes: withholding taxes are imposed on services, loan 
interests and dividends as a means of ensuring compliance with income 
tax payments. Otto and Cordes (2002) assert that withholding taxes, 
particularly on declared dividends, are used as both an instrument for 
obtaining additional income taxes as well as a tool for discouraging the 
repatriation of profits and thus encouraging local reinvestment. 
Table 2.5: Summary of Direct Petroleum Tax Instruments 
 Income tax Resource rent tax  Withholding tax 
Concept  Usually included within 
the income tax regime 
and often at a higher rate 
 Most often progressive in 
order to ensure that 
government share from 
the upside of a project 
 
 Usually tied to project 
profitability 
 It is deferred until 
project‘s costs are 
recovered i.e. income 
to the government is 
delayed 
  
 Imposed on services, 
interests and 
dividends 
 Primary purpose is to 
ensure compliance 
Merits   Since it is within the 
nation‘s income tax 
regime, its assessment, 
collection and monitoring 
are easily captured  
 Capturing assessment 
and collection lowers 
administrative difficulties 
 It is a neutral tax 
system 
 Delay in the provision 
of income to the 
government can be 
avoided when 
combined with royalty 
and or income tax 
 Ensures faster 
generation of revenue 
 Discourages 
repatriation of profits 
 Involves little or no 
cost of collection 
Demerits   Income tax, if 
progressive, makes 
government to share 
from the downside of 
projects  
 It only provides 
government with 
income when target 
return is reached 
 Relatively more difficult 
to assess and monitor  
 High rates likely to 
affect operational 
performance of the 
investors 
 Locks up investors‘ 
capital with tax 
authorities 
Effects on 
investment 
decisions  
 May not be neutral 
because the parameters 
used to determine 
income tax rates are not 
necessarily related with 
investors‘ rate of return 
  
 Relatively neutral and 
hence reflects the 
MOCs‘ risk 
 Affects investors cash 
flow  
Source: Based on Section 2.4.3.2 
2.4.3.3 Quasi taxes  
These are non-tax instruments that are employed by oil producing 
nations to generate revenue. These instruments are relatively of lesser 
importance than the taxable instruments in terms of revenue generation 
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(Sunley el al, 2002). However, they influence a project‘s profitability and 
impact indirectly on taxation (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  
One non-tax instrument that is widely employed is bonuses. There are 
various bonuses paid to the host country by MOCs and these mainly 
comprise signature, production and discovery bonuses. A signature 
bonus is a one-off payment made by an MOC on signing a contract. It 
captures economic rent to the host government irrespective of the 
outcome of the exploration activities. A discovery bonus, although less 
frequently encountered (Martin, 2004), is also a one-off payment 
following the declaration of a commercial discovery and after approval of 
the MOC‘s development plan by the National Oil Company (NOC). A 
production bonus, in contrast, is recurring and paid when production 
reaches a certain level or when a predefined volume has been produced.  
Bonuses are easy to be administered and, as noted above, also provide 
governments with an early form of income. However, high bonuses may 
discourage investors who are risk-adverse especially if perceived political 
or geological risk is high.  
Production sharing is also another quasi tax used. It was first applied in 
Indonesia in 1966 (Mustafaoglu, 1981) and since then various versions 
have been developed. However, the main characteristics of any 
production sharing contract, Mustafaoglu (1981) noted, are threefold; 
cost recovery provisions, profit split between the host government and 
the MOC, and the various taxes. The cost-recovery provisions allow the 
MOCs to first recover their exploration and development costs from the 
annual production which could be a fixed percentage or an amount of oil 
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equal to its costs amortised over a number of years. Once costs are 
recovered, the remaining production is shared between the parties - the 
government and the contractor - on a predetermined basis.  
A production sharing agreement can be designed to provide flexibility in 
the fiscal system to suit a particular project without changing the overall 
fiscal regime. Although this may benefit both the government and the 
MOCs, it may, however, involve design and administrative difficulties 
which have the potential of rendering the contract difficult to administer, 
particularly in terms of the determination of allowable costs.  
Governments may participate in the equity of petroleum projects for both 
economic and non-economic reasons. Economically, governments 
participate strategically and operationally in order to try to secure a 
higher share of revenue generated from profitable projects (Baunsgaard, 
2001). For non-economic reasons, on the other hand, motivation for 
participation includes the desire to be involved in the ownership 
operations, to facilitate the transfer of technological know-how and to 
control development (Otto and Cordes, 2002; Baunsgaard, 2001). 
Whatever the motive, government participation, according to Otto and 
Cordes (2002), can be through: i) acquisition of free equity position as a 
percentage of total equity investment, ii) acquisition of equity in the 
same way as any other joint venture partner, or iii) any other means in 
between the first two approaches. 
There are a number of implications resulting from equity participation. 
First, there is the possibility of conflict of interest resulting from the role 
of the government as regulator and at the same time being a 
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shareholder. The government may be in an advantage position when it 
assumes only the role of taxing and regulating projects rather than being 
involved directly as an equity shareholder (Sunley, 2002). The likelihood 
of a government‘s inability to meet its cash call commitments (if it is an 
equity holder) is also an issue that may influence the MOC‘s investment 
decisions. This is so particularly where the cash calls on governments are 
paid out of production, in which case the overall burden of financing the 
project is left with the MOCs (ESMAP, 2004).  
Environmental protection has been a matter of global concern for quite 
some time now. Various environmental organisations at both national 
and international levels (e.g. Greenpeace, Earth First, United Nations 
Environment Programme, and European Environment Agency) are 
formed with the motive of promoting environmental policies 
development. This lobby for environmental protection encouraged 
governments, particularly of mineral resource-rich countries, to respond 
by making it mandatory for the MOCs to pay for any environmental 
damages and to internalise environmental preservation costs in the costs 
of their operations (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  
Although the tax treatment of environmental obligations is important to 
the MOCs, Fullerton et al (2008) noted that environmental tax cannot 
assure a particular environmental impact as the MOCs‘ behavioural 
responses may be lower or greater than expected. Thus, where accurate 
attainment of environmental objective is the main concern, this may be a 
significant downside to environmental taxation.   
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Table 2.6: Summary of Quasi petroleum tax instruments 
 Bonuses  Production 
sharing 
Equity sharing Environmental 
protection 
Concept  Paid upon 
signature of E&P 
agreement, 
discovery, etc 
 Affect project 
risks by 
increasing E&D 
economic 
threshold 
 Provide the 
government 
with option to 
participate 
 Characterised 
by recovery of 
cost, profit split 
and various 
taxes  
 Participation may 
be through: free 
acquisition of 
equity, equity as in 
any other JV, and 
other means 
between the two  
 Participation is for 
economic and non-
economic reasons 
 It is a global 
concern 
 Encourages 
government to 
make it 
compulsory for 
investors to 
pay for 
environmental 
damages 
Merits   Easy to 
administer 
 Provide early 
revenue 
 Provide fiscal 
flexibility 
 Risks 
associated with 
E&P activities 
are avoided by 
host countries 
 Results in increased 
share of 
government 
revenue  
 Facilitates the 
transfer of 
technology  
 Corrects 
divergence 
between 
private and 
social costs 
 Shifts financial 
risk to the 
investor 
Demerits   Large bonus 
depends on 
overall fiscal 
terms, country‘s 
risks 
 Decommissioni
ng liability 
might not be 
avoided 
 Regulatory 
checks and 
balances may 
be lacking  
 Conflict of interests 
from the role of 
government as 
regulator and 
shareholder 
 Government may 
not honour its cash 
call commitment  
 Complex to 
administer 
 Cannot assure 
specific 
environmental 
impact 
Effects on 
investment 
decisions  
 High signature 
bonus may 
discourage risk 
averse investor 
 Commerciality 
increases the 
economic cut-off 
rate of a project 
 It is the most 
preferred 
option for the 
investors. 
Hence, it 
encourages FDI 
inflow 
 Participation is 
regarded as 
deterrent to 
investment by 
many investors 
 Where cash calls 
are paid out of 
production, the 
investor bears the 
burden of raising 
the entire finance 
 Ability to 
deduct 
environmental 
cost lowers 
compliance 
costs    
Source: Based on Section 2.4.3.3 
2.4.3.4 Special petroleum fiscal provisions 
While the above tax instruments are designed to capture as much 
revenue as possible for the government, some special provisions are 
often included in petroleum fiscal systems in order to modify the timing 
and or magnitude of the revenue streams. These provisions, Tordo 
(2007) asserts, are normally intended as incentives aimed at attracting 
investors, accommodate unique features of a petroleum asset, or to 
influence the investors choice toward specific public policy goals. Some of 
the most commonly used provisions are presented in Table 2.7 below. 
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Table 2.7: Special petroleum tax provisions 
Accelerated 
capital 
cost 
allowances 
Assets are depreciated in many ways over their expected life (useful life 
of equipment, economic life of the reservoir). The methods used in the 
industry are: (a) straight-line (equal annual deductions); (b) declining 
balance (straight-line depreciation calculated for the remaining value of 
the asset each year); (c) double declining balance (doubles straight-line 
depreciation for the remaining value the asset each year); (d) sum of 
year digits (based on an inverted scale that is the ratio of the number of 
digits in a given year divided by the total of all years digits); and (e) 
unit of production (the capital cost of equipment, after deduction of the 
accumulated depreciation and of the salvage value, is multiplied by the 
ratio between the total production in a year and the recoverable 
reserves remaining at the beginning of the tax year). 
Depletion 
allowances 
The depletion allowance is the deduction from gross income allowed to 
investors in exhaustible commodities (such as minerals, oil, or gas) for 
the depletion of the deposits. The theory behind the allowance is that 
an incentive is necessary to stimulate investment in this high-risk 
industry: as the reservoir depletes, the company will need to undertake 
more exploration to find new reservoirs. The depletion allowance is 
meant to subsidize further exploration. Since the industry is a global 
one, it is quite likely that the depletion allowance may be used to 
subsidize exploration in competing countries. For this among other 
reasons, depletion allowances are granted/have been granted by only a 
few countries  
Interest 
deduction 
rules 
Project financing is quite common for large projects or for small oil 
companies. Normally interests on loans are deductible from taxable 
income and qualify for cost recovery. Inter-company interests may also 
be cost recoverable and tax deductible, if on an arms-length basis. 
Loss carry 
forward 
This refers to the ability of a company to ―carry forward‖ losses from 
one year to offset tax liability in future years. When limitations apply 
the loss can be carried forward for a set number of years (normally 5 to 
7) after which the benefit expires. In most cases, unlimited loss carry 
forward is granted. 
Investment 
credits 
In some countries, governments provide an incentive to investors by 
allowing them to recover an additional percentage of tangible capital 
expenditure (also known as investment uplifts or ―allowances‖ and 
investment credits). In some cases investment credits can be taxable 
Tax holidays When capital investment in a project is considerable, the host 
government may grant tax holidays to investors. Tax holidays provide a 
valuable advantage to investing companies that can accelerate the 
project payback. On the other hand, host governments should be 
careful in utilizing this mechanism to attract investors 
 Source: Tordo, 2007 
2.5 Alternative petroleum tax regimes  
Governments across producing nations use various types of petroleum 
fiscal systems. According to Kaiser and Pulsipher (2004), there are more 
fiscal regimes in the world than there are countries for three basic 
reasons: i) numerous versions of contracts may be in place at any one 
time, ii) countries most often use more than one fiscal arrangement, and 
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iii) contract terms are often negotiated and renegotiated because of 
changes in political and economic conditions. These numerous fiscal 
regimes are classified into two broad categories: concessionary systems 
and contractual systems (see Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: Classification of Petroleum Fiscal Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Johnston, 1994    
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government decides whether the petroleum resources are privately 
owned or are owned by the state. The MOCs, under this system, are 
transferred the right to explore and produce petroleum on the concession 
areas. In the words of Nakhle (2008:32), a concessionary system is:  
 
The first branch deals with the title to the mineral resources. Concessionary systems 
allow private ownership in contractual systems, the state retains ownership 
 
 
 
The primary difference here rests upon whether the fee is 
taken in cash (service) or in kind (PSC) 
 
 
 
 
 
     Also referred to as  
        Production Sharing Agreements 
 
Divided primarily upon whether fee is based upon a flat fee 
(pure), or profit (risk) 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petroleum Fiscal Arrangements 
Concessionary Systems 
 
Contractual Systems 
Production Sharing 
Contracts 
Service 
Contracts 
Pure Service 
Contracts 
Risk Service 
Contracts 
45 
 
―an arrangement between a government and a company that grants 
the company the exclusive right to explore for, develop, produce, 
transport and market the petroleum resource at its own risk and 
expense within a fixed area for a specific amount of time‖. 
It is, however, worthy to note that the degree of concession varies. In its 
traditional form, the concession arrangements grant the MOCs the 
ownership of the petroleum resources in the ground and as such they 
have exclusive control over all operations under the concession. The 
state only receives royalties and taxes. Under the modern concessionary 
system, however, right of ownership of the petroleum resources is only 
transferred to the MOCs at the wellhead. At this point, Johnston (2007) 
noted, the MOCs take the title to gross production less royalty oil, unless 
the government agreed to be paid royalty in cash. In effect, the right of 
ownership of the petroleum resources in the ground remains with the 
state. Accordingly, the state, through participation, has a more direct 
involvement and control of operations (Le Leuch, 1988). The state, in 
addition to royalties and income taxes, also receives bonus payments, 
import and export duties, and domestic supply obligations.   
Concessionary systems are subject to review because governments 
sometimes change their petroleum tax laws and levels. In some cases, 
concessionary systems are renegotiated. Although countries have 
different types of royalty sliding scaling systems and levels of taxation 
(see Johnston, 1994), most concessionary systems are very easy to 
understand. A royalty/tax system, according to Kaiser and Pulsipher 
(2004), has in its basic forms three components: i) royalty, as discussed 
earlier, represents a cost of doing business and is tax-deductable, ii) 
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deduction, which include operating cost and capital allowance and iii) tax, 
on the income of the MOCs.  
There are a number of reasons why countries are applying a 
concessionary system to petroleum activity16. First, it is relatively risk 
free. The MOCs provide the finance as well as the technical expertise and 
equipment and bear all the risks associated with them (Le Lench, 1988). 
Second, the concessionary regime gives room for the government to 
participate, through national oil companies (NOCs), in upstream 
operations. This, according to Klueh et al (2007), will enable the NOCs 
and their staff to acquire the necessary skills and expertise to be able to 
take over operations in the future. Third, the royalty/tax system allows 
for ring fencing of individual projects in order to limit the extent to which 
MOCs can offset the costs of one project against the other. Ring fencing, 
Nakhle (2008) noted, safeguards new entrants from discrimination by 
reason of the fact they have no income against which to deduct expenses 
incurred from E&P activities.  
While the above advantages are enough to encourage the application of 
the royalty/tax regime, there are certainly some drawbacks of the 
regime. First, bidding rounds for licensing under a concessionary regime 
tend to be expensive both in terms of money and time17. Unless the 
system is designed in such a way that it can attract financially and 
technically strong bidders, bidding processes may not be profitable. 
Second, MOCs tend to be conservative in bidding for concession areas, 
                                                          
16 According to Johnson (2001), there are 55 countries that apply the concessionary 
system in petroleum activity. 
17 Under a concessionary system the government or land owner will transfer title of the 
minerals to the oil company which is then subject to the payment of royalties and taxes. 
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particularly those areas that not previously explored. Accordingly, if the 
government is targeting for substantial up-front bidding fees, it stands to 
be at disadvantage (Radon, 2007).  
2.5.2 Contractual system 
This regime is based on the French legal concept of state ownership of 
mineral resources for the benefit of all citizens (Johnston, 1994). The 
MOCs are given a right for a share of the resource produced in 
agreement with a production sharing contract (PSC) or service contract 
(SC). If the MOCs receive a share of oil produced after the government 
share is deducted, the system is called PSC (also known as production 
sharing agreement (PSA)), and the MOCs effectively take title to their 
share of output. On the other hand, if the MOCs are paid fees for 
successful E&P operations, the system is called an SC (also known as 
risk-service contract (RSC)). The terms of the contracts are basically 
determined through legislation but many aspects of them may be 
negotiated (Kaiser and Pulsipher, 2004). Contractual systems, just like 
the concessional systems, are frequently renegotiated as political and 
economic conditions change. 
Under contractual systems, the MOCs bears all the costs and risks of 
exploration and development with no right for repayment should there be 
no discovery. Where, however, discovery is made, the MOCs are allowed 
to recover the costs they incur and this is called cost recovery or cost oil. 
Cost oil includes previously unrecovered costs, operating and capital 
expenditures, and investment incentives.  
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As the reward of the MOCs under a SC is in cash, the MOCs, according to 
Nakhle (2008), prefer a PSC18 than the SC. There are a number of 
reasons for such preference. First, the fact that the state is the owner of 
the petroleum resources demonstrates the state‘s claim to sovereignty 
over its petroleum resources. The MOCs are only entitled to ownership of 
their share of production at the point of export or other predetermined 
points. Second, all equipment bought and used by the MOCs in their E&P 
operations within the country becomes the property of the host country. 
Title of such equipment, according to Johnston (1994), may pass to the 
host country either immediately on arrival in the country or upon 
commissioning or start of operation. Third, all risks associated with E&P 
activities are avoided by the host country. The MOCs, as noted earlier, 
bear all the risks and expenses and are only allowed to reclaim their 
costs if operations are successful. Fourth, government take is not only 
improved but also comes earlier (Nakhle, 2008). In addition to royalties 
and income taxes, the government earns under the concessionary 
system other revenue elements under the PSC which include state 
participation, bonuses, and domestic supply obligations. Fifth, the system 
is flexible making it possible for each PSC to be adaptable to different 
geographical and geological situations in the country which is necessary 
in making up the differences in fields or areas that cause development 
costs of some fields or areas to be higher than others (Baunsguard, 
2001).       
The contractual system may be favoured for the reasons above, but 
certainly has some shortfalls that are worthy of consideration. First, the 
                                                          
18 Henceforth PSC is used synonymously with contractual system.   
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automatic transfer of title of equipment and other facilities purchased by 
the MOCs to the host government legally transfers the decommissioning 
liability of such equipment to the state. Unless the government ensures 
in the contract that the obligation for decommission is that of the MOCs, 
the burden cannot be avoided (Tordo, 2007). Second, the PSC system 
which in most cases is designed as a self-contained law (Sunley et al, 
2002) lacks regulatory checks and balances (Radon, 2007). The 
government, Radon (2007) further noted, is thus left with enforcing such 
things as environmental practices of the MOCs, which in effect reduces 
its share of take.  
2.5.3 Choice between concessionary and PSC regimes 
There is no hard and fast rule for the choice between a concessionary 
system and a PSC system (Sunley et al, 2002). The choice of a regime 
by any producing nation is, thus, a matter of discretion since the fiscal 
terms of the concessionary regime is replicated in a PSC regime and vice-
versa (see Table 2.8). 
Table 2.8: A comparison of royalty/tax and PSC regimes 
Risk/Reward 
Trade-off 
Tax/Royalty 
Regime 
Production Sharing 
Low risk to 
government 
 
Royalty 
 
There may be an explicit royalty; or there may 
be a limit on cost oil that functions as an 
implicit royalty 
Medium risk 
 
Income tax 
 
Income tax, which may be paid out of the 
government‘s share of production 
High risk 
 
Resource Rent Tax 
 
The determination of the amount of profit oil 
can mimic a resource rent tax 
  Source: Sunley et al., 2002 
From Table 2.8, it can be seen that the PSC regime employs an explicit 
royalty and also subjects the MOCs to income taxes as any other 
50 
 
company. These are both applicable components under the 
concessionary regime. Similarly, the split of profit oil under the PSC 
regime can be said to be an imitation of the resource rent tax (RRT) 
under the concessionary regime.   
While the adoption of a fiscal regime type is a matter of discretion as 
discussed above, primarily countries should design tax systems that best 
suit their needs in accordance with prevailing global circumstances that 
allow the efficient capture of economic rent. At the exploratory stage, for 
example, the adoption of a PSC is more beneficial, particularly where 
there is scarcity of fund, as governments are not required to fund 
exploration activities. On the contrary, where reserves are proven, 
governments may partake in JV agreements in order to secure state 
ownership of part of the petroleum reserves.  
A summary of the main features of the alternative petroleum fiscal 
regimes is presented in Table 2.9 
Table 2.9: Summary of main features of fiscal regimes 
 R/T Systems PSC Service 
agreements 
Types of projects All types All types All types but often 
non-exploration 
Ownership of facilities Contractor group Government NOC Government NOC 
Facility title transfer No transfer When landed or 
when 
commissioned  
When landed or 
when 
commissioned 
Group ownership of 
hydrocarbons 
Gross production 
less royalty  
Cost oil + profit oil None 
Hydrocarbon title 
transfer 
At the wellhead Delivery point or 
fiscalisation point  
None 
IOC lifting entitlement Typically about 
90% 
Usually from 50-
60% 
None (by 
definition) 
Government 
participation  
Yes, not common Yes, common Yes, very common 
Government control Very little More control Most control 
  Source: Johnston, 2008 
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2.6 Implementation of petroleum tax systems 
The worth of a country‘s tax regime, petroleum or otherwise, depends on 
how effectively it can be implemented. A well designed tax regime that 
cannot be implemented is worth little (Bird and Zolt, 2003). The 
administrative aspects of taxation, therefore, need to be captured 
properly while designing a tax system. A poorly administered resource 
tax system, according to Calder (2010a), has the significant risk of not 
only causing serious damage to government revenues and reputation but 
also the likelihood of leading to bad tax policy choices.   
In this section, three different areas as they relate to the administration 
of petroleum tax system will be reviewed: tax policy, functions, and 
institutions.  
2.6.1 Tax policy 
Petroleum tax policy is an important aspect of petroleum tax 
administration. Within the context of petroleum taxation, it refers to the 
design of rules that govern petroleum taxes (Calder, 2010b). Tax policy, 
Calder and McPherson (2008) further noted, determines the nature, 
extent, and difficulty of the administrative challenges of the various 
petroleum tax instruments discussed in 2.4.3 above. Below is a review of 
the administrative challenges posed by some of the tax instruments.  
1. Bonuses: bonuses, as stated earlier, are one-off payments when E&P 
license agreements are signed and, thus, require no ongoing 
administration. Although contract awards that produce the best feasible 
negotiated terms and avoid the risks of collusion and corruption need the 
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design of good administrative procedures, Calder and McPherson (2008) 
are of the view that these procedures, no matter how well they are 
designed, are generally not thought of as administrative issues. Since 
bonuses are paid up-front they may not be responsive to future changes 
in profitability of projects. Thus, bonuses, if paid in large amounts, may 
lead to renegotiation of contracts which, in turn, may indirectly create 
administrative complications (Calder, 2010b).  
2. Royalties: each class of royalty poses some administrative challenge. 
For volume based royalty, establishing the volume of production, for 
example, involves a tedious process of installing, maintaining, and 
testing of meters to enable measuring, analysing, and monitoring of 
production quantities in order to ensure that all room for illegal 
extraction is blocked. In the case of value based royalty, the challenges 
are those of establishing price because of variations in quality and 
different bases of pricing.  
3. Income taxes: the administrative challenges relating to income taxes, 
according to Calder (2010b), concern difficulties of valuing other 
revenues, such as ancillary income and gains on disposal, and difficulties 
associated with establishing costs, such as cost recovery limit and 
treatment of cost offsets, to be included in the computation of tax 
liabilities.  
4. Participation: using participation as a tax instrument poses some 
administrative challenge. The need, for example, for a reliable and 
transparent accounting system as well as a good commercial and 
business footing are good examples of the challenges of equity 
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participation. Where participation involves service or buy-back contracts, 
Calder and McPherson (2008) argue that oversight of such contracts is 
likely to pose challenges relating to monitoring and controlling costs 
similar to those faced under profit taxes.   
From the review above, it can be seen that some of the instruments pose 
greater challenge than the others. Ignoring these challenges, Calder 
(2010b) argued, would mean that the petroleum tax policy should be 
determined almost entirely by the government‘s broader policy objective 
of capturing a fair share of the petroleum resources for the host 
government while at the same time encouraging investors to ensure 
optimal recovery of those hydrocarbon resources. The problem, however, 
with these objectives is that they often compete rather than complement 
each other (Nakhle, 2008). To manage this problem, governments 
attempt to strike a balance between policy objectives and administrative 
challenges by simplifying administration within the overall tax framework 
(Calder, 2010b). Some of the ways of achieving simplification include the 
following: 
1. Benchmarking of prices of output. This may seem crude but Calder 
(2010b) argues that it is simpler and more transparent than setting 
pricing on the basis of actual sales. 
2. Reduction of the differences in the treatment of different cost 
categories. For example, standardising depreciation rates for exploration, 
development, and production costs may make the computation of 
depreciation less complicated.  
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3.  Allowing the deduction of interest on the basis of standard rules. 
A good example of doing this is to limit eligible debt to a certain 
percentage of development costs less income from production activities.  
4. Placing of reasonable limits on deductible costs incurred for the 
payment of goods and services from associate companies. This might 
seems crude relative to full deduction but again is much simpler and 
more transparent. 
While the above examples may be appropriate for most countries, care 
should, however, be taken to ensure that administrative simplification is 
not taken too far. The methods of capping costs, for example, can be 
arbitrary and unrealistic. This may distort decisions and, perhaps, exert 
pressure for contract renegotiation.  
Notwithstanding the measures above, striking a balance between tax 
policy objectives and administrative simplicity is still not an easy task. 
Many countries, Calder (2010b) noted, have different resource taxes that 
are administratively simple and straightforward, but at the same time 
have complex petroleum taxation regime because of the number of 
taxes, on one hand, and the number of sub-regimes that apply to 
different license areas.   
2.6.2 Tax functions  
Tax administrative functions, according to Calder (2010a), are broadly 
classified into routine and non-routine functions. Routine functions relate 
to the mechanics of collecting tax while non-routine functions concern 
the correct quantification of tax. 
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2.6.2.1 Routine tax functions  
These functions, Calder (2010a) noted, involve four different but 
interrelated activities: i) registration of taxpayers, ii) processing of tax 
returns, iii) making of tax assessments, and iv) collection of tax. Where 
the taxpayers population is large, routine functions can result in 
taxpayers either failing to make themselves known to the tax authorities 
and/or refusing to file their tax returns or even failing to pay tax when 
due (Calder and McPherson, 2008). However, since oil production in most 
producing countries is carried out by few MOCs, identifying these 
companies presents no administrative problems and in most cases the 
MOCs generally comply with routine obligations of submitting tax returns 
and paying taxes when due particularly if the tax system is backed with a 
strong penalty for default (McPherson, 2008). Accordingly, routine 
administration of petroleum taxes is arguably simpler than routine 
administration of other taxes. 
2.6.2.2 Non-routine tax functions  
There are a number of non-routine functions that relate to petroleum tax 
administration which include; valuation of petroleum resources, tax 
audit, and dispute resolution. These functions are directly related to 
petroleum tax administration (Carder and McPherson, 2008).  
First, the valuation of crude oil produced is needed for both production 
and profits taxes and is derived by multiplying volume and price. The 
administrative challenge involved is that of establishing production 
volume and crude oil price. Establishment of production volume are 
technical and require sophisticated equipment. Various approaches are 
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adopted but traditionally output is established at year ends. In order to 
be effective, however, the procedures, as noted by Calder (2010a), 
should be carried out on a continuous basis rather than at the year end.  
Appropriate pricing of crude oil produced is fundamental for producing 
nations. Accordingly, tax authorities, in many countries, determine in 
advance what prices MOCs must use for valuing oil production for tax 
purposes (Calder, 2010a). This pricing approach, Calder (2010a) further 
emphasises, is adopted because of the prevalence of transfer pricing 
risks and other risks in the petroleum industry.  
Second, no matter how well a petroleum tax system is designed, there is 
always some scope for error which may give rise for different 
interpretation and unacceptable manipulation of tax laws (Carder and 
McPherson, 2008). There is, therefore, the need for an effective tax audit 
to ensure that risk of revenue loss to the government is reduced.   
Tax audit can be carried out by making a full coverage of all the MOCs 
with comprehensive field audits in every case. This approach is often 
combined with a formal approach giving advance notice of the audit 
exercise (Calder, 2010a). Another approach is to combine full field audits 
of some selected companies with limited desk audits of other companies. 
Another approach is to undertake a mixture of desk audit and selective 
examination. Notwithstanding the approach a country adopts, the 
success of its tax audit depends largely on the skill and capacity of the 
auditor (Calder, 2010a).  
Tax audit, Calder (2010a) noted, is challenged for being aggressive and 
unfair with little protection for the MOCs from unreasonable audit 
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demands, tax adjustments, and penalties. In order to address this 
problem, producing nations, Calder (2010a) further noted, often make it 
a good practice by explaining, in published guidance or codes, how audit 
powers will be exercised and what safeguards are available to the 
taxpayers.  
Third, resolution of disputes can either be by agreement or through 
formal litigation. Dispute resolution in the course of an audit by 
agreement is preferred because resolving disputes by formal litigation is 
resource extensive and is typically very slow (Calder, 2010a). Disputes 
can be resolved successfully if the tax law is reasonably clear and there 
are adequately trained negotiators who are well versed in the law of 
taxation. Where disputes cannot be resolved by agreement, the MOCs 
should have formal rights of appeal.  
Many countries maintain tax tribunals that decide matters of fact and law 
arising from unresolved disputes (Calder and McPherson, 2008). 
Although appeals are made to the court, most often such appeals are on 
matters of law (Calder, 2010a). Because of the lengthy and cumbersome 
procedures involved in matters of fact if to be decided by the court, such 
matters are most often resolved by the tribunals. 
2.6.3 Tax institutions  
The allocation of administrative responsibility for petroleum taxation 
varies from country to country. Some countries assigned the 
responsibility to the state tax department alone, while in other countries 
the responsibility is assigned to the sector‘s ministry and some selected 
institutions. In a typical tax/royalty system, for example, the 
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responsibility for profits taxes is assigned to the state tax department 
while that royalty is assigned to the sector‘s ministry. Similarly, in a PSC 
income tax is the responsibility of the state tax department, while 
matters relating to government share of profit oil are the responsibility of 
the national oil company (NOC). 
Placing responsibility for petroleum tax administration in the hands of 
different agencies has the main advantage of reducing the risk of serious 
error and collusion as no single office controls the entire administrative 
procedures   (Calder, 2010a). It is, however, open to the accusation of 
being a duplication of work, too complex, lacks clarity about 
responsibilities and that there may be too many regulators for companies 
to deal with (Calder, 2010a). 
The above disadvantages can be minimised by improving cooperation 
among the agencies, which Calder (2010a) says is often ignored in 
practice. Various ways of improving cooperation among petroleum tax 
administrative agencies have been suggested in the literature (see Calder 
and McPherson, 2008; Calder, 2010a). One such approach is to clarify 
the responsibilities of the agencies. This opens up the scope for the 
removal of duplication of functions and consolidation of procedures. 
Similarly, regular interchange and secondment of personnel among the 
agencies may also improve cooperation. Furthermore, a joint committee 
of the top management of the agencies is also likely to improve the 
cooperation among the agencies.   
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Whichever administrative approach a country adopts, the important thing 
is to have an effective administrative system which, according to Calder 
and McPherson (2008:40), requires:    
―Good, qualified, motivated staff, adequately paid, well trained, 
properly managed, supplied with adequate accommodation and 
resources, particularly IT, and given an adequate delegated budget 
and authority to do their job‖. 
  
The recruitment process of staff for petroleum tax administration is often 
poor and discriminatory in nature (Calder, 2010a). Similarly, petroleum 
tax offices, Calder (2010a) further noted, often have no control over 
appointment of staff but instead depend on bureaucratic and rather 
unresponsive personnel of civil service departments. Thus, for effective 
administration, recruitment practices should be reviewed and 
strengthened to give more autonomy to the tax offices, but in a way that 
is commensurate with the small number of staff required.  
It is equally important for producing nations to have a petroleum tax 
manual detailing guidance on petroleum tax laws and procedures which 
can be used as a means for communicating governments‘ efforts in 
applying petroleum law and practice in the industry.  
Another aspect of petroleum taxation that is often ignored is the 
management of the performance of petroleum tax administrators. The 
importance of effective managing of the performance of petroleum tax 
administrators is emphases by Calder (2010a:363) as thus:   
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―Something else often lacking is any effective management of staff 
performance. There is no setting of targets or objectives, no 
monitoring of performance, no annual reporting, and no mechanisms 
for rewarding good achievement or getting rid of poor performers‖. 
 
Addressing this problem, Calder and McPherson (2010a) affirmed, 
requires not only governments‘ financial commitment but also a 
fundamental overhaul of attitude towards performance management. 
Given the small number of petroleum tax administrators, this overhaul 
may be achieved. 
Further requirement for effective administration of petroleum taxation is 
the availability of, and access to information technology. Information 
technology can be employed in the petroleum sector to control and 
perform routine functions, establish audit trails, and also account for the 
assessment and collection of taxes (Calder, 2010a). All these have the 
potential of simplifying tax administration, improving openness, and 
reducing corruption. 
Financing of petroleum tax administration is yet another aspect that 
receives less attention from host governments (Calder, 2010a). Funds for 
administration could come from the budget as well as from loans, and 
grants. The problem, however, is that even where funding is enough, 
spending is often blocked by bureaucratic budgetary procedures (Calder, 
2010a).  
2.7 Conclusion  
The above analysis of the theoretical background relating to the design 
and implementation of petroleum taxation is used to inform the structure 
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of the research that is required to achieve the objectives of this study. Its 
accomplishment in this chapter sets out the basis for the analysis of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax regime. 
The chapter reviewed the functions and principles that underpin the 
effectiveness of all tax systems. Similarly, an analysis of the argument 
for the establishment of a separate petroleum tax system as well as the 
functions and characteristics of petroleum taxation was extensively 
carried out. A review was also made of the processes involved in the 
design of petroleum taxation including the definition of objectives and the 
instruments used in achieving set objectives. 
The analyses revealed a number of issues. It is evident that there is no 
single tax system that is applicable to all nations. This is particularly the 
case with petroleum taxation which, according to Miller (2000), is a 
complex issue both in terms of economic theory and political economy. 
Each country designs its petroleum tax system on the basis of its 
circumstances and needs. 
The review also identified that alignment of the investor‘s interest with 
that of the host government is at the heart of an effective petroleum tax 
system. This is a sensitive aspect of petroleum taxation as it requires 
compromises from both the host government and the investor.  
It was also found that there is no particular reason informing host 
governments‘ decisions on the choice of a particular petroleum fiscal 
regime.  The choice of a regime is a matter of discretion since the fiscal 
terms of concessionary regimes are replicated in a PSC regime and vice-
versa. 
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The review also revealed the link between tax administration and policy 
choices. A poorly administered tax has the risk of not only causing 
serious damage to government revenues and reputation but also has the 
potential of leading to bad policy choices. 
The next chapter reviews the literature relevant to the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system. Specifically, the review will focus on the tax 
objectives and instruments used in the design of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system. Similarly, the review will also focus on the nation‘s 
petroleum fiscal regime as well the procedures in place for administering 
such a regime 
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Chapter Three  
A Review of the Nigerian Petroleum Tax System  
3.1 Introduction  
In line with the general review of petroleum taxation system in the 
previous chapter, this chapter reviews the specific petroleum taxation 
that is operating in Nigeria. In order to achieve this objective, the 
chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 3.2 examines the 
development of the Nigerian petroleum policy addressing the various 
changes in oil policy that occurred over the years. This is followed by 
section 3.3 which deals with the Nigerian petroleum tax objectives and 
instruments. The laws governing the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
reviewed in section 3.4, while section 3.5 discusses the petroleum fiscal 
regimes employed in the Nigerian oil sector. Section 3.6 reviews the 
administration of the Nigerian petroleum tax system under two headings: 
administrative functions and administrative agencies. Section 3.7 
concludes the chapter.    
3.2 Development of Nigerian Petroleum Policy 
Until 1966, Nigerian oil policy had only been the collection of taxes, 
rents, and royalties (Nwokeji, 2007). From 1966 onward, Nigeria had 
witnessed various changes in its oil policy. One of these changes was the 
enactment of Decree No. 65 of 1966 which amended the government‘s 
financial agreements with the oil companies. This Decree, among other 
things, addressed issues relating to the rates of capital allowance allowed 
on qualifying capital expenditures.  
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In 1967, the fiscal provisions of the Nigerian Petroleum Act were 
amended by the enactment of Decree No. 1 of 1967 to provide for the 
establishment of posted prices which attracted royalties and tax 
payments and allowed for the expensing of royalties. These new 
provisions led to a significant increase in oil revenues for the government 
from N30 million in 1967 to N6.081 billion in 1977 (Udosen et al., 2009).  
Also at the heart of Decree No. 1 of 1967 were the indigenisation and 
partial nationalisation of the interests of the MOCs. This shift in policy 
could be attributed to at least three reasons. The first reason could be 
the government desire to address the longstanding public demand to end 
foreign dominance of the economy (Pearson, 1970). Second, the 
adoption of OPEC‘s Declaration of Petroleum Policy19 by member States 
also contributed to the policy shift. OPEC‘s decision to take over full 
control of the production and sale of oil in member states had, according 
to Nafziger (1973), directly impacted on Nigeria even though Nigeria was 
only attending OPEC‘s meetings as an observer prior to it joining the 
cartel in 1971. Third, the increase in oil revenues post-1966 was also 
another reason that convinced the government of the possible benefits of 
indigenisation and nationalisation of the oil sector (Jacoby, 1974).  
In 1969 the government took a further step by promulgating a Decree 
called Petroleum Decree No. 51 which, among other things: transferred 
the ownership and control of all oil resources in the country to the state, 
compelled the MOCs to employ Nigerians, established the government‘s 
                                                          
19 OPEC‘s declaration of petroleum policy refers to the intrinsic right of all countries to 
exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources for the purposes of national 
development as expressed by the United Nations (Rahman, 2004). 
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option of acquiring a stake in the MOCs, and specified that only 
companies registered in Nigeria could be granted oil licences.  
To actualise its indigenisation and nationalisation policy as contained in 
Decree No. 1 of 1967 and the Petroleum Decree of 1969, the government 
established the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC)20 in 1971 and 
acquired 35% stake in Elf that same year. By 1979, government share in 
the MOC‘s interests in Nigeria in the form of JVs had reached an average 
of 60% (Nwokeji, 2007).  
The late 1970s witnessed a dramatic switch in Nigeria‘s oil policy. The 
government, compelled by MOCs suspension of exploration activities, 
dropped its hard-line policy approach and re-acknowledged its 
dependency on the MOCs (Ojo, 1984). Several financial incentives, Ojo 
(1984) further noted, were provided to the MOCs in order to entice them 
to resume exploration activities. There was, for example, the reduction of 
the petroleum profit tax (PPT) from 85% to 65.75% on companies 
engaged in exploration but not producing and the cancellation of the 
requirement for the MOCs to meet, on a pro-rata basis, 30% of the 
country‘s domestic crude oil needs (Omorogbe,1987).  
Hit by the oil glut of the 1980s, Nigeria, in order to encourage further 
active participation of the MOCs in the oil sub-sector, signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the MOCs in 1986 which 
provides, among other things; replacement of the posted price with 
                                                          
20 The NNOC was established by the NNOC Act No. 18 of 1971. It is vested with the 
powers to acquire assets and liabilities, on behalf of the government, in existing MOCs 
and also to participate in all activities of the oil industry. The NNOC is succeeded by the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) which was established by the NNPC Act 
No. 33 of 1977, as amended  
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realisable market price of crude oil, a guaranteed minimum margin of 
$2.00 for realisable prices below $12.50/bbl, and a reserve addition 
bonus on successful discoveries. All these effectively reduced the amount 
of tax paid by the MOCs (Khan, 1994).   
The average 60% stake of the government in the MOCs has achieved the 
country‘s indigenisation and nationalisation policy but equally left the 
government with the burden of funding 60% of the financial commitment 
of its JV with the MOCs which the government found difficult to meet 
(Ameh, 2005). Accordingly, government policy started to shift from JV 
contracts to PSCs by offering, among other things; attractive royalty 
rates, relative to the rates applicable to the JVs, with the primary aim of 
encouraging deep sea exploration (Ameh, 2005).  
In addition to the shift towards PSCs, the government also took a new 
indigenisation approach in the 1990s. This time, instead of increasing 
government participation, the government advocated for increased 
Nigerian participation in the oil sector. In 1990, the Nigerian government 
promulgated a law that empowers it to recover legally the then 183 
marginal oil fields abandoned by the MOCs for lack of commerciality and 
allocated them to several indigenous oil and gas companies (Agoro, 
2000). 
3.3 Nigerian Petroleum Tax System  
Generally, a tax system comprises of three basic components: tax policy 
objectives, tax laws, and tax administration (Somorin, 2010). This part of 
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the study critically reviews the tax policy objectives and instruments of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system. 
3.3.1 Tax policy Objectives  
Nigeria, just like any other oil producing state, has the main upstream 
fiscal objective of ensuring the generation of maximum revenue to the 
government from petroleum activities while at the same time 
guaranteeing the investors a reasonable return on investment (National 
Policy on Oil and Gas, 2004). With this broad objective in mind, the 
Nigerian petroleum tax regime is designed to achieve other specific 
objectives. 
In terms of share of oil rents, the tax regime is designed to capture a fair 
share to the government. Generally, Nigeria‘s shares of rents from 
petroleum projects are fixed in the range of 80-85 percent (ESMAP, 
2004). These shares of oil rents account for about 78% of Nigeria‘s total 
revenue which are similar to the levels of revenue that are obtained in 
other major oil producing countries (see Table 2.2). The pursuance of 
this objective has rendered Nigeria as an oil dependent nation (see Table 
2.2 and 3.2). This might not be good for the country in the long run as 
the world is now moving toward renewable energy.   
Similarly, in order to contain the cost of the MOCs, various incentives are 
given in the tax system (see Section 3.4.2). These incentives are aimed 
to encourage and motivate the MOCs in minimising wastages so that 
profit available for sharing between them and the government is 
improved (ESMAP, 2004). While it is important that Nigeria improves on 
the incentives it gives the MOCs, it seems worth noting that the 
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effectiveness of tax incentives as determinant for attracting FDI is not 
conclusive. Some researchers hold the view that tax incentives increases 
FDI (see Allen and Wells, 2001), while others disagree (see Morisset and 
Pirnia, 2001).      
Another important objective which the tax system seeks to achieve is 
effectiveness in sharing of the oil revenue among the three tiers of the 
government. Since petroleum resources in most states or federations are 
concentrated within one or two regions, an appropriate tax regime should 
provide an acceptable and stable revenue sharing formula for the nation. 
In the case of Nigeria, the constitution has clearly stated the formula for 
the distribution of petroleum and other revenues accruing to the 
government (see Table 3.1). However, one thing that is not clear is 
whether such sharing formula is considered fair by all the three tiers of 
the Nigerian government.   
Table 3.1: Nigeria’s Revenue distribution formula 
Recipient % share 
Federal Government 48.5 
State Governments 24.0 
Local Governments 20.0 
Special Funds 7.5 
    Source: Nigerian Constitution, 1999 
Accuracy in the timing and stability of revenue from crude oil is an 
objective that Nigeria, just like most oil producing nations, aims to 
achieve. Stability of revenue from petroleum is very important to Nigeria. 
As earlier discussed, Nigeria depends heavily on oil revenue. For 
example, more than 60% of Nigeria‘s projected government revenue for 
the years 2012 to 2015 will come from oil (see Table 3.2). Delay and 
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fluctuations in these projections will certainly not be favoured by the 
government. However, the achievement of these projections depends on 
developments in the international oil markets over which Nigeria has no 
control.  
 Table 3.2: Nigeria’s Fiscal Framework 2012-2015 (extract) 
 
Fiscal Item 
2012 
Projection 
(Billion) 
2013 
projection 
(Billion) 
2014 
projection 
(Billion) 
2015 
projection 
(Billion) 
 
Gross Revenue 
 
N9,406.06 
 
N10,097.19 
 
N10,949.97 
 
N11,566.50 
 
Oil Revenue 
 
N6,403.40 
 
N6,506.34 
 
N6,638.33 
 
N6,922.10 
 
Non-oil Revenue 
 
N2,741.15 
 
N3,300.31 
 
N3,998.48 
 
N4,329.15 
 
      Source: Budget Office of the Federation of Nigeria, 2012 
3.3.2 Tax instruments  
As in other jurisdictions, Nigeria employs a mix of tax and non-tax 
instruments to achieve the objectives above. These instruments are 
broadly classified by Omorogbe (2005) as pre-production and post-
production payments. Pre-production payments allow the government to 
raise some revenue prior to the discovery of any oil. The amount that can 
be earned from these payments depends on the deposits that the MOCs 
are expected to find (Omorogbe, 2005). Where the expected find is not 
substantial and the amounts for these payments are fixed high, it can 
serve as a disincentive for investment. Post-production payments, on the 
other hand, are payments after commercial production. These payments 
are basically geared toward capturing as much economic rent as possible 
to the state without hindering continued exploration and development 
activities.  
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Most of the pre-production payment instruments fall under a quasi-tax 
category (e.g. fees, bonuses) but in the case of post-production 
payments some instruments fall under direct taxes (e.g. income taxes), 
others under indirect tax (e.g. royalties, Value added tax), and still some 
others under quasi-tax (e.g. production bonuses, participation interests).  
Fees  
Various fees are paid by the MOCs operating in Nigeria to the 
government. These fees include payments in relation to applications, 
grants, and assignment in respect of: oil exploration licences; oil 
prospecting licences; and oil mining licences. 
An oil exploration licences is a licence granted by the Minister of 
Petroleum Resources authorising the licensee to assume exploration 
activities in the area covered by the licence but excluding land for which 
the grant of oil prospecting licence or mining lease for which licence is 
either granted or currently in force (Petroleum Act, Schedule 1(1), 1990). 
An exploration licence neither confers the holder any exclusive right over 
the licence area nor precludes grant of another licence. It expires at the 
end of every year (Petroleum Act, Schedule 1(2), 1990).  
Oil prospecting licences grant the holder the exclusive right to explore 
and prospect for crude oil under the area covered by the licence 
(Petroleum Act Schedule 1(5), 1990). The holder may, in accordance 
with Schedule 1(7) of the Petroleum Act, carry and dispose any 
petroleum won during the course of prospecting activities in compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. A prospecting licence in Nigeria usually 
does not exceed five years.   
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Oil mining leases is only granted to the holder of oil prospecting licence if 
the holder satisfied all the conditions imposed on the licence and has 
discovered oil in commercial quantity (Petroleum Act, Schedule 1(8), 
1990). The holder has the exclusive right to ―conduct exploration and 
prospecting operation and to win, get, work, store, carry away, transport 
export or otherwise treat petroleum discovered in or under the leased 
area‖ (Petroleum Act Schedule 1(11), 1990). The term of the lease 
should not be more than twenty years. 
Bonuses 
Bonuses are the main source of pre-production payments (Omorogbe, 
2005) and are a typical characteristic of production sharing contracts and 
service contracts. There are two types of bonuses included in Nigeria‘s 
PSC agreement: signature bonus and bid bonus. Because of the 
importance of risk perception in Nigeria, bid bonuses have been, 
relatively, kept modest (ESMAP, 2004). A summary of bonuses applicable 
to onshore and offshore fields in Nigeria is presented in Table 3.3.  
    Table 3.3: Bonuses payable in Nigeria’s upstream sector 
Bonus type On-shore Off-shore 
(<200m water depth) 
Signature $1 million $1million 
Production:  10Mbd 
               50Mbd 
$1million 
$2million 
$2million 
$4million 
      Source: ESPAP, 2004 
 
Rent  
MOCs operating in Nigeria are liable for a rent payable for each calendar 
year for which an oil exploration licence is in force (Petroleum (D&P) 
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Regulation, paragraph 60(1)). Where the exploration licence is in force 
for less than a calendar year, that part shall be regarded as a calendar 
year. Paragraph 60 (2) of the Regulation specified the amount payable 
on oil prospecting licence and oil mining lease as follows: 
1. $10 per square mile or part thereof on an oil prospecting licence 
2. $20 per square kilometre or part thereof on a producing mining 
lease for the first ten years 
3. $15 per square kilometre or part thereof after the expiration of the 
first 15 years of a producing mining lease and on renewal 
One good practice which Nigeria has not adopted is the distinction 
between licence for landward and seaward areas. This distinction, if 
adopted, will enable the government to set appropriate rents for 
landward and seaward licence regimes, which will arguably be of interest 
to the MOCs, instead of charging the unified rents above. 
Royalties  
Nigeria operates a sliding scale royalty system for its joint venture and 
production sharing contracts (see Tables 3.4 & 3.5). 
     Table 3.4: Royalty Rates Applicable to JV Contracts in Nigeria 
Water Depth (Meters) Royalty Rates (%) 
Onshore 20 
Offshore  
Up to 100 18.50 
101-200 16.50 
201-500 12.50 
501-800 8.00 
801-1000 4.00 
Over 1000 0.00 
         Source: ESMAP, 2004 
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Table 3.5: Royalty Rates Applicable to PSCs in Nigeria 
Water Depth (Meters) Royalty Rates (%) 
Onshore 10 
Offshore  
0-100 10 
200-500 12 
500-800 8 
800-1000 4 
>1000 0 
        Source: ESMAP, 2004 
Royalties are paid within 60 days of the date when payment was made 
last. The MOCs are, thus, permitted to pay the amount due for royalty 
not more one month after the due date. Where, however, there is a 
dispute as to the amount of royalty due for a particular quarter, 
Paragraph 61(2) of the Petroleum (D&P) Regulation stipulates the 
following: 
1. The licensee shall pay the amount it admits to be due within the 
time provided  
2. Any further amount agreed upon or found to be due on settlement 
of the dispute shall be paid within seven days of the settlement 
Income tax  
MOCs operating in Nigeria are liable to pay petroleum profits tax (PPT). 
Such liability to pay PPT explicitly exempts them from the liability to pay 
corporate income tax, which is applicable to companies in other sectors 
of the economy. Nigeria‘s PPT is applicable to all the JVs and PSCs in 
force in the country at the rate of 85% and 50% respectively.  
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Education tax21  
Education tax is assessed together with petroleum profit tax of 
companies engaged in petroleum operations in Nigeria. It is assessed at 
a rate of 2% of the assessable profits of a company. Any education tax 
paid by a company engaged in petroleum operations in Nigeria is allowed 
to be deducted, under Section 10 of the PPTA, in arriving at the adjusted 
profits of the company. 
Farm-out tax 
Any MOC that engaged in farm-outs22 is liable to PPT in Nigeria. This 
liability is proposed by the PPTA, 1990 in Schedule 2.9 as follows:  
"...where in any account period of a company, the company owning 
any asset in respect of which it has incurred qualifying expenditure 
wholly and exclusively for the purposes of petroleum operations 
carried on by it, disposes of that asset, the excess of the value of 
that asset, at the date of its disposal, over the residue of that 
expenditure at that date shall... be treated as income of the company 
of that accounting period. 
 
Capital gain tax  
Section 3 of the PPTA defines all forms of property as assets for the 
purpose of Capital Gain tax Act (CGTA) irrespective of whether the asset 
is located in Nigeria or in foreign country. The current CGT charged is 
10% in respect of any gain accruing to the taxpayer. The FIRS, according 
to ESMAP (2004), charges CGT when the parent company of a subsidiary 
                                                          
21
 Education tax is a tax levied on the profits of all companies toward the development educational 
facilities in Nigeria. It is viewed as a societal obligation on all companies. 
22 A farm-out is widely used in the petroleum industry to finance and manage risk in 
exploration activities. It is ―an agreement by one who owns drilling rights to assign all or 
a portion of those rights to another in return for drilling and testing on the property‖ 
(Brown, 1954:25). 
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in Nigeria is acquired even if there is no direct ownership of the company 
in Nigeria and also its name is not changed. 
3.4 Nigerian petroleum tax law 
Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system is governed by the nations Petroleum 
Profits Tax Act (PPTA). This law is, however, complemented by a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the government, through 
the NNPC, and the MOCs.  
3.4.1 Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA) 
The tax regime for petroleum operations in Nigeria is guided by the PPTA 
1990 as amended. The primary objective of the PPTA is to impose a tax 
regime on the profits of the companies engaged in petroleum operations 
in Nigeria and also provides for the assessment and collection of such 
profits. The main provisions of this Act are summarised in the paragraphs 
that follows. 
1. Determination of profits: Profits of a company engaged in E&P 
activities for any accounting period is defined by Section 9 (1) of the 
PPTA as the aggregate of: the proceeds of sale of all chargeable oil sold 
by the company in that period; the value of chargeable oil disposed by 
the company in that period; and all income of the company of that period 
incidental to and arising from any one or more of its petroleum 
operations. 
2. Types of profits: Three different types of profits are identified in 
Section 9 (3), (4), and (5) of the act as: adjusted profit, assessable 
profit, and chargeable profit.  
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 Adjusted profit: this shall be profits of an accounting period after all 
the deduction allowed by Section 10 (1) of the Act and any 
adjustment in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the 
Act 
 Assessable profit:  this shall be the adjusted profit of an accounting 
period after deduction allowed by Section 20 of the Act 
 Chargeable profit: this shall be the assessable profit of an accounting 
period after any deduction allowed by Section 20 of the Act 
3. Tax deductions: In computing the adjusted profit of any accounting 
period, companies engaged in petroleum operations are allowed to 
deduct outgoings and expenses that are wholly, exclusively, necessarily 
incurred, within or outside Nigeria, for the purpose of those operations 
during that period. These expenses, as contained in Section 10 of the 
Act, include rent incurred under oil prospecting or mining licence, all non-
productive rent, royalties in respect of natural gas sold or crude oil won, 
interest expenses on loan borrowed, interest on intercompany loans, 
expenses for repairs of premises, plant, machinery, or fixtures employed 
for the petroleum operation and bad debt directly incurred for the 
business.  
In the case of bad debt, the Act made it clear that deduction is only 
allowed provided that: i) the deduction made shall not exceed the part of 
the debt proved to be doubtful in that accounting period, ii) all bad debts 
recovered are treated as income of the company for that period, and iii) 
the board is satisfied that the debts for which a deduction is claimed 
were either included in the profit of the accounting period for which they 
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were incurred or advances made in the normal course of carrying 
petroleum business. 
While the above deductions are allowable, Section 13 of the Act identified 
a list of expenses that are not allowed to be deducted by companies 
engage in upstream petroleum operations. These expenses include 
expenses or liability not wholly or exclusively expended or incurred for 
petroleum operations, any capital withdrawn or intended to be 
withdrawn, any capital withdrawn other than repairs, any sum 
recoverable under an insurance or contract of indemnity, rent or repair of 
premises not used for the purpose of operation, any sum incurred as 
income tax or other similar charged within or outside Nigeria, and 
depreciation of any building, premises, fixtures or machinery.   
4. Assessable tax: The assessable tax for a company, as indicated 
earlier, is equal to 85% of its chargeable profits of that period (PPTA 
Section 21 (1), 1990). Where, however, a company has not yet 
commenced to make a sale or bulk disposal of chargeable oil under a 
programme of continuous production and sale, its assessable tax for any 
accounting period shall be 65.75% of the profit of that period. 
5. Restrictions on the effect of PITA and other Acts: Section 60 of the 
PPTA prohibits the payment of tax under the provisions of the PITA or 
any other Act on any income or dividend paid out of profits which are 
taken into account in the computation of the amount of any chargeable 
profits upon which tax is charged, assessed, and paid under the 
provisions of the PPTA. 
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6. Double taxation arrangements: Section 61 (1) of the PPTA empowers 
the Minister of Petroleum to make a double taxation arrangement with 
the governments of other countries with the view to affording relief from 
double taxation on tax imposed under the provisions of the PPTA and any 
other tax with similar characteristics imposed by the law of those 
countries.  
Section 62 (1) of the PPTA stipulates that any foreign tax payable, by a 
company engaged in petroleum upstream operations in Nigeria, in 
respect of any income in a country with which Nigeria has double 
taxation arrangement is to be allowed as a credit in respect income in 
Nigeria. Such credits, however, should not, in accordance with Section 62 
(3) of the Act, exceed whichever is the less of the amount of the: 1) 
foreign tax payable on the income or ii) difference between tax 
chargeable under the provisions of the PPTA (before the allowance of 
credit under Section 61) and the tax chargeable if the income were 
excluded in computing profits. 
3.4.2 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
This is a contract between the Nigeria government, through the NNPC, 
and the MOCs that governs all petroleum JV arrangements in the 
country. The MOU gives the tax payer two options for the calculation of 
tax. The first option is based on petroleum profit tax and royalty and the 
second on the revised government take. The tax payer has the right of 
choosing whichever option that gives the lower tax liability.  
The MOU was first introduced in 1986, and then revised in 1991 and 
2000 with the 2000 version being the current version. The objective, as 
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earlier stated, is to guarantee a certain level of profits to the MOCs in 
return for continuation of exploration activities. Some of the incentives of 
the 1986/1991 MOU as summarised by Adepetun (2000) are: 
a. A guaranteed minimum profit margin, under the 1986 MOU, of 
$2.00 per barrel after the deduction of tax and royalty. This 
minimum level was increased to a range of $2.30 to $2.50 per 
barrel equally after tax and royalty. 
b. A reserve addition bonus (RAB) for companies that increase their 
reserves by a level more than its actual production. This bonus is 
to be set off against the company‘s PPT. 
c. Tax reliefs for companies that were able to increase their 
investments each year beyond a certain level 
By granting such incentives, the MOCs are required, in return, to come 
up with a five year proposal aimed at meeting Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
incentives and also to lift agreed volumes of NNPC‘s crude oil on receipt 
of 15 days notice of the latter‘s inability to lift its share of crude oil 
(Omorogbe, 2005). 
The 1991 MOU was revised in 1996 and became effective on 1st January, 
2000. The main intent of the new MOU, according to ESMAP (2004), is to 
update the core features of the 1991 MOU, strengthen incentives to 
contain costs, and remove certain provisions which are found to be costly 
to the government. Some of the incentives of the new MOU include the 
following: 
a. A minimum guaranteed notional margin to the MOCs of $2.50 per 
barrel after tax and equity on their equity share of crude oil. The 
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NNPC, on the other hand, is given a minimum guaranteed margin 
of $1.25 on its crude after tax and royalty.  
b. A minimum guaranteed margin of $2.70 and $1.35 per barrel 
respectively for the MOCs and NNPC once their actual capital 
investment costs exceed an average of $2.00 per barrel in any 
calendar year 
c. A tax inversion rate of 35% was granted to encourage investments 
and maintain cost efficiency 
d. Any tax, levies or other charges by any of the three tiers of the 
Nigerian government, apart from PPT and royalty, shall be set off 
against the MOCs‘ tax liabilities for that year under the Education 
Tax Decree (ETD) 1993 as amended. Any amount outstanding 
after such off set is to be deducted under Section 10 of the PPTA 
1990 as amended. 
The MOU is a particularly complex contract agreement making it very 
difficult for many to understand. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties, 
the MOU has been effective in achieving the government aim of 
stimulating upstream petroleum activities (Omorogbe, 2005). Between 
1986 when the first MOU was signed and the year 2011 Nigeria‘s proven 
oil reserve has increased by 20.5 billion barrels (EIA, 2012).  
3.5 Nigeria’s petroleum fiscal regimes 
The main petroleum fiscal regimes employed in Nigeria are: i) 
Tax/royalty system which governs all JV agreement) and ii) production 
sharing contracts (PSC). 
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3.5.1 The Nigerian Joint Venture (JV) 
This is also called Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) and is the basic 
standard agreement between the government, through the NNPC, and 
the MOCs (NNPC, 2012). The JV agreement, which accounts for over 
95% of crude oil production in Nigeria (ESMAP, 2004), designated one of 
the partners to be an operator who prepares the program of work and 
the annual expenditure budget of the JV to be borne by the partners on 
the basis of their holdings. Each partner has the right to lift and 
separately dispose of its production share of interest subject to the 
payment of PPT and royalty (NNPC, 2012). Nigeria‘s JV model gave each 
of the partners the right to decide and carry on with sole risk operations. 
Other provisions of the JOA, according to Umar (2005), are: 
a. Contribution, by partners, of funds to finance the operations of the 
JV commensurate with their interest in the holdings of the JV 
b. Operator has the freedom to act on behalf of the JV on specific 
matters and also the right to commit the JV up to a certain 
authority limit 
c. A close, perhaps fiduciary, relationship exists between the partners 
with each of them liable only for their respective obligations 
d. Discussion of technical and policy matters is to be made at regular 
meetings of the operating committee or subcommittee with each 
partner equally represented 
3.5.1.1 The number of JVs in Nigeria  
There are six JVs involving the MOCs being operated in Nigeria and in 
each case the NNPC has the major share holding (see Table 3.6).  
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The JV contract operated by Shell contributes more than 40% of Nigeria‘s 
total oil production from over eighty oil fields (NNPC, 2012). It is 
operated largely in dry land or mangrove swamp. Next is the JV contract 
between the NNPC and Chevron. It has been the second largest producer 
in the past with approximately 400,000 barrels of crude oil per day 
(NNPC, 2012). Chevron oil fields are located offshore in shallow water. 
The company is currently targeting a production volume of 600,000 
barrel of crude oil per day.  
JV number three is with Mobil which is being operated in shallow water 
off Akwa Ibom state in the Niger Delta region. It had average production 
of 543,000 and 632,000 barrels per day respectively in 1996 and 1997 
(NNPC, 2012). Within the next five years, Mobil is expected, according to 
industry sources, to overtake Shell as the largest producer of crude oil in 
Nigeria (NNPC, 2012).   
The fourth JV is between NNPC, Agip and Philips petroleum. This venture 
is producing 150,000 barrel of crude oil per day from small onshore 
fields. The fifth JV agreement is between the NNPC and Elf. This 
arrangement produces approximately 125,000 barrels of crude oil per 
day in both onshore and offshore fields. The sixth JV is operated by 
Taxaco and owned by NNPC, Taxaco, and Chevron. This JV, according to 
NNPC (2012), is currently producing about 60,000 barrels of crude oil per 
day from five offshore fields.  
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  Table 3.6: Major Nigerian Oil Production Joint-Ventures 
(Extract) 
Operators  
 
Other 
operators  
NNPC                  Major Producing Fields 
Shell (30%) TotalFinaElf 
(10%) 
55% Bonny or Eastern Division - Nembe, 
Cawthorn Channel, Ekulama, Imo 
River, Kolo Creek, Adibawa and 
Etelelbou  
Forcados or Western Division - 
Forcados Yorki, Jones Creek, 
Olomoro, Otumara, Sapele, Egwa 
and Odidi 
ExxonMobil 
(40%) 
None 60% Edop, Ubit, Oso, Unam and Asasa 
ChevronTexaco 
(40%)  
  
 
None  60% Meren, Okan, Benin River, 
Delta/Delta South, Inda, Meji and 
Robertkiri  
Funiwa, Middelton, North Apoi, 
Pennington and Sengana  
Agip (20%) 
 
Phillips 
(20%) 
60% Obama, Obiafu, M'Bede, Abgara and 
Oshi 
TotalFinaElf 
(40%) 
None 60% Obagi, Aghigo, Okpoko, Upomami, 
Afia and Obodo-Jatumi 
    Source: EIA, 2003 
In recent years, precisely since the year 1996, the NNPC has found itself 
in arrears vis-a -vis its JV funding obligations partly because of the 
difference between the time when approval is given for the corporation‘s 
budget and when cash calls are due for payment and partly because of 
the underfunding of the corporation (ESMAP, 2004). This inability of the 
NNPC to meet its cash call obligations, ESMAP (2004) further noted, 
could either delay the prompt implementation of projects, which in turn 
defers all associated tax revenues and other benefits, or results in a 
massive build up of interest costs for the NNPC should the partners 
continue with the projects by financing NNPC‘s shortfall through bank 
loans as allowed by the joint operating agreement. 
84 
 
Realising the danger of the continued inability of the NNPC to pay its 
cash call commitments, the Nigerian government has, over the years, 
shifted its focus from JV contracts to PSCs as discussed earlier. Similarly, 
the government may choose to adopt alternative methods of financing its 
share of the JV contract. One such alternative is project finance. Under 
this financing option, the bank gives the NNPC the required fund to meet 
it financing obligations in return for a share of NNPC‘s future project 
revenues. Although project finance is a viable option, it is, nevertheless, 
costly because high interest rates and the unwillingness of the lending 
banks to accept any commercial or technical risk. Furthermore, the 
government could also sell all or part of its equity.  
3.5.1.2 The tax/royalty system fiscal provisions 
As indicated above, all the JV partners above are governed by the 
provisions of the tax/royalty system which comprise the following 
1) Royalty: this is imposed, as earlier stated, under the PPTA 1990 as 
amended. The government, in 1995, fixed a rate of 20% for onshore 
fields and rates from 18.5% to 0% for offshore oil fields (see Table 3.5). 
The royalty payable is currently calculated using a price which the 
Minister of Finance may establish, from time to time, as its price for 
Nigerian crude oil.  
2) Petroleum profit tax: as earlier indicated, the PPT rate for JV 
contracts is 85% for companies that have recovered their preproduction 
expenditures. For companies that have not yet recovered their 
preproduction costs, the Act fixed a rate of 65.75%. 
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3) Additional taxes: In addition to the PPT, companies engaged in JV 
contracts are also liable to additional taxes including value added tax 
(VAT), education tax and import duties, among others. 
4) Income tax ring fence: For PPT purposes, the entire exploration 
and exploration activities of all companies engaged in JV contract is ring 
fenced. This prevents the companies from transferring losses from 
upstream operations to downstream operations and also from 
downstream to upstream. 
5) Income tax allowances: In addition to all expenses deductible 
under Section 10 of the Act, MOCs engaged in JV contracts also enjoy 
additional allowances. First, MOCs are granted capital allowances for all 
qualifying capital expenditure incurred (see Table 3.7). Where, however, 
the assessable profit of a company is insufficient such that the capital 
allowances for a given period cannot be taken full, then any amount 
remaining may be carried forward in accordance with Section 15 (5) of 
the PPTA until fully taken.  
Table 3.7: Rate of annual allowance for MOCs in Nigeria  
Year % 
1 20 
2 20 
3 20 
4 20 
5 19 
    Source: Nigerian Petroleum Profits Tax Act, 1990 
Second, all MOCs engaged in JV contracts are granted an investment tax 
credit allowance. This is a tax offset on qualifying capital expenditure 
incurred. The rates allowed differ according to location (Table 3.8). 
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Table 3.8: Investment tax credit for MOCs in Nigeria  
Location Rate (%) 
Onshore oil 5 
Offshore oil  
Up to 100m 10 
101-200 15 
Over 200m 20 
    Source: Nigerian Petroleum Profits Tax Act, 1990 
 
Third, losses incurred by companies engaged in JV contracts in any 
accounting period are allowed to be carried forward indefinitely (PPTA, 
1990). Losses brought forward from previous accounting periods are 
added to adjusted profit to arrive at the period‘s assessable profit.  
3.5.2 The Nigerian Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
The Nigerian Deep Offshore and Inland Basic Production Sharing Contract 
Act (PSCA) 1999 as amended defined a PSC as:  
 ―Any agreement or arrangements made between the Corporation or 
the Holder and any other petroleum exploration and Production 
Company or companies for the purpose of exploration and production 
of oil in the Deep Offshore and Inland Basins‖23 
Historically, a PSC was introduced for the first time in Nigeria in 1973 in 
an agreement between the then Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC) and the Ashland Oil Nigeria Company in respect of Oil Producing 
License (OPL) No. 98/118 for a period of 20 years and renewable for 
another 5 years (Umar, 2005). Until 1991, PSCs were seldom used in the 
Nigerian oil industry. In 1993 the first round of PSC was executed. This 
was followed by the second round of execution in 2000. 
                                                          
23 Section 18 of the PSCA defines the term ―Holder‖ as any Nigerian company holding an 
oil prospecting license or oil mining lease that is located within the Deep Offshore and 
Inland Basin areas of Nigeria.   
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A PSC in Nigeria is governed by statutory and contractually negotiated 
terms between the government, represented by the NNPC, and the 
MOCs. Some of the areas covered by legislation include government 
participation, ownership of petroleum resources, commerciality of oil 
reserves, environmental protection and safety, local content, and 
taxation issues, among others. On the other hand, contractual areas 
subject to negotiation include terms and duration of contract, work 
commitment, rights and obligations of the parties involved in the 
contract, management functions and powers, and accounting procedures 
among others.  
The main provisions of the Nigeria‘s model production contract, as 
outlined by Umar (2005), include the following: 
a. All rights to the contract areas are held by the NNPC, 
b. The NNPC is responsible for appointing the MOCs as contractors 
under the arrangement giving them exclusive right to petroleum 
activities in the areas covered by the contracts. 
c. The MOCs are permitted by the contract to operate for a period of 
30 years representing 10 years for exploration and 20 years for oil 
mining. 
d. The MOCs are mandated by the contract to make available 
sufficient funds for operations and also to guarantee and bear the 
risks of operating costs. 
e. The contractors are also required to provide employment to 
Nigerians. In addition they are required to train Nigerians and 
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encourage the government drive for the actualisation of local 
content with a view towards achieving technological transfer. 
f. No restriction is imposed on cost recovery by the MOCs. They are, 
instead, allowed to recover operating expenses within the first five 
years and to enjoy an agreed percentage of the profit. 
In order to ensure that the above provisions are adhered to, PSCA 
required the establishment of a management committee within thirty 
days of the date the contract becomes effective. The committee 
comprises ten members, with five members each from the NNPC and the 
contractor. The power to appoint the chairman of the committee rests 
with the NNPC; the power to appoint the secretary rests with the 
contractor. Similarly, the NNPC, through the committee, monitors and 
controls the operations of all the companies engaged in PSCs. These 
powers to monitor and control the operations of the contract, as outlined 
by PSC Act include: 
a. The revision and approval of work plans and budget estimates. 
b. Consideration and decision-making on matters relating to 
relinquishment of contract areas that is consistent with the 
provisions of the contract and petroleum laws. 
c. Monitoring of contractors to ensure they correctly implement the 
provisions of the accounting, lifting, procurement, and project 
implementation procedures and all amendments and revisions 
thereto as agreed to by the parties. 
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d. Monitoring of contractors to ensure that they provide annual 
budget estimates for building desired capacity of the companies‘ 
personnel in all aspects of petroleum operations. 
One of the important aspects of the PSC is how oil is shared between the 
host government and the oil companies (see Figure 3.1). In Nigeria, oil 
production under a PSC is shared as cost oil, royalty oil, tax oil, and 
profit oil. 
a. Royalty oil: this is to be allocated to the NNPC in such a quantity 
that it will generate a sum equal to the actual royalty payable 
during each month  
b. Cost oil: this is to be allocated to the MOC in such a quantity that 
it will raise an amount sufficient enough for the recovery of 
operating cost.  
c. Tax oil:  this is to be allocated to the NNPC in such a quantity that 
it will generate an amount equal to the PPT liability payable each 
month. 
d. Profit oil: this represents the balance of crude oil available after 
the deduction of royalty oil, tax oil, and cost oil; it is to be 
allocated to each party based on a predetermined sharing formula. 
The PSC, unlike the JV contracts, releases Nigeria from the burden of 
providing up-front cash calls needed for operation. Moreover, lack of E&P 
expertise coupled with the right of ownership of the concessions make 
the PSC a viable option for Nigeria. However, in an investigation into an 
alleged missing amount of N2.8 billion from the NNPC account in 1980, it 
was found that the PSC between the NNOC and Ashland Oil had no 
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benefits whatsoever for the NNPC; the underpinning features of the PSC 
were inequitable and lopsided  in favour of Ashland oil (Nlerem, 2010). 
Accordingly, various revised versions of PSCs were issued. 
In 1990, Nigeria issued a model PSC which provided for 30% as cost oil, 
40% as tax oil, and 30% as profit oil to be shared between the NNPC 
(35%) and MOCs (65%), with taxes due on the MOCs to be paid out of 
their 65% share in accordance with the provisions of the companies 
income tax act (CITA)24. Similarly, in 1991 Nigeria issued another model 
PSC that modified the earlier version. The model provided, among other 
things, that tax oil is to be taken in kind by the government while the 
MOCs are to recover their operating costs from the cost oil sold by the 
company.  
These modifications to PSCs were necessary in order to ensure the 
government achieved the maximum gain possible from the use of PSCs 
in Nigeria. Despite all the modifications over the years, PSCs in Nigeria, 
Nlerem (2010) asserts, seems to be attractive to the MOCs because of 
the favourable fiscal regime which it gives to them.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 See Cap C 21, Law of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
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Figure 3.1: Nigerian PSC Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: NNPC, 2011   
3.5.2.1 PSC fiscal provisions   
The Nigerian PSC is mainly governed by the provisions of the PPTA as 
amended and the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin PSC Act of 1999 as 
amended. Some of the tax provisions include the following:  
1. Royalty: the royalties payable under PSCs are determined by 
relevant sections of the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Act, 1999 (as 
amended) and the provisions of the Petroleum (D&E) Regulations, 1990 
(as amended (see Table 3.5 for the rates)). Considering the fact that 
most Nigerian deep offshore oil fields are deeper that the 1000 meters 
limit where the royalty payable is 0%, it will be right to conclude that 
royalties on offshore PSCs are effectively not paid.  
2. Petroleum profit tax: section 3 of the deep offshore and inland 
basic act provides for a PPT of 50% flat rate, as earlier noted, on the 
chargeable profits of companies engaged in PSCs in Nigeria. This tax 
liability shall be split between the NNPC and MOC in the same ratio as 
profit oil is shared.   
NNPC 
Profit Oil 
Production 
NNPC Govt of Nigeria 
Tax Oil 
Contractor  
Royalty 
Oil 
MOU Tax Credit 
Shallow Water 
Contractor 
profit Oil  
Cost Oil 
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3. Investment tax credit/allowance: Section 4 of the deep offshore 
and inland basin provides for 50% investment tax credit on qualifying 
capital expenditure incurred up to 1st July, 1998 and a 50% investment 
tax allowance thereafter. Investment tax credit is deducted from the total 
amount of tax payable while investment tax allowance is deducted from 
taxable income.  
4. Cost recovery: MOCs engaged in PSCs are allocated enough cost 
oil to enable them to recover their operating costs which comprise 
tangible drilling costs, capital expenditures, intangible drilling costs, and 
qualifying non-capital expenditure. All capital costs shall be recovered in 
equal instalments over a period of five years or over the remaining life of 
the contract, whichever is less. However, qualifying non-capital 
expenditures are, on the other hand, recovered in the year in which the 
expenditures are incurred.    
5. Ring fencing of operating expenses: Section 8 of the deep offshore 
and inland basin act provides for the ring-fencing of all operating 
expenses incurred on different oil fields. Although, the 1993 PSC appears 
to have permitted the consolidation of operating expenses on different 
licenses for tax purposes (see Clause 8(1) (b) of the 1993 PSC), the 
NNPC contends that the interpretation given to the clause is for the 
purpose of cost recovery in respect of an MOC that has more than one oil 
prospecting license, in which proceeds from each license area is ring-
fenced in accordance with Section 8(1) of the deep offshore act. 
6. Profit split: the balance remaining after the allocation of royalty, 
tax, and cost oil, as discussed earlier, is split between the NNPC and the 
MOC according to predetermined percentages. Where a discovery cannot 
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be commercially developed at the profit splits the PSC allows the NNPC 
and the contractor to come together and agree on an appropriate terms 
and conditions that will allow for the development of such discovery for 
the benefits of both the NNPC and the MOC. Table 3.9 below presents 
Nigeria‘s current profit splits.      
 
Table 3.9: Profit split between the NNPC and the MOCs 
Production  
(barrels) 
2002 profit split (%) 
Government Contractor 
0-350 30 70 
351-700 35 65 
701-1000 50 50 
1001-1500 55 45 
1501-2000 65 35 
Over 2000 Negotiable 
      Source: Chukwu, 2009 
3.6 Administration of Nigerian petroleum tax system 
This section reviews the administration of Nigerian petroleum tax system 
under two headings: tax functions and administrative institutions. 
3.6.1 Tax functions    
The administrative functions of the Nigerian petroleum tax system, as 
the case with most petroleum tax regimes across the world, is broadly 
classified into routine and non-routine functions. 
3.6.1.1 Routine functions  
As stated earlier, routine functions involve four different but interrelated 
activities: registration of taxpayers; processing of tax returns; making of 
tax assessment; and collection of tax. 
94 
 
First of all, as in most oil producing countries, the number of MOCs 
operating in the Nigerian petroleum sector is few. There are currently 18 
MOCs operating in Nigeria (NIPC, 2012). Of this number, Shell, Chevron, 
Taxaco, Mobil, Agip, Elf, and Total are the major operators and together 
they produce over 90% of Nigerian crude oil (Nwokeji, 2007).  
Second, Section 30 (1) of the PPTA, 1990 (as amended) requires MOCs, 
for each accounting period, to make up their final accounts and also 
prepare their estimated adjusted and assessable profits for the period 
and compute their estimated tax liabilities for that period and send them 
to the board. Where an MOC cannot deliver its accounts and particulars 
within the time prescribed under section 30 of the Act, or fail to comply 
with notice given to it under section 31 or 32 of the Act or extension 
granted to it under section 34 of the Act, the board may in accordance 
with the provisions of section 35 (3) proceed to estimate the amount of 
tax to be paid by such MOC and make assessment accordingly. This  
Third, tax assessments for all companies engaged in petroleum 
operations in Nigeria are made in such a form and manner that the board 
authorise and shall contain, according to section 37(1) of the PPTA, the 
name and addresses of the companies assessed and also in respect of 
each MOC for each of its accounting periods, the accounting period 
concern, amount of chargeable profits, assessable tax and chargeable tax 
for that period. A copy of such assessment and of each amended or 
revised assessment is then filed in a list which shall constitute a list 
called the assessment list (section 37(3)). All MOCs whose names appear 
on an assessment in the assessment list are served with a notice of 
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assessment by the board stating its accounting period, chargeable 
profits, assessable profits and chargeable tax charged and assessed, 
place for the payment of the tax and an information concerning its right 
for objection as allowed under section 38 (2) of the Act. 
Fourth, the collection of taxes, except in cases where objection or appeal 
is pending, in which case the board shall only enforce payment for the 
part which is not in dispute, shall in accordance with section 45 of the 
PPTA be payable in equal monthly instalments together with a final 
instalment.  
The first monthly instalment is to be paid not later than the third month 
into the accounting period in an amount equal to one-twelfth of the total 
liability or any other equal monthly proportion where the accounting 
period is less than a year. Each of the subsequent instalments shall be 
due not later than the last day of the month in review. The thirteenth or 
the final payment shall be due within 21 days after a notice of 
assessment is served on the company. 
Where a tax due remains unpaid, section 46 of the PPTA imposes a 
penalty of an amount equal to 5% of the instalment due be added to the 
instalment outstanding. Accordingly, the board shall proceed to issue a 
demand notice to such defaulting MOCs and if payment is not effected 
within a month from the date of the service of the notice, the board may 
then proceed to enforce payment through all legal means including suing 
the company in a court of competent jurisdiction.   
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3.6.1.2 Non-routine functions  
As Calder and McPherson (2008) noted, non-routine functions include 
valuation of petroleum resources, tax audit, and dispute resolution. In 
this subsection, these issues as they relate to the Nigerian petroleum 
taxation system are discussed. 
First, crude oil valuation in Nigeria, just like in any other oil producing 
nation, involves the two basic administrative challenges of establishing 
production volume and oil price. As discussed earlier, the price for 
Nigerian crude oil is established, from time to time, by the Minister of 
Finance. On the other hand, the establishment of production volume in 
Nigeria is the responsibility of Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). 
The basic activities employed in volume produced are flow metering and 
temperature measurement. Flow metering is the process of using a 
meter to measure the volume of crude oil as it passes through pipelines 
while temperature measurement is used to determine the bulk crude oil 
in the storage tank for the computation of standard volume of crude oil.    
Second, the audit of companies engaged in oil operations in Nigeria is 
carried out by the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI) through reputable independent auditors that are selected 
through an open, transparent, and competitive process (NEITI, 2005). 
The audit generally covers three broad areas, namely: financial audit; 
physical audit; and process/governance audit. 
a. Financial audit: this involves the examination of financial flows and 
the determination of the chain of the custody of finances in order 
to hold specific agencies accountable. This audit reconciles a 
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company‘s payments made by MOCs with receipts by the CBN and 
with the records of the FIRS and DPR. The reconciliation is 
achieved by verifying the calculations of the FIRS and the DPR with 
a sample of some selected MOCs‘ tax returns and royalty 
statements.   
b. Physical audit: this exercise ensures that the volume of crude oil 
produced is correctly reported by the MOCs and also ensures that 
each MOC‘s reported production volume agrees with the volumes 
the government uses for royalty and tax calculations. This audit, 
therefore, looks into some highly technical areas characterised by 
metering and temperature and pressure measurements, among 
others.  
c. Process audit: this is principally on governance issues in the 
industry. It investigates how the major agencies in the sector run 
the business including an assessment of whether the Crude Oil 
Marketing Department (COMD) of the NNPC is accurately pricing 
the government share of the equity oil. The audit also includes an 
investigation of the integrity of NNPC‘s upstream division.  
Third, an oil company that is not satisfied with an assessment made upon 
it may complain to the board for amendment. Where the board refuses to 
amend the assessment as desired by the company, the company may, 
within 30 days after notice of refusal is served to it, appeal against the 
assessment to the appropriate Appeal Commissioners upon giving a 
written notice to the board and to the secretary to such Commissioners. 
Section 41(2) of the PPTA requires the company to specify the following 
in its appeal: 
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a. The official number of the assessment and the period to which it 
relates; 
b. The amount of tax charged by the assessment; 
c. The date in which the board served the company with a notice of 
refusal to amend the assessment; 
d. The precise reasons for appealing against the assessment; and 
e. A formal address of the company to be used by the secretary of 
the appeal Commissioners for the purpose of service of notices, 
precepts, or other documents. 
Similarly, where the company is still dissatisfied with the decision of the 
Appeal Commissioner, section 42 of the PPTA entitles such company to 
appeal to the Federal High Court after giving notice in writing to the 
board within 30 days after the commissioners‘ decision. 
All appeals are heard in closed door unless otherwise directed by the 
judge on the application of the appellant. The cost for any appeal is 
discretionarily fixed by the judge hearing the appeal. Where an 
assessment becomes final and conclusive, section 43(2) of the Act 
requires any tax overpaid be repaid. 
3.6.2 Petroleum tax agencies  
Nigeria is one of the countries that assigned the responsibility of 
petroleum tax administration to many agencies. Specifically, there are 
five agencies responsible for the administration of petroleum tax in 
Nigeria. These agencies, according to ESMAP (2004), are: Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS); Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN); National 
Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), Department of 
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Petroleum Resource (DPR); and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
(MPR). A brief discussion of their responsibilities as they relate to 
petroleum taxation is given below 
1.  Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS): in accordance with the FIRS 
(Establishment) Act of 2007 the FIRS is responsible for the assessment 
and collection of PPT and other taxes accruing to the government from 
JVs and PSCs. As the nation‘s main tax institution, it empowered by 
Section 8 of the FIRS Act (2007) to assess, collect, account and enforce 
payment of all taxes due to the government from all the MOCs operating 
in Nigeria.  
2.   Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN):  this is the apex bank of the nation. 
Its main objectives are to: issue legal tender currency in Nigeria; 
maintain external reserve sufficient enough to safeguard the 
international value of the Nigerian currency; promote monetary stability 
and also ensure sound financial system; and act as banker and financial 
adviser to the Nigerian Federal government. In relation to petroleum 
taxation, the CBN plays the following roles: 
a. To act as depository for royalties, petroleum profit, and all other 
direct petroleum taxes. The CBN maintains offshore bank accounts 
into which the MOCs are instructed to pay in all petroleum taxes 
due to the government; and  
b. To provide information on all taxes it collected for reconciliation 
with the petroleum tax assessment of the Federal Inland Revenue 
Service (FIRS) and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR).   
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3.   National Petroleum Investment Management Service (NAPIMS): this 
is the upstream wing of the NNPC and oversees Nigeria‘s investments in 
the JVs, PSCs, and SCs. The main responsibility of NAPIMS is to manage, 
on behalf of the NNPC, all Federal government‘s interest in upstream 
petroleum operations. Specifically, the NAPIMS ensures the maximisation 
of petroleum profit tax and guarantee a higher margin on investment 
through efficient mechanisms for monitoring and reducing cost. It also 
ensures that all the nation‘s petroleum contractual arrangements (i.e. 
JVs, PSCs, and SCs) are efficient and effective. 
4.  Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR): this is the regulatory arm 
of the Nigerian petroleum sector. It is charged with the responsibility for 
regulating, enforcing, and monitoring the activities of the oil sector in 
accordance with the provisions of relevant laws which include; Petroleum 
Act (1969); Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations; Petroleum Offshore Oil 
Revenue Act (1973); and NNPC Act (1977). Its specific functions and 
responsibilities include: 
a. to supervise all the operations being carried out in the nation‘s 
petroleum industry under licences and leases in order to ensure 
compliance with all applicable laws and regulations in accordance 
with the industry‘s good practice; 
b. to advise the government and other relevant agencies on technical 
matters and policies that are relevant in impacting on the 
administration and control of the nation‘s petroleum resources; 
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c. to ensure timely and adequate payments of all rents and royalties 
by all the companies engaged in petroleum operations as at when 
due; and 
5.  Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR): The MPR is the top 
government body charged with the responsibility for the formulation and 
implementation of government policies and objectives relating to the 
nation‘s petroleum industry. In relation to petroleum taxation, the 
Ministry has the role of administering government interests in the 
petroleum sector in order to maximise full economic benefits expected 
from the nation‘s petroleum resources and also ensures the optimisation 
of government interests in all petroleum contractual arrangement. 
3.7 Conclusion  
On a general note, this chapter reviewed the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system with emphases on its design and implementation. The chapter 
reviewed the Nigerian petroleum tax policy objectives as well as the mix 
of tax instruments employed. Similarly, a review was also made of the 
laws governing the Nigerian petroleum tax system covering both the 
PPTA as well as the MOU between the NNPC and the MOCs. The two main 
Nigerian petroleum fiscal regimes were also reviewed. The chapter also 
reviewed both the administrative functions as well as agencies of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system.   
A number of issues were revealed from the analysis. First, it is evident 
that the Nigerian petroleum policy has undergone a series of reforms, all 
of which were geared toward the government objective of controlling the 
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oil resources and also to get a greater share of the oil revenue. Second, 
it is also clear from the review that central to the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system is the desire to ensure that maximum revenue is accrued to the 
government from oil and gas activities while at the same time 
guaranteeing the investors a reasonable return on investment. This is 
consistent with what all oil producing nations are pursuing.  
Third, the review also revealed that Nigeria employs a mixture of 
petroleum tax instruments. This is done in order to broaden the revenue 
base of the government, on the one hand, and also to create an identity 
of interest between the government and the MOCs. Fourth, the analysis 
revealed that Nigeria is moving away from its traditional JV contracts to 
PSCs. The JV arrangement is becoming out of fashion in Nigeria because 
of the growing inability of the government to meet its cash calls 
commitments.  
Finally, it is evident in the analysis that Nigeria employs a multi-agency 
approach in the administration of its petroleum tax system. This 
approach, as noted earlier, has the advantage of reducing the risk of 
serious error and collusion as no single office controls the entire 
administrative procedures. 
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Chapter Four 
Economic Rent as a Theoretical Framework for the Design of a 
Petroleum Tax System 
4.1 Introduction  
The concept of economic rent has, historically, underpinned the work of 
economists (Wessel, 1967) and is broadly divided into two versions; i) 
Ricardian rent and ii) Paretian rent (see Wessel, 1967). The Ricardian 
version has its origin traced through Marshal and Mill and then to 
Ricardo, whiles the Paretian version has its origin from the work of 
Pareto25. Although definitional differences exist between the two 
versions26, many writers do not recognise such difference and thus use 
them interchangeably, while those that see the dissimilarity adopt either 
of the definitions that suit their thinking (Wessel, 1967).  
In spite of the differences that exist between the Ricardian and Paretian 
School of thoughts, as explained above, they are, however, united on the 
ground that economic rent affects land only. This position is strongly 
opposed by modern economists, who hold the view that ―all factors 
including land have alternatives. Therefore payment of rent should be 
attributed to all factors‖ (Jain and Ohri, 2009:308).  
 
                                                          
25 Alfred Marshal, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, and Vilfredo Pareto were among the 
most influential economists of their times.   
26 The Ricardian define rent as ―... the excess amount earned by a factor over the sum 
necessary to induce it to do its work‖, while Paretians view economic rent as ―.... the 
excess of earnings over the amount necessary to keep the factor in its present 
occupation‖ (Shepherd, 1970:209). 
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There are two basic reasons for this modern view on economic rent. 
These reason, Jain and Ohri (2009) noted, are: i) land has alternative 
uses and part of the rent paid for putting it into any one use would 
necessarily have to be paid to keep it in its present use, and ii) other 
factors of production (labour, capital, and enterprise) may also earn 
surpluses over and above what is necessary to keep them in their 
present use. It, thus, appears that all factors of production are alike: part 
of the payment for these factors of production is necessary to keep them 
from transferring to other jobs and the other part is a surplus over and 
above what is necessary to keep the factors in their present use. It is this 
surplus, which is not only peculiar to land, that is called economic rent in 
the view of the modernists. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 4.2 
discusses the meaning of the concept of economic rent. This is followed 
by section 4.3 which explains the different types of economic rent. 
Section 4.4 addresses the application of economic rent in the petroleum 
industry. The reasons for the adoption of the economic rent theory as a 
theoretical framework for the design of petroleum taxation are discussed 
in section 4.5. Section 4.6 deals with some of the theories, other than 
economic rent, that could be applied as a framework for the design of 
petroleum tax system. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.   
4.2 The meaning of economic rent  
Economic rent (see Figure 4.1), just like any other economic concept, 
has been variously defined. Tollison (1982) defines it as the ―excess 
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return above normal levels that take place in competitive market‖. 
Dickson (1999:1), on the other hand, sees economic rent is: 
"The true value of the natural resource, the difference between the 
revenues generated from resource extraction and the costs of 
extraction. These costs include the costs of employing factors of 
production and their opportunity costs" 
Economic rent, according to Banfi et al (2003:2), is defined as: 
"The surplus return above the value of the capital, labour and other 
factors of production employed to exploit the resource. It is the 
surplus revenue of the resource after accounting for the costs of 
capital and labour inputs". 
Similarly, Stiglitz (1996:298-99), describes economic rent as:  
―Economic rent is the difference between the price that is actually 
paid and the price that would have to be paid in order for the good or 
service to be produced . . . Anyone who is in the position to receive 
economic rents is fortunate indeed, because these ―rents‖ are 
unrelated to effort . . . Firms earn economic rent to the extent that 
they are more efficient than other firms . . . Consider a market in 
which all firms except one have the same average cost curve, and 
the market price corresponds to the minimum average cost of these 
firms. The remaining firm is super-efficient, so its average costs are 
far below those of the other firms. The company would have been 
willing to produce at a lower price, at its minimum average cost. 
What it receives in excess of what is required to induce it to enter the 
market are rents—returns on the firm‘s superior capabilities . . .‖  
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Cordes (1995:26), on the other hand, describes economic rent in a 
different but consistent way as:  
―The difference between existing market price for a commodity or 
input factor and its opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is the 
reservation price or minimum amount owners of the goods or service 
would be willing to accept . . . Thus, economic rent is a surplus—a 
financial return not required to motivate desired economic behaviour. 
Its existence implies predominantly distributional rather than 
resource allocation consequences. From a public policy viewpoint all 
rents could be taxed without altering current decisions on production 
and consumption. Resource owners would still earn acceptable or 
needed returns on their investment so output would remain the 
same. Consumption levels would not change because under 
competitive conditions producers cannot shift the tax burden to 
raising prices. As a result, economic rent could be redefined as the 
magnitude of returns which could be taxed away without causing the 
pattern of resource use to be altered‖. 
Economic rent is, therefore, extra revenue earn by investors. It is a 
bonus (Raja (1999) which even if taxed away can still allow companies to 
realise a rate of return acceptable on their investment. As a result, many 
scholars, including Rowland and Hann (1987), are of the view that 
economic rent constitutes a justifiable base for petroleum taxation.  
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 Figure 4.1: Division of production value into economic rent and 
economic cost of production 
      
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
                
 
 Source: Anderson, 2006 
 
 
 
4.3 Types of economic rent 
Different types of economic rent have been identified in the economic 
literature. The knowledge of the differences that exist between them, 
which is important for taxation policy, would serve as an important step 
in explaining the suitability of economic rent as a base for petroleum 
taxation.  
4.3.1 Scarcity rent  
Scarcity rent is also referred to as Hotelling rent27. It is the ―excess of 
marginal revenue above marginal cost‖ (Khanna, 2001:17). In a more 
detailed way, Kooten and Bulte (2001:65) define scarcity rent as: 
 ―The difference between marginal revenue and marginal production cost 
that can only come as a result of the natural or policy induced scarcity of the 
resource‖. It is the rent that results from the scarcity of resource‖.  
                                                          
27 The term scarcity rent is referred to as Hotelling rent because it was first coined by 
Harold Hotelling in 1931 in his famous work ―The Economics of Exhaustible Resources‖  
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Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg (1999:215), on the other hand, define 
scarcity rent as ―the difference between price and extraction cost when 
resource is extracted such that the net benefit maximised over time‖. 
Scarcity rent, therefore, represents the ―forgone future profits as a result 
of extraction today‖ (Dickson, 1999:2).  
Scarcity rent, Raja (1999) noted, occurs only in the short run before they 
are computed away. Such rents, Kooten and Bulte (2001:65) noted, are 
―earnings over and above that required to maintain a firm in business in 
the short run‖.  
The intuition behind the Hotelling rule28 is clear; net price most rises at 
the rate of interest as a condition of equilibrium, if not the present value 
of the net price that could be received from selling the resource in some 
periods would be higher in some other periods. The implication is that, 
resource owners would not be indifferent about when to extract and sell 
their resources.  
4.3.2 Differential rent 
This is also called the Ricardian rent. Ricardo was of the view that land 
varied in fertility and when demand was economically sufficient to grow 
corn on less fertile land, high profits were earned by anyone owning very 
fertile land.  
Ricardo (1971) is of the view the all units of land have different grade in 
terms of fertility and location. The application of the same amount of 
                                                          
28 Hotelling rule refers to the principle behind economics of exhaustible resources as 
coined by Harold Hotelling, and it states: ―for a nonrenewable resource, net price (market 
price minus marginal cost) must rise at the rate of interest in competitive market 
equilibrium‖ (Livernois, 2009).  
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factors of production – labour, capital, and other cooperating resources – 
on these units of land, Ricardo (1971) argued, gives rise to differences in 
productivity levels. This difference or the excess arising from the superior 
unit of land over the inferior units is what Ricardo (1971) called economic 
rent.   
Although some scholars have argued that corn was expensive because of 
the high rents paid to land owners, the argument central to the Ricardo‘s 
theory was that price of corn was a function of supply and not the levels 
of rents as Ricardo (1971:44) rightly put:  
 ―Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because 
corn is high and it has been justly observed that no reduction would 
take place in the price of corn, although the landlord should forego 
the he hole of their rent‖. 
Figure 4.1 below presents a diagrammatical analysis of the Ricardian rent 
theory. From the figure, rent is indicated on the vertical axis and quantity 
of land on the horizontal axis. The vertical line SS1 indicated the fixed 
supply of land such that OS hectares will be supplied whatever the rent 
offered or paid, if above zero. The demand for land is derived from the 
demand for corn (that is the product) and is indicated by the downward 
slope DD1. The equilibrium position in the land market fixes the rent paid 
at OR on the vertical axis.  
From the above analysis, two conclusions can be deduced: i) land rent is 
purely determined by demand. This is because as supply is fixed, any 
variations in rents can occur through shifts in the demand curve DD1, 
and ii) taxes levied on rents will neither affect the rent paid nor the 
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quantity of land supplied. Land is fixed at all prices and rent paid will be 
OR, no matter what proportion of this is taken in tax (see Figure 4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2: Ricardian Rent Theory 
Rent    
  N        
  D                       S1 
  R              D1 
             
  O                        S  Land 
4.3.3 Quasi rent    
Quasi rent was first introduced by the Economist Alfred Marshall but he 
stopped short of giving explicit definition of the term29. Marshall was, 
however, of the view that differential surpluses that arise from a factor of 
production whose all times supply is fixed should be called rent, while 
temporary gains which a factor of production earns due to temporary 
limitation of its supply should be called quasi rent 
 
 
                                                          
29 While there were no disputes as to the fact the concept of Quasi rent was introduced by 
Marshall, Stonier and Hague (1964:292) are of the view that Marshall has not explicitly 
define the term quasi rent when they state thus ―there is no explicit, formal definition of 
quasi-rent in Marshall, and the term has been used both by him and by other writers in a 
variety of related but not identical senses‖.  
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Stonier and Hague (1964:93) viewed quasi rent thus:  
―The quasi-rent of a machine is its total short-run receipts less the 
total costs of hiring the variable factors used with it and of keeping 
the machine in running order in the short run ....‖ 
 
Kooten and Bulte (2001:65), on the other hand, define quasi rent as 
―earnings over and above that required to maintain a firm in business in 
the short run‖. Short run rent, Nakhle (2009) noted, is the difference 
between market price and supply prices of variable inputs such as labour 
and power and is expected to be greater than long term rents.  
4.4 Economic rent within the context of a Rentier State 
The meaning and concept economic rent has adequately been discussed 
in the preceding sections. In this section, the concept of economic rent is 
explored further within the context of the theory of the rentier state30. 
The theory was first coined by Hossein Mahdavy and has since been 
employed by Middle East experts in their discussion about the Arab 
community (Yates, 1996).  
In its broadest sense, rentier state is defined as ―those countries that 
receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external economic rent‖ 
(Mahdavy, 1970:428). It is also defined as ―a state reliant not on 
extraction of the domestic population‘s surplus production but on 
externally generated revenues, or rents, such as those derived from oil‖ 
(Anderson, 1990:61). The stage at which an oil producing country could 
be called a rentier state is arbitrary. However, Beblawi (1987) is of the 
                                                          
30 The theory of the rentier state is a theory that concerns with the mode of the 
development and nature of states whose economies is dominated by external rent 
particularly oil rent (Yates, 1996).  
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view that for a state to be classified a rentier state four basic 
characteristics must be present. First, the economy must be one where 
rent predominates. Second, the origin of such rent must be external 
source meaning domestic rent, even if it is substantial, is not enough. 
Third, only few are engaged in the generation of rent with the majority 
involved in distribution and consumption. Fourth, the government is the 
principal receiver of the rent.  
The main feature of a rentier state, according to Luciani (1987), is that 
the external rent coming into the state tends to free the state from the 
need to extract income from the domestic economy. With the significant 
contribution coming from the oil sector, Mahdavy (1970:432) noted, oil 
producing countries are able to embark on large public expenditure 
programs without necessarily resorting to domestic taxation. Mahdavy 
(1970:429) further noted that the prices of oil export are clearly 
separated from the cost of domestic production such that Mahdavy 
(1970:429) put thus: 
―the input requirement of the oil industry from the local economies – 
at least for the inputs that have an opportunity cost – are so 
insignificant that for all practical purposes one can consider oil 
revenue almost as  free gift of nature‖ 
While classification as a rentier state is synonymous to oil-riches, there 
are, nevertheless, the consequences of being a rentier state, among 
which include i) slow rate of economic growth relative to their resource 
poor countries counterpart (Sachs, 2000) and  ii) heavy dependence on 
importation of goods and services instead of providing the momentum for 
the growth of productive sector.       
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Kuru (2002) asserts that most of the rentier states are from the Middle 
East and North Africa while Anderson (1990), on the other hand, include 
Nigeria and Venezuela as among the rentier states outside the Middle 
East. The classification of Nigeria as a rentier state was a direct result of 
the oil boom of the 1970s and 80s (Falola and Heaton, 2008). While the 
oil boom earns a considerable amount of revenue for the government, it 
nevertheless causes serious setbacks to the Nigerian economy, 
particularly its agricultural sector as discussed in chapter one. 
4.5 Application of the concept of economic rent in the petroleum 
industry  
The application of the concept of economic rent in the petroleum sector 
rests on the close association of issues in the mineral industry with the 
term economic rent. These issues, as Tilton (2003) noted, include: 
1. The basic raw materials that are being exploited in the mining 
sector are in most jurisdictions owned by the government. For this 
reason, the state should receive compensation above the normal taxes 
paid by other industries. This addresses the idea of surplus return;  
2. Mineral resources are nonrenewable; as such an opportunity cost 
is incurred for consuming the resources today. In effect, the availability 
of these resources in the future either will rely on poorer quality of 
resources that are expensive or the usage of alternative materials and;  
3. Acknowledging the fact that many projects have not been earning 
competitive returns on their investments, there are some others that are 
regarded as bonanzas. Certainly, these bonanzas tend to draw the 
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attention of the public and raise questions on why the proceeds from 
mines should be equitably shared among the company and government.      
On a more specific term, each of the three types of economic rent 
discussed above can accurately be applied in the petroleum sector. This 
is explained in the following subsections.  
4.5.1 Scarcity rent  
Petroleum is an exhaustible resource; once burned, it cannot be reused. 
Against this background, Hotelling (1931) pointed out that in the case of 
all exhaustible resources price should exceed marginal cost of production 
even if the market were perfectly competitive. This notion, called the 
Hotelling rule, can best be understood using an illustration. 
Suppose for some unavoidable reasons, the world production of crude oil 
could only be 80% next year relative to the amount being produced this 
year. If there is a short run price elasticity of demand of 15% that would 
imply next year‘s price of crude oil would increase, then it would pay 
anyone to buy the crude oil today and store it with a view to selling into 
next year‘s favourable market. On the other hand, it would be more 
efficient for the owner of any crude oil reserve to leave the oil in the 
ground and then wait to produce it next year when the price has risen.  
Under a competitive market, for the owner to surrender the use of his 
exhaustible resource, he will be given a compensation that just leaves 
him or her indifferent between producing now or in the future. This 
compensation for the sacrifice is the economic rent.  
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4.5.2 Differential Rent 
Ricardo, as noted above, holds the view that agricultural land could be 
separated according to its fertility; the most fertile land produces a given 
quality of food at a lower cost than the second most fertile class and so 
on.  
Petroleum, just like agricultural land, also differs in quality and comes in 
various types defined according to their physical or chemical properties. 
However, the most common approach is to describe crude oil by its 
density, often referred to as gravity number (Hook, 2009). These 
varieties of crude oil are broadly classified in two main types, viz; light 
and heavy.  
Refining of heavy and sour crude oils is complicated31, and thus cost 
ineffective. Lighter crude oil, on the other hand, is easier to distil into 
high value, high quality products. As a result they are sold at a premium 
higher than heavier crude oil. This analysis concurred with Ricardo‘s 
notion of economic rent. 
4.5.3 Quasi rent  
Quasi rent, as noted above, is returns that accrue to firms from past 
investment and innovative practices. Firms can adopt innovative 
practices and undertake strategic investments in areas such as 
advertising and manpower training to achieve higher productivity and 
                                                          
31 Refining of heavy crude oils is complicated because of the presence in them of many 
characteristics - low gravity, high viscosity, high initial boiling point, high carbon residue 
and low hydrogen – which require great deal of processing to yield quality products 
(Nygren, 2008).   
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better reputation that would eventually lead to higher prices or lower 
costs.  
In the petroleum industry, companies expect returns from their 
investments, part of which represents a return on exploration 
expenditure that might have been undertaken in the past. This return is 
called a quasi rent on exploration. This rent, though it might not allow 
the generation of satisfactory return on exploration, will not result to the 
closure of a current mine (Garnaut, 2010). Similarly, an oil company 
expects return on the original development of an oil field. This, on the 
other hand, is called quasi rent on development expenditure. Again 
although tax could transfer part or all of that quasi rent from the 
company to the government, Garnaut (2010) further noted, production in 
that oil field could not be affected. 
In the short-run the supply of crude oil is fixed since significant 
investment in exploration is needed to increase known reserves. While 
the international market for crude oil is competitive, producing nations 
have the power to award concessions MOCs the right to explore crude oil 
and supply the oil market at the competitive price. The difference that 
exists between the average variable cost of production and the global 
market price for crude oil represents quasi rent. The question as to 
whether such rent flows to the company or the host government is a 
policy issue. Most often, however, this rent is apportioned between the 
government and the oil company in accordance with an agreed ratio.   
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4.6 Economic rent theory as a theoretical framework for the 
design of petroleum tax system 
The theory of economic rent is one of the several theories that are 
applicable to taxing of petroleum resources. This section discusses the 
reasons why the economic rent theory is adopted in this research as a 
theoretical framework for the design and implementation of petroleum 
taxation.  
First and foremost, the reason that informed the decision to adopt the 
economic rent theory as a framework is that taxes levied on economic 
rent will not act as a disincentive on firms to undertake any activity since 
rent is not a requirement for the continuation or initiation of business 
operations (Nakhle, 2008). This is very important for producing nations 
because, as noted in the second chapter, attraction of as much foreign 
investment as possible into the petroleum sector is arguably a 
requirement for the achievement of the main objective of ensuring that a 
fair share of the petroleum resources accrue to the host government 
without jeopardising the interest of the investors. 
Second, a tax regime that has been designed to capture economic rent 
tends to increase government take when economic rent increases, and 
reduces government take when economic rent decreases (Nakhle, 2008). 
This is consistent with the principles of a flexible tax regime which 
provides the government with an adequate share of economic rent under 
varying conditions (Tordo, 2007). As markets and project conditions 
change over time, Tordo (2007) further asserts that flexible tax regimes 
become stable and this limits the need for renegotiation of contracts. 
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Third, taxing economic rent is argued by many scholars to be fair (Otto 
et al, 2006), particularly to the community (Swan, 1984). McLean 
(2006), for example, based his argument on the reason given by Winston 
Churchill:  
―The roads are made, the streets are made, the railway services are 
improved, electric light turns night into day, electric trains glide to 
and fro…and all the while the landlord sits still. Every one of these 
improvements is effected by the labour and at the cost of other 
people – yet his [the landlord‘s] land value is enhanced. When the 
land is eventually sold, it is sold by the yard or inch at ten times, 
twenty times or even fifty times its agricultural value…‖ 
Analysing Churchill‘s statement, it is apparent that landowners, in their 
capacity as landowners, have done nothing or very little to procure the 
gain they enjoyed from the appreciation of the value of their land. It was, 
rather, conferred by the state acting on behalf of the citizens. The 
citizens, therefore, ought to have or see some of the returns. The same 
argument also applies to the petroleum industry, as Otto et al (2006:23) 
rightly put it:  
―Why ... should the benefits created by the country‘s geologic legacy 
not flow to all its citizens, rather than to the owners of mining 
companies, many of whom may be foreigners?‖ 
Finally, most taxes distort the economy and diminish efficiency. For 
example, an income tax on labour has the effect of shifting the supply 
curve of labour downward. This results in the society consuming less 
output relative to when such tax is not levied. Taxing economic rent, on 
the other hand, does not affect the availability of labour, capital, and 
other factors of production, and thus, free of such distortions (Otto, et al, 
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2006). In other words, by shifting taxes off labour, capital, and other 
factors of production and on to economic rent, growth and employment 
would be stimulated and many distortions in the economy would be 
avoided.  
4.7 Other theories that could be applied as framework for 
petroleum taxation 
There are other theories, apart from the economic rent theory adopted 
for this study, which could be applied as a framework in the design of 
petroleum taxation. Two of these theories, namely; Principal-Agent 
theory and the Transaction Costs theory, as identified applicable by 
Osmundsen (1998) are discussed in the following subsections. 
4.7.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory is mainly concerned with proffering solution to two main 
problems that occur in agency relationship. These problems, according to 
Eisenhardt (1989), are: First, the agency problem that arises when i) 
there is conflict between the goals or desires of the principal and the 
agent, and ii) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify 
whether the agent has acted rightly. Second, is the problem of risk 
sharing when the principal and the agent have different attitude toward 
risk. In this respect the problem is that the principal and the agent might 
prefer different actions because of differences in risk preference.  
Table 4.1 presents the main features of the agency theory. 
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Table 4.1: Main features of agency theory 
Key idea Principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion  
Organisational assumptions  Partial goal conflict among participants, efficiency as the 
effectiveness criteria, information asymmetry between 
principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity  
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Problem domain  Relationship in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression, management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
   Source: Eisenhardt, 1989 
Within the context of the oil industry, the government, working on the 
notion that petroleum deposits are in many cases common resources 
whose ownership is shared by all inhabitants, acts on behalf of the 
residents as principal and by a discretionary licensing system grants the 
private companies (acting as agents) the right to extract petroleum 
resources in return for which they pay taxes (Osmundsen and Lovas, 
2009). This relationship, between the government and the MOCs, has 
given rise to the agency problems identified above.  
During petroleum extraction, MOCs incur costs and make discoveries of 
new reserves of crude oil. The oil companies then report their discoveries 
and total costs to the government. However, since in practice the 
government is not always there to observe the costs being incurred and 
the discoveries made, it does not know the true cost of exploration 
(Rahman and Helal, 2004). This explains the reasons why the agency 
theory is employed in the petroleum sector (Rahman and Helal, 2004).  
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While the agency theory is appropriate to be applied in the petroleum 
sector as discussed above, it is not employed in this study because the 
aim of the study is not to proffer solution to problems resulting from 
conflicts of interests that may arise in contractual relationship when host 
governments and MOCs happen to be differently informed32. This study, 
on the other hand, as discussed earlier, investigates the appropriateness 
of the Nigerian petroleum tax system in meeting the objectives for which 
it was designed to achieve. Similarly, the main objective of agency 
theory, is to explain how parties to a contract design a contract that 
minimise costs associated with agency problems. Again, this is not the 
subject of this research. 
4.7.2 Transaction cost theory 
The idea of transaction cost theory, coined by Coase (1937) and later 
improved by Williamson (1985), rests upon two basic assumptions about 
human behaviour: bounded rationality and opportunism33.  Economic 
actors are assumed to be rational but are limitedly so (Williamson, 
1985). Decision makers strive or intend to make rational choices but are 
constrained by limited cognitive capacity. The bounded rationality 
assumption about economic actors has several implications, one of which 
is the impossibility of the economic actors to write exhaustive contracts 
that captures all possible future contingencies ex ante (Williamson, 
                                                          
32 Host governments and MOCs have different needs and interests which occasionally give 
rise to conflicts of interests between them. These conflicts of interest, in turn, leads in 
one of them or both them taking actions that may be against the interest of the other. It 
is this type of problems that agency theory deals with.   
33 Williamson (1985) assumed economic actors to be characterised by bounded rationality 
because of their limited cognitive abilities and their inabilities to receive, store, retrieve, 
and process all information free of errors. He sees the actors as behaving 
opportunistically through self interest – lying, cheating, incomplete or distorted disclosure 
of information. 
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1985). The problem of bounded rationality becomes more complex under 
highly uncertain or highly complex transactions. This is because the 
degree of uncertainty between contracting parties creates an information 
problem (Williamson, 1975). Without sufficient information, complete 
contracts cannot be written, hence incomplete contracts result 
(Williamson, 1996)34.  
Combined with uncertainty, bounded rationality may lead to opportunistic 
behaviour of the agent (Williamson, 1985). Opportunistic behaviour, 
according to Williamson (1985:47), is ―lying, stealing, and cheating but it 
is also more subtle forms of deceit‖. This behaviour, Williamson (1975) 
noted, may be serious if a customer is in a small numbers exchange 
situation (Williamson, 1975)35 due to investment in specific assets 
(Williamson, 1985). 
Against the background of bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour, Williamson (1985) suggests three features of a transaction 
as: frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity. Of these three features, 
Williamson (1985) argues that asset specificity is the dominant feature 
because assets take the form of sunk costs in the case of contract 
breaking. When a contract, incomplete by nature that has as object a 
specific asset is signed, fundamental transformation takes place 
                                                          
34 A contract is incomplete, according to Williamson (1996:368), if ― 1) not all the 
relevant future contingencies can be imagined, 2) the details of some of the contingencies 
are obscure, 3) a common understanding of the nature of the future contingencies cannot 
be reached, 4) a common and complete understanding appropriate adaptations to future 
contingencies cannot be reached, 5) the parties are unable to agree on what contingent 
event has materialised 6) the parties are unable to agree to whether actual adaptations 
to realised contingencies corresponds to those specified in the contract, and 7) even 
though both the parties may be fully apprised of neither, in which event costly haggling 
between bilaterally dependent parties ensue‖    
35 Small numbers exchange is a situation where a customer, because of small number of 
contractors in a market, has no alternative to change contractor if opportunistic 
behaviour is observed. He purchases from the same contractor at a high price.  
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(Williamson, 1985)36. The implication is that the competitive situation 
transforms in a lock-in situation in which it becomes expensive for the 
buyer as well as the seller to switch for a new partner.  
Fundamental transformation results in a bidding disequilibrium between 
the incumbent supplier and its competitors at the contract renewal stage 
to the advantage of the incumbent. The main reason that explains this 
incumbency advantage, as Harstad and Crew (1999) noted, is the 
difficulty to access a fair compensation for the transfer of physical 
specific assets between the losing incumbent and the entrant firm or the 
government. A summary of the main features of transaction theory is 
presented in Table 4.2 
Table 4.2: Main features of transaction cost theory 
Unit of analysis Transaction 
Focal dimension  Various types of asset specificity 
Focal cost concern Mal-adaptation  
Contractual focus Choice of (ex post) governance mechanism 
Theoretical orientation Comparative assessment 
Strategic intent Shareholder view 
Sources of market frictions Bounded rationality, uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, opportunism, and asset specificity  
  Source: Kim et al., 2005 
 
In petroleum jurisdictions, host governments offer favourable contract 
terms to MOCs in order to attract them undertake E&P projects. Once a 
                                                          
36 Fundamental Transformation refers to the transformation of a large numbers bidding 
competition at the outset into a small numbers supply relation during contract 
implementation and at contract renewal intervals for transactions that are supported by 
significant investments in transaction specific assets. In other words if, from the 
beginning, the parties have chosen to be partners from a competitive market, after 
signing the contract their relationship turns bilateral. 
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contract is signed, and expenditures necessary for each E&P project is 
incurred, the MOCs are likely to encounter hold-up problem posed by the 
ex post opportunistic behaviour of the host country. This is because 
investments by the MOCs in those specific assets cannot easily be moved 
to alternative E&P projects in other jurisdictions. As a result, the host 
countries tend to exploit the MOCs for larger rents (Teece, 1986). To 
respond to such opportunistic behaviour, MOCs need to develop effective 
safeguards to protect their ―sunk investments‖. It is these contracting 
issues that transaction cost theory is employed to proffer solution to.  
Just like the agency theory, transaction cost theory is not adopted in this 
study because the theory, as evidenced from the above discussion, is 
theory based on the opportunistic behaviour of the host government. As 
this study is not seeking to examine the opportunistic behaviour of the 
host country, the application of the theory is, thus, not appropriate for 
this study.  
4.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, a review of the literature on the concept of economic rent 
covering the meaning, types, and its applicability in the petroleum 
industry was made. It was found that economic rent, as a concept, is 
suitable for application in the petroleum industry and particularly for the 
design of petroleum taxation as it does not act as a disincentive to 
investment. Similarly, a review of literature on other possible theories 
that could be applied in the design of a petroleum tax system revealed, 
among others, that the agency theory and transaction cost theory are 
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also appropriate. A discussion of these theories together with the reasons 
for not using them in this study was presented above.   
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Chapter Five 
Research Methodology and Methods 
5.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the methodology and methods 
employed in this study. To achieve this aim, the chapter reviews 
philosophical assumptions, methods and techniques employed in 
research endeavour and on the basis of that discuss the assumptions and 
method employed for the study. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into 
six sections. Section 5.2 deals with the philosophical assumptions 
relating to ontology, epistemology, and human nature that researchers 
make while conducting research. This is followed by a discussion on the 
formulation of the research hypotheses in section 5.3. Sections 5.4 and 
5.5 respectively deal with the various methods of data collection and 
methods of data analysis employed in research. Section 5.6 concludes 
the chapter.  
5.2 Research Philosophy   
The choice of methodology37 to be adopted by a researcher depends on 
the sets of assumptions the researcher makes when conducting his or 
her research (Ryan et al, 2002).  These assumptions which relate to 
ontology, epistemology and human nature are not totally objective or 
value free and as such they should be recognised and assessed by 
researchers in order to ensure that they are consistent with their 
                                                          
37 Methodology, in its broadest term, refers to the way in which a researcher conducts 
research (Jonker and Pennink, 2010). In other words, methodology is simply the way or 
process in which one attempts to investigate and obtain knowledge about the real world 
(Hassard, 1991). 
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personal beliefs (Hopper and Powell, 1985). Collectively the assumptions 
are referred to as a ―paradigm‖ (Lawal, 2008).  
A paradigm is defined as ―the basic way of perceiving, thinking, valuing 
and doing associated with a particular vision of reality‖ (Harmon, 
1970:5). A paradigm is also described as set of rules and regulations, 
written or unwritten, which establishes or defines boundaries and 
dictates how the researcher behaves inside the boundaries (Baker, 
1992). In other words, a paradigm, according to Bailey (1978), is like a 
mental window through which the researcher views the social world out 
there based on his or her paradigm of concepts, categories, assumptions 
and biases.  
There are quite a number of frameworks that have been developed in an 
attempt to define paradigm in social and organisational theory. However, 
that of Burrell and Morgan (1979) has attracted substantial attention 
(White, 1983) and retains widespread acceptance across many areas of 
management and sociological literature (Lowe, 2001).  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) developed a framework that fits all views 
within social sciences into four sociological paradigms, namely; 
functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist. 
These paradigms are based on the relationships between two dimensions 
- subjective-objective dimension and regulation-radical change dimension 
(see Figure 5.1) - and are the ―very basic meta-theoretical assumptions, 
which underwrite the frame of reference, mode of theorising and modus 
operandi of the social theorists who operate within them‖ (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979:23).  
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Figure 5.1: Sociological Research Paradigms 
         
 Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979 
 
The subjective-objective dimension is divided into four underlying 
assumptions of researchers relating to; ontology, epistemology, human 
nature, and methodology (see Figure 5.2). In each case, these four 
assumptions can be subjective or objective. 
Figure 5.2: Subjective-objective approach to social science 
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Ontological questions deal with the nature of reality, whether it is an 
objective nature external to the individual or it is a cognitive construction 
within one‘s mind (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Related to ontology is 
epistemology, which relates to investigation of the very essence of 
knowledge, its nature and forms. It entails whether knowledge is hard, 
real, and capable of being transmitted in tangible form or whether the 
foundation of knowledge is personal, more subjective and of a 
transcendental type (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  Assumption about 
human nature reflects the relationship between human beings and their 
environments. Burrell and Morgan (1979:2) understood this relationship 
as whether ―human beings and their experience are regarded as products 
of environment‖ or ―man is regarded as creator of his environment‖. 
Methodological assumption relates to method used to investigate 
knowledge about the social world. A researcher‘s choice of methodology 
depends on the ontological, epistemological, and human nature 
assumptions he/she holds (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). If the social world 
is viewed hard and external, just like in the natural sciences, then 
nomothetic methodology applies and if, on the other hand, is viewed soft 
and more subjective, then an ideographic methodological approach is 
emphasised (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
The regulation-radical change dimension consists of assumptions about 
the nature of society (see Table 5.1). From the regulation perspective, 
the assumptions are that the social world is stable, cohesive and 
integrated with underlying unity. Emphasis is on consensus between 
human beings and the satisfaction of needs. The society‘s status quo is 
always maintained or at worse changes slowly with no room for conflicts 
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and differences. Assumptions from the radical point of view are that the 
social world is unstable and divided, with deep-rooted structural conflict 
and modes of domination. Emphasis here is on the unstable nature of 
interaction or structure that leads to new structure. The status quo 
changes very rapidly and the forces that changes the society are largely 
present.  
Table 5.1: Regulation-Radical Change Dimension 
The sociology of REGULATION is 
concerned with: 
The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE 
is concerned with: 
a) The status quo  
b) Social order  
c) Consensus (voluntary agreement) 
d) Social integration and cohesion 
e) Solidarity 
f) Need satisfaction (aligning social 
and individual needs) 
g) Actuality 
a) Radical change 
b) Structural conflict 
c) Modes of domination 
d) Contradiction 
e) Emancipation 
f) Deprivation (the social need erodes 
individual fulfilment) 
g) Potentiality 
  Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979 
These two dimensions, as noted earlier, helped Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) to come up with four contiguous but mutually exclusive 
paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical 
structuralist. The functionalist paradigm stands for the believe that ―the 
social world is composed of relatively concrete artefacts and relationship 
which can be identified, studied and measured through approaches 
derived from natural science‖ (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:25). This 
paradigm takes a realist ontological position and combines it a positivist 
approach to epistemology, deterministic position as regards human 
nature, and a nomothetic methodology. 
Just like the functionalist, the interpretive paradigm is also within the 
ambit of the sociology of regulation. In contrast, however, the 
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interpretive paradigm views ―the social world as emergent social process 
which is created by individuals concerned‖ (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979:28). It assumes nominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemology, 
voluntarist view of human nature, and an ideographic methodology. 
While the radical structuralist and humanist paradigms respectively 
assume all the philosophical assumptions underpinning the functionalist 
and interpretive paradigms, they, however, substitute the consensual 
societal view of the functionalist and interpretive paradigms with a 
conflicting one. Emphasis is on emancipatory agenda, in which research 
is geared towards freeing people from forces that restrict their potential 
for growth and development. This, according to Burrell and Morgan 
(19790, can be achieved through conflict and change.  
Although, the Burrell and Morgan‘s (1979) framework is widely accepted 
across many areas of management and sociological literature, it has 
nevertheless been criticised by some commentators. For example, Flood 
(1990) and Jackson (1991) argue that that the framework does not 
provide a complete taxonomy of all possible theoretical positions. 
Alvesson and Deetz (1996), on the other hand, challenge that the 
subjective-objective dimension implicitly sides the functionalist view by 
hiding the subjective nature of the underpinning assumptions in 
objectivist ontology. Other scholars criticised the framework on two 
related areas: 1) it is too simplistic way of showing a division between 
different methodologies in a matrix and 2) its tendency to preserve and 
strengthen paradigm incommensurability (see Hopper and Powell, 1985; 
Willmott, 1993).  
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Notwithstanding the criticisms above, the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
framework has become foundation for many frameworks for empirical 
research in social science (see Chua, 1986). From accounting 
perspective, researchers, such as Tomkins and Groves (1983), Hopper 
and Powell (1985), Chua (1988), Laughlin (1995) and Ryan et al (2002) 
have explored alternative accounting research paradigms. The main 
approaches can be classified as mainstream, interpretive, and critical. 
Although this sociologically divided trichotomy is originally developed to 
differentiate management accounting, it remains useful for accounting 
research (Fulbier and Sellhorn, 2008).  
The mainstream accounting research is consistent with what Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) refer to as functionalism (Ryan et al, 2002) and 
comprises of research approaches such as objectivism, social systems 
theory, and pluralism (Hopper and Powell, 1985). It is also categorised 
as comprising of the positivist, realist, instrumentalist, and 
conventionalist research approaches all in the same group as 
functionalism (Laughlin, 1995). This approach assumes that reality is 
external and can be observed and economic actors are assumed to be 
goal oriented utility maximisers. With this approach, generalisation and 
causal relationships is very important, thus, making the use of statistical 
research methods almost exclusive. One of the consequences of the 
assumptions underpinning this research approach is that accounting 
researchers take current institutional framework of governments, 
markets, and prices as given in their natural setting (Chua, 1886). Thus, 
it is not the purpose of mainstream accounting to make an attempt to 
evaluate and perhaps change an institutional structure. The accountant 
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takes a neutral position by not evaluating these end-states. The primary 
role of the accountant, Chua (1986) noted, is the provision of financial 
information on the means to achieve these states.  
The interpretive methodological approach, on the other hand, is a 
product of ―Germanic philosophical interests which emphases the role of 
language, interpretation, and understanding in social science‖ (Chua, 
1986:613). It provides an insight into ―the complex world of lived 
experience from the point of view of those who live it‖ (Schwandt, 
1994:118). Interpretive research assumes reality as socially constructed 
with the researcher becoming the vehicle through which the reality is 
revealed (Walsham, 1995). The creation of the social world is 
characterised by interaction between the researcher and the participants 
(Mingers, 2001). Thus, interpretive researchers, Orlikowski and Baroudi 
(1991) noted, attempt to understand phenomena through accessing 
meanings participants assign to them. Researcher‘s interpretations of 
data play vital role in interpretive research as it brings ―subjectivity to 
the fore, backed with quality arguments rather than statistical exactness‖ 
(Garcia and Quek, 1997:459). Methodological approaches such as 
symbolic interactionism, grounded theory, and ethnomethodology all fall 
within this approach (Laughlin, 1995; Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
Critical accounting research has its root from the history of critical 
disciplines which question the pre-eminence of the dominant social view 
that society is forever fluid and any pretensions of stability in social 
dynamics are mere illusion (Tilling and Tilt, 2003). Critical accounting 
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theory has two broad aspects that distinguished it from the mainstream 
and interpretive theories.  
First is the contextualisation of accounting practice within a wider domain 
which Laughlin (1987:479) put as thus:  
―While it is acknowledged that a great deal is known about the 
technical aspects of accounting, it is argued that little is understood 
about either accounting‘s social roots or the interconnection and 
interrelationship between the social and the technical‖ 
Part of the reason for this contextualisation is the recognition that 
accounting is not science but a human endeavour (Francis, 1990). The 
second aspect is the call for the transformation of the whole system. In 
this context, Laughlin (1987:482) holds the view that ―the present is not 
satisfactory, that reality could be better than it is‖. This call for the 
transformation of the whole system, according to Tinker (1988), is what 
clearly distinguishes critical accounting from the positivist approach.   
For the purpose of this study, the interpretive paradigm consistent with 
the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework is adopted. This is in line with 
the argument by many scholars that the adoption of a particular research 
paradigm by a researcher is a requirement for the achievement of his/her 
research objectives. For example, Guba and Lincoln (1994:116) argued 
thus:  
―Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, ought to go 
about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what 
paradigm informs and guide his or her approach‖.  
The Burrell and Morgan (1979) interpretive paradigm, as noted earlier, 
has nominalism, anti-positivism and voluntarism as ontological, 
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epistemological and human nature assumptions which lead to the 
adoption of an ideographic methodology.  Adoption of nominalism as an 
ontological assumption is justified because the knowledge of the 
appropriateness of a petroleum tax regime based on a nation‘s 
circumstances and needs is based on the cognitive construction within 
ones‘ mind.   
Similarly, this research is about examining the perception people have on 
whether the Nigerian petroleum tax system is designed in line with the 
country‘s circumstances and needs. This conforms to Burrell and 
Morgan‘s (1979) anti-positive epistemology which argues that the social 
world is relativistic by nature and can only be understood from the 
viewpoint of those concerned in studied activities.  
The voluntarism assumption for human nature is used for this study. This 
choice of the voluntarists‘ position of human nature is informed by belief 
that human beings are the result of their free wills. This is consistent with 
interpretivists‘ view that the social world is an ―emergent social process 
which is created by individuals concerned‖ (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979:28). Thus, in the context of this research, the behaviours of 
individuals are not defined and influenced by the situation or 
environment under which tax is design and implemented.   
The choice of nominalism, anti-positivism and voluntarism as ontological, 
epistemological and human nature assumptions led to the adoption of an 
ideographic methodology, thus positioning the study within the ambit of 
an interpretive paradigm consistent with the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
framework.  
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Regarding the idea of ―regulation‖ and ―radical change‖ as put forward by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979), this study, just like any other interpretivist 
approach, is closely inclined to regulation rather than radical change. 
However, as a result of the apparent weaknesses of the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) framework, as earlier noted, this research adopted the 
―middle range‖ thinking advocated by Laughlin (1995) as it shows 
openness to both radical change and maintenance of status-quo. In the 
words of Gray et al (1988:8), the middle range thinking is a study ―... in 
which the status-quo is accepted (although variously interpreted) and 
explicit, and overt ambition is neither to destroy capitalism nor to refine, 
deregulate and/or liberate it‖.  
5.3 Formulation of hypotheses 
Formulation of hypotheses in a research project is a fundamental 
requirement for an effective execution of the research work. In the words 
of Kpolovie (2011:38): ―an empirical research cannot be considered to 
have been well executed without hypothesis‖. Accordingly, in order to 
determine whether the Nigerian petroleum tax system is appropriately 
designed to meet the needs of Nigeria, six hypotheses, indicated by H11 
to H16, were formulated for this study. Each of the hypotheses is 
operationalised using a number of applicable statements which were 
tested in the order in which they contribute to the attainment of the 
study‘s objectives to which the hypothesis relates.  
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H11:  Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair representation of the 
interests of the government and the MOCs. 
 
The broad objective of a petroleum tax system, as discussed in Section 
2.4.2, is to strike a balance between the interest of the government and 
that of the investors (MOCs). However, since there are no universal 
benchmarks designed for balancing the interests of contracting parties 
(Radon, 2009), governments and MOCs necessarily negotiate 
arrangements that ostensibly allow the host government to come up with 
petroleum tax objectives that fairly capture the interests of all parties.  
In Nigeria, over the years compromises have been made by both the 
government and the MOCs. The government, for example, in response to 
the oil glut of the 1980s, signed an MOU with the MOCs providing, among 
other things: the replacement of posted price with market price of crude 
oil, a guaranteed minimum margin of $2.00 for crude oil prices of less 
than $12.50/bbl and a reserve bonus on successful discoveries. The 
effect of all these, according to Khan (1994), was a reduction in tax paid 
by the MOCs. Similarly, the MOCs, in line with the indigenisation policy of 
the Nigerian government, were compelled to gradually surrender an 
average of 60% of the JV holdings to the government.  
Given that compromises have been made it seems reasonable to 
investigate if the taxation system in place fairly represents the interests 
of the MOCs and the Government. 
This hypothesis is tested through five different but related objectives of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system in the following order: i) equity in the 
distribution of oil revenue between the government and the MOCs; ii) 
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yearly increase in government petroleum revenue; iii) influence of tax 
incentives on MOCs investment decisions; iv) distribution of tax revenue 
among the tiers of government in Nigeria; and v) incentives for 
enhancing the international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system.  
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments are suitable for achieving the 
objectives set for the petroleum tax system. 
 
Governments across oil producing nations apply a wide range of tax 
instruments in order to meet the objectives set for their petroleum tax 
systems (Goldsworthy and Zakharova, 2010). What matters, therefore, is 
not the number of instruments but the ability of each of the instruments 
to meet the set objectives of the tax system. 
Nigeria, just like any other oil producing nation, employs a combination 
of tax and non-tax instruments in order to meet the nation‘s petroleum 
tax objectives. the main instruments are: i) bonuses and fees; ii) royalty; 
iii) income tax; iv)participation; and v) production sharing. It seems 
appropriate to assess whether or not those ―experts‖ in the area view 
these instruments as being suitable for achieving the objectives set for 
the petroleum tax system. 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound administrative system for petroleum 
tax matters 
 
The efficiency of a tax system, according to Bejakovic (2000), is not only 
determined by proper tax legislation but also by the effectiveness of the 
tax administration. A tax system cannot function better than its tax 
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administration (Jenkins, 1992). This underscores the importance of a 
sound tax administrative system in most countries. 
Nigeria, being heavily dependent on crude oil revenue, needs not only a 
good petroleum tax policy but also a well-organized administrative 
system for petroleum tax matters that is comprehensive, flexible and 
cost effective. It is for these reasons that it seems appropriate to test the 
above hypothesis.  
H14: The implementation processes for Nigeria’s petroleum tax system 
are effective  
 
As earlier noted, the worth of a tax system depends on how effective it is 
implemented. A poorly administered resource tax system, Calder (2010a) 
noted, has the potential of causing great damage to government 
revenues, reputation and polices. In order to be effective in 
implementation, the Nigerian government has put in place several 
measures, including: training and development of tax officials and 
maintenance and financing of multiple petroleum tax administrative 
agencies. This hypothesis is developed to test the effectiveness of these 
measures in ensuring successful implementation of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system.  
The hypothesis is tested via: i) government support for effective 
administration of petroleum tax system; ii) adequacy in the finance of 
Nigeria petroleum tax agencies; iii) possession of required features by 
Nigerian petroleum tax administrative agencies for ensuring successful 
administration; and iv) relationship and capacity of Nigeria‘s petroleum 
tax administrative agencies. 
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H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating to the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system are adequate.  
 
Tax evasion is a problem that has the potential of undermining 
government budgets, damaging public welfare and creating a sense of 
unfairness that may lead to further evasion (Luis et al, 2006). 
Accordingly, governments, particularly of oil producing nations, have 
compliance mechanisms for the detection of tax evasion built into their 
tax system.  Nigeria, as discussed in Chapter 3, has defined petroleum 
tax regulations that make provisions for review.  Similarly, various tax 
policies for fast payment of petroleum taxes, including self-assessment 
system, monthly instalment payment of tax liabilities and penalties for 
late payments, were built into the tax system. Testing the above 
hypothesis should give insights into the effectiveness of these compliance 
mechanisms. 
Three statements were used for testing this hypothesis: i) main 
attributes of the Nigerian petroleum tax system; ii) features designed to 
assist petroleum tax compliance; and iii) policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes.    
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is reactive to changes in 
factors that significantly affect tax matters     
 
A country‘s petroleum tax system is affected by both global and local 
factors that may prevent the country‘s tax objectives being met. In view 
of that, governments provide for some allowances while designing their 
tax systems such that their system can react appropriately to any 
changes that occur. The Nigerian petroleum sector has been perceived to 
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be out of tune with the current realities of Nigeria and indeed with the 
best practices obtained in the global petroleum industry (Oyesina, 2010). 
The realisation of this informed the government to draft a bill which it 
calls ―the Petroleum Industry Bill‖ proposing amendments to the existing 
system. The bill is currently receiving attention of the National Assembly. 
Testing the above hypothesis should shed light on the appropriateness of 
the tax system in enabling the government to react to changes in factors 
that significantly affect tax matters.  
In a similar way, this hypothesis is tested via five statements relating to 
the tax system : i) capacity to adjust to changes in tax regulations in 
other countries and increase in MOCs‘ risk of making a loss; ii) adjust 
government share of petroleum revenue for changes in the profitability of 
the MOCs; iii) control mechanism for detection of fraudulent practices 
and underreporting of production; iv) ability to cope with MOCs fear and 
public concerns; and v) government reaction to requests for greater 
share of oil rent and compensations for environmental damages by 
communities in the oil region. 
5.4 Research Methods 
There are traditionally two broad classifications of research methods, viz; 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. In recent years, however, 
a third classification variously called mixed-methods (Creswell, 2003), 
multi-methods (Brannen, 1992), multi-strategy (Bryman, 2004), or 
mixed-methodology (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) is introduced to the 
research literature.  
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Quantitative research involves counting and measuring of events as well 
as performing statistical analysis of numerical data (Smith, 1988). It is 
scientific in nature, and tends to be employed when a theory is already 
well developed and is just being confirmed. It is best used in ‗objective‘ 
studies. The goal of quantitative research is to measure and analyse 
casual relationships between variables within a value-free framework 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Quantitative research, Carey (1993) noted, 
uses much larger sample size than qualitative research in order to ensure 
that representative samples are used. Various techniques, including 
randomisation, highly structured protocols, and written or oral 
questionnaires, are used to ensure the attainment of this goal. 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is a naturalistic approach that 
seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as 
―real world setting where the researcher does not attempt to manipulate 
the phenomenon of interest‖ (Patton, 2001:39). It is, defined by Patton 
(2001:39) as ―the kind of research that produces findings arrived from 
real-world settings where the phenomenon of interest unfolds naturally". 
In the words of Shank (2002:5)38, qualitative research is simply ―a form 
of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning‖. Qualitative research has 
the goal of understanding a social or human problem from multiple 
perspectives. To achieve this goal, it is conducted in natural settings and 
involves a process of building a complex and holistic image of the event 
                                                          
38 Qualitative research is systematic, according to Shank (2002), because it is planned 
and follows the rules agreed upon by members of the qualitative research community. 
Shank, 2002) refers to qualitative research as empirical because is an inquiry that is 
grounded in the world of experience. By inquiry into meaning, Shank (2002) means 
researchers try to understand how others make sense of their experience. 
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of interest. Qualitative research methods involve interviews and 
observations. It also includes surveys, case studies, and document 
analysis, among others.  
Mixed-method research is defined ―as the class of research where the 
researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single 
study‖ (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:17). Justifying the position of 
mixed research, Huberman (1994:4) acknowledge that:  
―In epistemological debates it is tempting to operate at the poles. But 
in the actual practice of empirical research, we believe that all of us 
...... are closer to the centre with multiple overlaps" ....... an 
increasing number of researchers now see the world with more 
pragmatic, ecumenical eyes‖ 
While there are a number of reasons for combining the two paradigms39, 
the literature has identified only two legitimate reasons which, according 
to Sale et al (2002), are: first, to achieve cross-validation or 
triangulation40 and second, to achieve complementary outcomes by using 
the strength of one method to enhance the other.  
The emphasis in this research is on the use of the qualitative research 
method because it is based on the perception of people on the factors 
that govern the operation of petroleum taxation in Nigeria. In addition, 
                                                          
39 There are several reasons for the combination of the two approaches which include: 
First, the two approaches share the common goal of understanding the world in which we 
live (Haase and Myers, 1988). Second, both approaches have the commitment to 
understanding and improving human condition, have the common goal of disseminating 
knowledge for practical use, and the same commitment for rigor, conscientiousness, and 
critique in research methodology (Reichardt and Rallis, 1994). Third, the need for 
researchers not to be preoccupied with the quantitative-qualitative debate since it will not 
be resolved in the near future and the fact that epistemological purity does not guarantee 
research (Miles and Huberman, 1984).  
40 Cross-validation or triangulation, according to Denzin (1970), refers to the combination 
of two or more theories or data sources to study the same phenomenon in order to gain a 
complete understanding of it. 
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since the findings of this study may not be generalisable across oil 
producing nations due to the fact that each jurisdiction has its own 
circumstances that may differ from the others, the emphasis on 
qualitative research whose underpinning principle is non-generalisation of 
findings seems appropriate.  
5.4.1 Population of the study 
A population simply refers to any set of persons or objects that have at 
least one characteristic in common (Basha and Harter, 1980). It is also 
defined as ―entire group of people, events, or things of interest that the 
researcher wishes to investigate‖ (Sekaran, 2001:225). The knowledge 
of a population at the outset of a study is crucial in identifying the proper 
sources from which data for the study can be collected (Zikmund, 2001). 
As a result, 10 legitimate stakeholder groups were selected for the study 
(see Table 5.2)41. With the exception of Higher Institution of Learning 
(HIL), each of the nine other groups maintains an Oil and Gas 
Department and on average there was a total of 25 staff manning the 
Department (Table 5.2). In the case of HIL, there were, on average, 3 
                                                          
41 There are other stakeholders that were not surveyed in this study for at least two 
reasons. First, some of the stakeholders were duly represented by the institutions 
surveyed. For example, the states, local governments, and oil communities are 
represented by the National Assembly. Each state in Nigeria is represented by three 
senators and some house of representative members who are elected by the people to 
speak on their behalf at the NASS on issues that affect the nation and their related 
communities (Nigerian constitution, 1999). The states and local governments were also 
represented by the AGF.  The AGF, through the Federation Account Allocation Committee 
(FAAC), meets, on a monthly basis, with the representative of all the states and local 
governments in Nigeria and disburse the revenue that accrues to the federation among 
the three tiers of government. Second, the views of some other stakeholders were not 
thought to be important in meeting the objectives of the study. For example, because of 
the unincorporated status of the MOCs operating in Nigeria, the views of international 
accounting firms were not sought. But on reflection, the study was of the view that they 
should have been sampled because they represent one of the groups of experts on 
petroleum taxation.  
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petroleum accounting lecturers in 8 Universities in Nigeria that offer 
petroleum accounting.  
Table 5.2: Estimation of population of the “expert” groups42 
    Source: Based on pilot study   
In order to be satisfied that the identified stakeholders have the 
appropriate knowledge of the petroleum tax system in Nigeria, every 
effort was made to seek assurances and advice from a range of 
individuals in positions of authority in Nigeria‘s oil and gas taxation 
sector43. On the basis of the input they provided and by subsequent 
interrogation of the available information of the groups selected, there 
are reasonable grounds to support the view that the experts do have the 
requisite knowledge.  
It is also noteworthy that these groups of experts have different goals 
and objectives that they want to achieve from the revenue obtained from 
the petroleum tax system in Nigeria. These vested interests of the 
                                                          
42 These estimates were arrived at during the pilot study in Nigeria and represent the 
total number of staff with expertise in upstream petroleum accounting matters in the 
respective Oil and Gas departments of the stakeholders groups.     
43 The first step taken was to identify persons in position of authority in the Nigerian oil 
sector. This was achieved through the help of contacts who were either employees or 
close associates of the persons identified. The researcher then met with those persons 
and sought their assurances and advice on whether the experts selected for the study 
really have the appropriate knowledge of the petroleum tax system in Nigeria. Some gave 
their assurances outright while others took about a week.  
 Groups of “experts” Population 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  28 
Federal Inland Revenue Service  32 
Central of Bank of Nigeria  23 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources  27 
Multinational Oil Companies  24 
Accountant General‘s office  24 
Auditor General‘s office  29 
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  4 
National Assembly  31 
Higher Institution of Learning  24 
Total 246 
Average (figure rounded to the nearest whole number) 25 
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experts in the tax system arguably influence not only the behaviour in 
how they respond to the various suggestions in the research 
questionnaire but also their input to the design and operation of the 
system.  
The paragraphs below discuss the interests of the expert groups and 
their likely responses to the study questionnaire. 
1. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) principally 
manages the interests of the government in the oil and gas industry 
(Nwokeji, 2007). In so doing, it engages in all activities that would 
improve the petroleum industry in the general interest of Nigeria. In 
addition, it works closely with the MOCs in exploiting opportunities within 
the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. As such, the NNPC might be expected to 
respond positively to some statements that suggest interaction with the 
MOCs has gone well and to those that reflect well on the investment 
friendly nature and competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system. The media and literature suggest strongly that there is general 
dissatisfaction with the amount of revenue that the Nigerian oil and gas 
sector has produced for the government and society (see Ogbonna, 
2012; Asuni, 2009). Unfortunately for the NNPC a large share of the 
blame for this situation has been ascribed to the operational 
ineffectiveness of the NNPC (Izeze, 2012). There is a distinct possibility 
that in responding to statements about the performance of other parts of 
the oil and gas sector in Nigeria that the NNPC may try to deflect 
attention away from any perceived faults it may have by commenting 
negatively on that performance.   
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2. The Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is Nigeria‘s main tax 
institution. It is empowered by Section 8 of the FIRS Act (2007) to 
assess, collect, account and enforce payment of all taxes due to the 
government from all the MOCs operating in Nigeria. The FIRS, therefore, 
ensures that the MOCs not only pay their tax liabilities when due but also 
comply with all tax regulations. Accordingly, the FIRS might be expected 
to respond positively to statements relating to the efficacy of tax policies, 
administration and compliance. 
3. The Central Bank Nigeria (CBN) and Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
(MPR) are among agencies responsible for the administration of 
petroleum taxation in Nigeria. These agencies might, therefore, be likely 
to agree with statements that suggest the effectiveness of the tax 
implementation processes and compliance mechanisms.    
4. The Multinational oil companies (MOCs) are among the major players 
in the Nigerian oil sector. They account for over 90% of the nation‘s 
petroleum taxes. Their main objective is to ensure that their interests are 
adequately captured in the tax system. Consequently, in the hope that 
more attractive terms may be set in the future, there may be an 
inclination for them to disagree with statements that overtly suggest that 
the taxation system is attractive to investors. Such views are supported 
in the literature. For example, Otto et al. state ―companies rarely believe 
that they pay too little tax‖ (Otto el al., 2006: Xi) and thus it is likely that 
the MOCs might disagree with statements that support the 
appropriateness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system in capturing their 
interests. 
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5. The Accountant General‘s office (AGF) is responsible for accounting 
and control of all government finances (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). It 
therefore presumably has a vested interest in cultivating the view that 
such control in the past has been well exercised since that should reflect 
well on the way the AGF has performed its duties. The AGF distributes, 
on a monthly basis, the revenue accruing to the federation among the 
three tiers of government. Hence, it might be positive in responding to 
statements that suggest fairness in revenue distribution and 
effectiveness in exploitation and use of oil revenues. 
6. The Auditor General‘s office (AGO) is responsibilities for auditing the 
accounts of all ministries, boards, and parastatals including the agencies 
responsible for the administration of petroleum taxation.  In many ways 
the expectation for the this group is that it will mirror the opinions of the 
Accountant General‘s Office with respect to statements on petroleum 
taxations issues since both groups have a responsibility for ensuring that 
control systems operate effectively within the petroleum taxation area.  
7. The Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) is the 
nation‘s EITI wing that audits all tax revenues paid to the government by 
the MOCs and publishes same. The activities of NEITI have, arguably, 
been largely responsible for Nigeria achieving the status of being EITI 
compliant (Onwuemenyi, 2011). Consequently, it would be surprising if 
this group did not respond positively to statements that supported the 
success of the processes at play within the petroleum taxation system in 
Nigeria. 
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8. The National Assembly (NASS) is responsible for making laws in 
Nigeria and it is actively engaged, through its oil and gas committee, in 
ensuring that laws relating to the oil petroleum industry are up-to-date. 
It is a political group of influential actors within the petroleum industry in 
Nigeria. In common with politicians worldwide, when there are perceived 
inefficiencies within the operational side of an area of economic 
importance they are likely to receive a share of the blame in the media 
(for example DailyPost, 2012) In line with the comments above relating 
to the NNPC, this group might respond negatively to the effectiveness of 
the performance of other groups.  
9. Lecturers44 from Higher Institutions of Learning (HIL) with expertise in 
petroleum taxation affairs will have a sound theoretical knowledge of the 
issues involved in setting policy and assuring competitiveness of the 
system. They will also be acutely aware that funding for their institutions 
is heavily dependent on government patronage and on the petroleum 
industry being seen to be a success story (Akikungbe, 2001). It is 
uncertain how they might respond to the statements but the overall 
tendency is likely to react positively to them. 
5.4.2 Sample and sampling technique  
A sample in the words of Webster (1985:1100) is ―a finite part of a 
statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information 
                                                          
44 Lecturers from universities in Nigeria form part of the population of this study because 
some universities in Nigeria offer petroleum accounting courses that cover all aspects of 
accounting. The lecturers teach petroleum accounting and also perform academic 
oversight functions. They also partake in the review of accounting curriculum in line with 
developments in the oil sector.  Thus, for this study the lecturers that formed the 
population were purely those from the 8 universities in Nigeria that offer petroleum 
accounting.    
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about the whole‖. In relation to qualitative research, there are no hard 
and fast rules for the determination of sample size (Patton, 2002). The 
size of a sample in a qualitative research exercise, as noted by Patton 
(2002), depends on certain factors which include: what the researcher 
wants; the purpose of the research; what is at stake; what will be useful; 
what will affect the credibility of the research; and what can be done with 
the available time and resources. 
A researcher, after considering the above factors identified by Patton 
(2002), may use his/her judgement to decide on a suitable number of 
respondents for his/her study as Sandelowski (1995:179) rightly put 
thus: 
―Determining adequate sample size in qualitative research is 
ultimately a matter of judgment and experience in evaluating the 
quality of the information collected against the uses to which it will be 
put...‖  
On the basis of the argument above, 15 respondents were judgementally 
sampled across the stakeholder groups.45 The decision to sample 15 
respondents evenly across the respondents‘ groups is justified because 
there was no remarkable difference in the populations of the groups. As 
can be seen from Table 5.2, only one population group could be 
considered to be an outlier46. All the populations were close to each other 
and approximate to the average population of the entire groups. 
Similarly, sampling 15 respondents out of an average of 25 translates to 
about 60% of the entire study population being surveyed. Thus the 
                                                          
45 The case of NEITI is an exception because the institution had only 4 upstream 
petroleum accounting experts as at the time when the survey was conducted. 
46 An outlier is an item of data that is numerically distant from the rest of the data set 
(the data in this case are individual populations).  
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evidence suggests that the sample is a good representation of the 
population.  
On the other hand, judgemental47 sampling was used in this study for 
two main reasons. First, it is the method that dominates the research 
literature that utilises the qualitative approach and the selection of the 
most productive sample to answer research questions (Marshall, 1996). 
Second, the sampling technique allows the selection of the sample 
elements with extreme precision making it easier to guarantee respect 
for criteria such as homogeneity (Thietart, 2001).  
5.4.3 Method of Data Collection used in the study 
There are many different methods for collecting data with each having its 
strengths and weaknesses. The type of data collection method 
researchers choose depends on some complex factors as Floyd and 
Fowler (2002:58) states: 
―The choice of data collection mode – mail, internet, personal 
interview or group administration – is related to the sample frame, 
research topic, characteristics of the sample and available staff and 
facilities; it has implications for response rates, question form and 
survey costs‖. 
Apart from the factors listed by Floyd and Fowler (2002) above, there 
are, of course, some other obvious factors that affect the choice of data 
collection method. These include: availability of time for data collection, 
money budgeted, and the nature of questions to be asked.  
                                                          
47 The other two techniques, according to Marshall (1996), are 1) convenience sampling 
which involves the selection of the most accessible subjects. It is the least costly but 
gives poor results and lacks intellectual credibility and 2) theoretical sampling which is 
theory driven and necessitates building of interpretive theories from the data that 
emerged and then selecting a new sample to examine and elaborate on this theory. 
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With these factors in mind, a researcher adopts a method or a 
combination of methods for his or her research. These methods include 
questionnaire and interview.   
A questionnaire is defined as ―a document containing questions and other 
types of items designed to solicit information appropriate to analysis‖ 
(Babbie, 1990:377) It is considered one of the most widely used data 
collection methods because, as respondents are asked to answer the 
same set of questions, it serves as an efficient response collection 
method from a large sample (Saunders et al, 2003). Depending on the 
objectives of the data collection exercise, a questionnaire survey, as 
suggested by Dillman (1978), may be used to collect one or more of the 
following types of information: (i) the attributes of people such as 
personal characteristics in terms of age, marital status, educational 
background, and occupation, (ii) Behaviour and events - what people do, 
for example, the frequency of people engaging in risky behaviours such 
as smoking or consumption of alcohol, (iii) Peoples‘ believes and/or 
knowledge - what people think is true in which Dillman (1978) noted that 
there is no implied judgement about what is good or bad, (iv) attitudes 
or opinions or reasons - what people say they want or ―how people feel 
about something‖.  
While a questionnaire is designed to gather the types of information 
identified above, its effectiveness in gathering such information depends 
on the researcher‘s observance of certain design guidelines or principles. 
These guidelines, according to Malhotra (2004), include; specification of 
information needed, what should be included in each question, the types 
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of questions to be asked, number of questions to ask, ability of the 
respondents to answer the questions, willingness of respondents to 
answer question, and what should be the structure of the question.  
A questionnaire can either be structured, semi-structured, or 
unstructured. A structured questionnaire consists of pre-coded questions 
with well defined patterns to follow the sequence of questions. Most 
qualitative data collection activities, according to Acharya (2010), use 
structured questionnaire. Structured questionnaire has the advantage of 
being easy to administer, consistency in answers and easy for data 
management. Unstructured questionnaire, on the other hand, consist of 
open ended and vague opinion type questions which, Acharya (2010) 
noted, may not be in the format of interrogative sentences, and 
therefore, the moderator has to elaborate the sense of the questions. 
Unstructured questionnaire is most appropriate for focus group 
discussions. A questionnaire having the mixture of both closed and open 
questions is levelled semi-structured or otherwise quasi-structured 
questionnaire. The use of semi-structured questionnaire enables a 
researcher to gather a mix of qualitative and quantitative data.  
Just like questionnaires, interviews are widely used as data collection 
instrument throughout social sciences (Nunkoosing, 2005). It is defined 
by Cohen and Manion (1994:271) as: 
 ―a two-person conversation initiated by the interviewer for the 
specific purpose of obtaining research-relevant information, and 
focused by him or her on content specified by research objectives of 
systematic description, prediction, or explanation‖.   
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Interviews are very useful, particularly for getting the story behind 
participants‘ experiences. The interviewer, according to McNamara 
(1999), can pursue in-depth information around the topic and can be 
useful as follow-up to certain respondents to questionnaires with a view 
to investigate their responses. Although research objectives govern the 
questions asked in interviews, the content, sequence, and wording of 
interviews are entirely in the hands of the interviewer (Kerlinger, 1970).  
Interviews, according to Fontana and Frey (2005), can be divided into 
three categories, viz: structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, 
and unstructured interviews. A structured interview is one that has a set 
of predefined questions and the questions would be asked in the same 
order for all the respondents. This standardisation is aimed at minimising 
the possible effects of the questionnaire and the interviewer on the result 
of the research.  
Semi-structured interview is relatively more flexible than structured 
interview, and it consists of both closed-ended and open-ended 
questions. In a semi-structured interview the interviewer has the 
freedom, during the course of the interview, to adjust the sequence of 
the questions to be asked and to add questions based on the context of 
the participants‘ responses.  
Unstructured interview is an interview in which neither the questions nor 
the answer categories are predetermined, rather the interview rely on 
social interaction between the researcher and the informant (Minichiello 
et al, 1990). The objective of an unstructured interview is to expose the 
researcher to unanticipated themes and thus help him or her to develop 
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a good understanding of the interviewees‘ social reality from the 
interviewees‘ points of view.   
As earlier stated in Section 1.6, this research employed a questionnaire 
as the only method of data collection. The use of questionnaire as the 
only research instrument in this study can be justified for two main 
reasons. First, the desire to triangulate48 using questionnaire and 
interview could not be achieved because none of the respondents would 
agree to be interviewed. They claimed that petroleum taxation was a 
sensitive issue in Nigeria49 and any attempt to grant interview might 
cause them their jobs and even their lives. Thus, after several efforts to 
persuade them to change their minds had failed, it was understood that 
any further attempt to get the respondents interviewed might result in 
them responding to the questionnaire in a biased manner and hence the 
proposed use of an interview was dropped. Consequently, there has been 
a trade off between trying to ensure that undue pressure has not been 
applied to the respondents that may influence their responses, and 
seeking secondary confirmation of the validity of the responses. In 
addition, the study attempted to identify and minimise processes that 
might impact adversely on the reliability and validity of the data used in 
the analysis (see Section 5.4.3.3). Second, and more importantly, a 
questionnaire offers an objective means of gathering information 
concerning people‘s knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours 
                                                          
48 Triangulation is a term use to describe the use of a combination of methods in a 
research (Sarantakos, 1998) 
49 Part of the reason that made the respondents believe that petroleum taxation was a 
sensitive issue in Nigeria was because of the vested interests of very powerful people in 
the country in the oil sector (Gboyega et al., 2011). These people are well rooted in the 
executive, petroleum ministry, and the national assembly (Waddilove, 2012) making it 
difficult for experts in the industry to express their views.    
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(Oppenheim, 1992). This has served the study‘s aim of examining the 
perceptions that different groups have on whether the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is designed in line with the country‘s circumstances 
and needs. While the study is aware of the limitations of using a 
perception question as a basis for accepting or rejecting hypotheses, the 
approach has been persevered with because it was the role that the 
selected groups of ―experts‖ have in the design and operation of the tax 
system that is important. And one way of assessing their likely influence 
is to find out how they view what had happened to revenue collection 
and its administration. This insight into the propensity of the experts to 
have preconceived views on certain issues will affect the meaning and 
understanding attached to each and every variable investigated. In this 
way, using a perception questionnaire enables tentative conclusions to be 
drawn about the hypotheses and also allows fair conclusions to be drawn 
about the interplay between these experts.  
The processes involved in the design, piloting, and administration of the 
questionnaires are discussed in Sections 5.4.3.1 through 5.4.3.4 that 
follow.  
5.4.3.1 Questionnaire design 
The design of a questionnaire affects not only the response rate but also 
the validity and reliability of the data collected (Saunders et al, 2003). 
Accordingly, adherence to certain basic principles during the design 
process is a fundamental requirement for an effective questionnaire 
design. Oppenheim (1992), for example, suggested that words used in 
questions should be understandable to all respondents, and not only 
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that, the intended meaning of those words (i.e. spirit of the words) 
should be clear to all the respondents. In order to achieve this 
requirement for this study, a series of meetings was held with my 
supervisory team. After three months of writing, the wordings in the 
questions were satisfied to be simple and understandable to all the 
respondents. This position seems to hold true as none of the respondents 
complained or asked for clarification of the wordings in the questions.  
An effective questionnaire design also demands the aggregation of 
answers into a battery or composite of scale, such as the Likert Scale and 
Thurstone scale, in order to ensure that the items used are the most 
efficient and effective ones that exploit the construct of interest, 
maximise validity, minimise respondent burden, and minimise the 
financial costs of data collection (Krosnick, 1999). In this regard, except 
for the first section, which asked the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents, and indeed for some very few open-ended questions, this 
study employed a five point Likert scale (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 
3=neutral, 4=disagree, and 5=strongly disagree). This enabled the 
respondents to indicate, by ticking the appropriate boxes, the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed with statements in the questionnaire. 
A clear layout also makes a questionnaire effective (Saunders et al, 
2003). In this study, the questionnaire started with an introduction that 
stated the purpose of the survey and also included instructions for 
completing the survey. Assurance for the confidentiality of the 
information provided was also made clear in the introduction (see 
Appendix C). 
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The questionnaire was divided into five sections. The first section sought 
information on the demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
Respondents were asked three questions in this section regarding their 
place of work, occupation, and years of working experience. These 
characteristics were used to examine the differences in opinion among 
the study‘s different stakeholders regarding petroleum tax issues covered 
in the study. Other demographic characteristics, such as age, nationality, 
and educational background, have not been included in this study 
because they were not relevant in addressing the research question of 
the study. 
Section two of the questionnaire asked questions on Nigerian petroleum 
tax objectives and instruments. The aim was to determine whether, in 
the opinions of the respondents, these tax objectives and instruments 
were appropriately designed to achieve a balance between the interests 
of the government and those of the MOCs. Five were asked in all in this 
section. The first question asked the respondents views on how equitable 
oil revenue was shared between the government and the MOCs. The 
impact of tax incentives on MOCs investment decisions was asked in the 
second question. Question three asked the respondents‘ opinion as to 
whether the three tiers of governments in Nigeria were satisfied with the 
manner in which revenue from petroleum taxation is shared. The 
international competitiveness and effectiveness of the tax system in 
capturing appropriate share of oil rent to the government were asked 
respectively in questions four and five. 
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The third section asked five questions on issues governing petroleum tax 
administration in Nigeria. These issues relate to effectiveness of the tax 
system‘s administrative plan, government‘s efforts in ensuring the 
effectiveness of petroleum tax administration, adequacy of funds for 
petroleum tax agencies, and the effectiveness of country‘s tax agencies.  
In section four, three questions pertaining to petroleum tax compliance 
were asked to ascertain whether: i) in the views of the respondents the 
presence of a clear statement of the purpose of tax regulation and 
capacity for regular and timely review of the tax regulation have 
encouraged compliance; ii) database for petroleum taxes paid, adequate 
numbers of government petroleum taxation experts, and tax officials‘ 
adequate knowledge of the oil industry exist; and iii) petroleum tax 
policies help in achieving past payment of petroleum taxes. 
The final section addressed issues relating to flexibility of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system. Views of the respondents on the ability of the tax 
system to adjust to changes in tax regulations in other countries as well 
as increase in investors‘ risk of making losses were sought. Similarly, the 
respondents‘ views on the relationship between government take and the 
profitability of the oil companies as well as the control mechanisms of the 
tax system were sought. Other issues covered in the section were the tax 
system‘s response to fraudulent practices as well as the reaction of the 
tax system to requests by oil communities.  
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5.4.3.2 Pilot Study 
A pilot study is ―a specific pre-testing of research instruments, including 
questionnaire or interview schedules‖ (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 
2001:1). The importance of pilot testing has been acknowledged by 
many researchers. Blaxter et al (2006:137), for example, state that: 
 ―You may think you know well enough what you are doing, but the 
value of pilot research cannot be overestimated. Things never work 
quite the way you envisage, even if you have done them many times 
before, and they have a nasty habit of turning out very differently 
from how you expected on occasion‖  
Welman and Kruger (1999) also identified the significance of pilot testing 
to include: i) needed for the detection of possible flaws in the 
measurement procedures and operationalisation of independent 
variables; ii) valuable to identify unclear or ambiguous items in a 
questionnaire; and iii) help gather information, through the non-verbal 
behaviour of respondents, about any embarrassment or discomfort 
concerning the content or wordings in a questionnaire.      
Generally, the main aim of pilot study is to provide information that can 
contribute to the success of a research project. This is affirmed by quotes 
from many scholars, for example: ―to see if the beast will fly‖ (De Vos et 
al, 2002:410), ―Do not take the risk, pilot test first‖ (Van Teijlingen and 
Hundley, 2001:2). Pilot testing, therefore, saves some time, effort, and 
money which can be lost if a study fails because of unforeseen 
shortcomings. Additionally, pilot testing enables researchers to refine 
questions to be clearer and to ensure successful data recording 
(Saunders et al, 2003). 
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In this study, two pilot tests were conducted in succession. The first test 
was conducted at the Aberdeen Business School (ABS). Four research 
students, two academic staff, and one administrative staff took part in 
the exercise. Their comments, suggestions, and recommendations 
regarding the content, questions wordings and the layout of the 
instrument were all noted and the questionnaire revised accordingly.  
The second pilot test was conducted in Nigeria with some respondents 
from across the stakeholders groups. As the oil and gas departments of 
the study‘s stakeholders‘ groups are all situated at their headquarters, all 
the respondents for the test were selected from the headquarters. 
Valuable comments and suggestions were received. Although there were 
no complaints either on the wordings or the clarity of the questions, most 
of the participants complained that the questionnaire was too lengthy 
and suggested its reduction. With the help of my supervisor, the 
questionnaire was thoroughly revisited, and revised in line with the 
participants‘ comments and recommendations. 
5.4.3.3 Reliability and validity   
The decision as to how research should be conducted in order to get the 
answers needed and to minimise the threats to the credibility of the 
findings requires the consideration of two important concepts: reliability 
and validity. Reliability and validity are quality evaluation concepts that 
are commonly used in quantitative research (Golafshani, 2003). 
Although, many naturalistic investigators, notably Lincoln and Guba 
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(1985)50, have attempted to use different terminology in order to 
distance themselves from the positivist paradigm, several authors still 
argue that the broad and abstract concepts of reliability and validity can 
still be applied to all research as the general goal of finding plausible and 
credible explanations for outcomes is central to all research (Kuzel and 
Engel, 2001). Still further, some investigators, such as Pitts (1994), have 
attempted to respond directly to the issues of reliability and validity in 
their qualitative studies. 
Reliability indicates the extent to which a variable or set of variables are 
in agreement with what it is intended to measure (Hair et al, 2005). It is 
simply described by Joppe (2000:1) as: 
―The extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate 
representation of the total population under study is referred to as 
reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a 
similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to 
be reliable‖. 
There are various threats to reliability. Saunders et al (2003) identified 
four of them, namely; participant error, participant bias, observer error, 
and observer bias. Participant error reflects the attitude of the 
respondents at the time of receiving the questionnaire. Where the timing 
of the receipt of the questionnaire is inappropriate for them, then results 
generated may be different from their actual beliefs due to stresses and 
variables of their surroundings. In this study the respondents were asked 
to fill the questionnaire within a period of three weeks. It is, therefore, 
believed that the respondents were not under stress and their answers 
                                                          
50 In a seminar work in 1985, Lincoln and Guba used the concept of ―trustworthiness‖ 
consisting of four aspects: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as 
a qualitative substitute for the quantitative concepts of reliability and validity. 
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not distorted. Participant bias, on the other hand, occurs when 
participants can be identified individually as they tend to give desirable 
answers. In this study respondents were anonymous. It is, therefore, 
assumed that this threat did not affect the reliability of the questionnaire.  
Observer error occurs due to the way questions are asked in the 
questionnaire. This error is minimised by standardising more than 95% 
of the questions in this study. Making the questions to conform to 
particular style was to allow the respondents to interpret them in a 
similar way. Observer bias occurs when the researcher looks for data 
that support his or her point of view. To minimise this threat the 
researcher tried to be as objective as possible during the collection and 
the analysis of data. 
Validity, on the other hand, is defined as the ―appropriateness, 
meaningfulness, and usefulness of a measure for a specific purpose. 
Validity is generally seen as the most important consideration in the 
evaluation of a measure‖ (Jenson, 2003:2). Similarly, Saunders et al 
(2003), describe validity as ability of a study to truly measures what was 
intended to be measured, or how truthful research results are. A more 
precise definition of validity is the one given by AERA et al (1999:184) as 
―the degree to which accumulated evidence and theory support specific 
interpretations of test scores entailed by proposed uses of a test‖.  
There are many different types of validity. Jensen (2003) identifies three 
the most common types of validity to be content, construct, and criterion 
validity. Content validity refers to the extent to which the items of a 
measure are representative of some defined domain of interest and it is 
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usually determined by expert judgement. Construct validity refers to how 
well questions related to the same objective correlate with each other 
and it is often established through factor analysis, opinion of judges, and 
known correlations among others. Criterion validity refers to how well 
results obtained from one data collecting instrument are supported by 
other surveys or questionnaires and it is often established by correlating 
the results of the different gathering instruments.  
Just like reliability, there are also a number of threats to validity. Some 
of these, as identified by Lafaille and Wildeboer (1995), are: first, the 
composition of a research group also affects the validity of a research 
instrument. There is, for example, the problem of subject bias, in which 
the wrong people have been selected as respondents. This study avoided 
this threat by employing a careful selection procedure of respondents.  
Second, the influence of participants‘ also affects the validity of an 
instrument. A research participant can have influence in several ways, 
including; belief system, social influence (such as sexual or social 
taboos), memory failure, and poor state of health (such as bad eye-
sight). This threat is minimised by standardising more than 95% of the 
questions in this study. The standardisation of questions was to allow the 
respondents to interpret the questions in a similar way. 
Third, there is the possibility of subject mortality. This threat has little or 
no effect on this study for two main reasons: participants‘ responses 
were gathered via a questionnaire and within a short period of time, and 
a reasonable number of questionnaires with allowances for possible 
eventualities were administered to respondents. 
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5.4.3.4 Administration of questionnaire 
With the exception of three questionnaires51, all the returned 
questionnaires were personally administered to the respondents by the 
researcher. As all the 0il and Gas departments of the surveyed 
institutions were located in Abuja as at the time when the field work was 
conducted, the researcher went to these institutions and met with 
officers in charge of research and then handed over the questionnaires to 
them who in turn distributed them to the appropriate  staff. In the case 
of NNPC, the researcher was not allowed to see the officer in charge of 
research. However, with the help of a colleague, who is an influential 
executive member of the Corporation‘s Union, the NNPC‘s portion of the 
questionnaire was distributed to the appropriate staff. In the same vein, 
the same colleague also helped in distributing the questionnaires for the 
MOCs and MPR. 
Some of the questionnaires were returned within a week, while others 
took up a month and a half. A series of telephone calls and personal 
visitation to the institutions were made all with the view to maximise the 
response rate. 
5.5 Methods of data analysis used in this study 
Bogden and Bilken (1982:145) defined data analysis as:  
―The process of systematically searching and arranging the interview 
transcripts, field-notes, and other materials that you accumulate to 
increase your understanding of them and to enable you to present 
what you have discovered to others‖.  
                                                          
51 These were NNPC staff that were served an electronic copy of the questionnaire 
through their email box. They duly filled the questionnaire and returned via the 
researcher‘s email box.  
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Data analysis, Bogdan and Bilken (1982:145) further noted, involves: 
―Involves working with data, organising it, breaking it into 
manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering 
what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you 
will tell others‖ 
Accordingly, Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data analysis as 
consisting of three activities: i) data reduction, ii) data display, referring 
to organised assembly of information to enable the making of 
conclusions, and iii) conclusion drawing and verification. These three 
activities are interwoven before, during, and after data collection. 
Data reduction, which is otherwise called data condensation (Tesch, 
1990), refers to the process of selecting, simplifying, abstracting, and 
transforming raw data, is an ongoing process throughout the analysis 
process. It can occur, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), through 
the choice of a conceptual framework and achieved through summaries, 
and coding among others. Data need to be reduced in order to make it 
more readily handy and understandable (Berg, 2004). 
Data display, on the other hand, Miles and Huberman (1994:11) noted, 
is ―an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits 
conclusion drawing and action‖. The most frequent form of display, for 
qualitative data, in the past has been extended text. This is because it is 
cumbersome (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data display is intended to 
organise the collected data in a way that will permit conclusion drawing 
(Berg, 2004). The creation and use of displays, as with data reduction, 
are not separate from analysis but part of it. 
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Conclusion drawing and verification involves drawing meaning from data 
and building a logical chain of evidence. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
noted that there should not be any definitive conclusion during data 
collection and preliminary conclusions should be verified. 
The above processes can be achieved either by a parametric or non-
parametric statistical tests. Parametric statistics, Geisser and Johnson 
(2006) noted, assume that data are drawn from a type of probability 
distribution (usually normal) and inferences are made about the 
parameters of the distribution. On the other hand, non-parametric 
statistics do not depend on the type of the probability distribution from 
which data were drawn. Table 5.3 presents some of the commonly 
statistical analysis together with parametric and corresponding non-
parametric tests. 
Table 5.3: Some Commonly Used Statistical Tests 
Parametric Nonparametric test Purpose of test 
t test for 
independent 
samples 
Mann-Whitney U test; 
Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test 
Compares two independent 
samples 
Paired t test 
Wilcoxon matched 
pairs signed-rank test 
Examines a set of differences 
Pearson correlation 
coefficient 
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 
Assesses the linear 
association between two 
variables. 
One way analysis of 
variance (F test) 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
of variance by ranks 
Compares three or more 
groups 
Two way analysis of 
variance 
Friedman Two way 
analysis of variance 
Compares groups classified 
by two different factors 
    Source: Dallal, 2001 
 
From Table 5.3, the t-test and Mann-Whitney test are tests used for 
comparing the means of two independent groups under parametric and 
non-parametric statistics respectively. The t-test assumes that data are 
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normally distributed and the two groups have equal variances. It is 
arguably the most widely used statistical test and produces excellent 
results. However, when discrete and or much skewed data are analysed, 
t-test results may void. On the other hand, the Mann-Whitney test 
specifies that the two independent groups come from the same 
population and are homogeneous and have the same distribution. The 
Mann-Whitney test is one of the most powerful non-parametric tests 
(Landers, 1981) and like any other non-parametric test does not depend 
on assumptions on the distribution of the population. 
Paired t-test and Wilcoxon matched pairs tests are parametric and non-
parametric tests for examining set of differences. The paired t-test 
examines the mean differences of individual paired measurements and 
therefore appropriate for pre and post situations. It is suitable for the 
evaluation of constant difference between two values (Westgard and 
Hunt, 1973). However, when it is used to analyse other types of 
differences it may lead to a problem. Wilcoxon matched pairs test, on the 
other hand, is used to explore the magnitude of difference between 
matched groups. It is most powerful for using the quantitative 
information inherent in the ranking of the differences in rank that are 
obtained by the matched pairs. 
Pearson correlation coefficient is a parametric statistical test which has 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient as its non-parametric 
equivalent for measuring the linear relationship between two variables. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear 
relationship between two variables and has the advantage of being 
169 
 
completely invariant to the linear transformations of these variables. 
Where the assumptions of the Pearson correlation are met but one or 
both of the variables are measured on ordinal scale instead of interval or 
ratio scale, then the Spearman‘s rank correlation coefficient is employed.   
One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Kruskal-Wallis tests are 
parametric and non-parametric tests that are employed in evaluating 
whether differences exist between three or more groups. ANOVA, which 
requires the homogeneity of variances, is a commonly used statistical 
test in many areas of science (Rice and Gaines, 1989). However, 
intergroup heteroscedasticity makes its application difficult.  
Generally, parametric tests are often used and are more robust than 
non-parametric tests. For parametric tests to produce accurate results 
the assumptions underlying them must be sufficiently met. However, as 
Erceg-Hurn and Mirosevich (2008) noted, these assumptions are rarely 
met in practice. Thus, for this and other reasons non-parametric tests are 
most prepared in the social sciences.    
In this study, data were analysed in line with the objectives of the study 
and involved the following steps.  
1. Data reduction: This was achieved through the adoption of the 
economic rent theory as a framework, determination of appropriate 
respondents, and careful construction of survey questions. Tables and 
figures were used in displaying the data gathered and no conclusion was 
made during data collection process.  
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2. Data codification: Coding is ―the process of converting questionnaire 
data into meaningful categories to facilitate analysis‖ (Williams, 2003). It 
involves the subdivision of the data and assignment of categories (Dey, 
1993). According to Williams (2003) researchers either think of the 
coding scheme at the beginning of their research in order to allow direct 
data entry from the questionnaire into the database or alternatively code 
the questionnaire responses onto separate coding sheets then enter the 
data from the coding sheets into the database. For the purpose of this 
study, the questionnaire responses were coded onto separate coding 
sheets before entered into the database (Appendix B). With the help of 
the study‘s supervisory team, the coding of the questionnaire was 
discussed with one of the statisticians of the Robert Gordon University. 
This was to avoid any mistakes during the coding stage. 
3. Adoption of statistical package: In order to enable the entry of the 
coded data into the computer system, the SPSS statistical package was 
adopted. Although there are other statistical packages52 that could be 
adopted, the choice of the SPSS was informed by at least two reasons. 
First, it is an extremely powerful data analysis package that handles very 
compound statistical procedures (Pallant, 2005). Second, it is the most 
widely used package in social science research.  
4. Missing value analysis: Missing values or data are questions with no 
answers or variables with no observations. This might be due to 
respondents refusing to answer a question, or because they do not 
understand the question, or there was not time for them to complete the 
                                                          
52 These include AtlasTi, Hyperreserch, Nud*ist, Nud*ist Nvivo, Decision Explorer, and 
Minitab, among others. 
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questionnaire, or that the respondents just lost interest. No matter how 
small that percentage, missing data can cause serious analysis problems. 
There is, for example, the problem of threat to the validity of a study, 
which, according to Croninger and Douglas (2005), is the main problem. 
In this study, having determined that the missing data were MCAR53,54, 
the mean estimation technique was used in completing the missing 
values. It is used in this study for two reasons. First, the mean 
estimation technique is the most widely used technique (Raymond, 
1986). Second, the SPSS software, which is employed in this study, has 
features that enable the computation of the mean automatically.  
5. Statistical tests and discussion of results: After the missing values 
were completed, the main analysis of the data was conducted using 
descriptive and non-parametric statistical tests. The descriptive statistics 
used were mean, median, cross-tabulation, and frequencies. These were 
used to analyse the demographic characteristics of the respondents as 
well as to explain the overall perception of the respondents in relation to 
each of the variables tested. On the other hand, the non-parametric 
statistic used was the Mann-Whitney test. The Mann-Whitney tests 
between the groups were conducted and the responses between the 
groups were identified and discussed.   
                                                          
53 Generally, there are three types of missing data that the literature on missing data 
identified (Nakai and Ke (2011): i) Missing completely at random (MCAR), which means 
the probability that responses are missing is unrelated to both the specific values that 
should have been obtained and the set of observed responses; ii) Missing at random 
(MAR), referring to the probability that responses are missing depends on the set of 
observed responses, but is unrelated to the specific missing values that should have been 
obtained; and iii) Not missing at random (NMAR), in which the probability that responses 
are missing depends on both the specific values that should have been obtained and the 
set of observed responses.  
54 The determination of the data as MCAR was through the Little‘s MCAR test. The test is 
based on the assumption that the calculated mean of the observed data in each 
assessment under MCAR is always the same regardless of the pattern of missingness 
(Little, 1988).    
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6. Summary of main findings: On the basis of the decisions made, a 
summary of the main findings together with the possible practical 
implications of each of the outcome was made. This summary served as 
the basis for the study‘s conclusion made in the final chapter.   
5.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, a review of literature on research methodology and 
methods was carried out. This served as a basis for the research 
methodology and methods adopted for the study. Specifically the 
interpretive paradigm is adopted for this study. The choice of this 
paradigm informed the adoption of the ideographic methodology. With 
the respondents‘ objection to interview, the study employed only 
questionnaires in collecting the data for the study which were analysed 
using the SPSS computer software. 
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Chapter Six 
Presentation and analysis of data 
6.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the questionnaire-based survey data 
collected. To achieve this, the rest of the chapter is divided into four 
sections. Section 6.2 gives an analysis of the response rate of the 
questionnaire. This is followed by the analysis of the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents using descriptive statistics in section 
6.3.  Section 6.4 discusses the analysis of the main findings from the 
survey. Finally, section 6.5 concludes the chapter.   
6.2 Questionnaire response    
The response rate of a questionnaire varies from one questionnaire to 
another and usually within the range of 10% to 90% (Walonick, 2004). 
However, well developed questionnaires, Walonick (2004) maintained, 
consistently produce high response rates. In this study, as noted in 
Chapter 5, a total of 139 questionnaires were administered to all the 10 
groups of respondents and 95 of them were returned (see Table 6.1). Of 
the 95 returned questionnaires, 3 were excluded because they were not 
completed in accordance with the instructions given. With this exclusion, 
the remaining 92 questionnaires constitute 66% of the total 
questionnaires administered. This is a very good response rate given the 
evidence above.  
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Table 6.1: Questionnaires issued and returned 
Respondents groups Issued  
 
Returned Excluded Used  
1) Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation 
 
15 
 
15 
 
0 
 
15 
2) Federal Inland Revenue 
Service 
 
15 
 
13 
 
0 
 
13 
3) Central of Bank of Nigeria  
15 
 
10 
 
0 
 
10 
4) Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
 
15 
 
7 
 
0 
 
7 
5) Multinational Oil Companies  
15 
 
7 
 
1 
 
6 
6) Accountant General‘s office  
15 
 
8 
 
2 
 
6 
7) Auditor General‘s office  
15 
 
7 
 
0 
 
7 
8) Nigerian Extractive 
Industries Transparency 
Initiative  
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
0 
 
 
4 
9) National Assembly  
15 
 
11 
 
0 
 
11 
10) Higher Institution of 
Learning 
 
15 
 
13 
 
0 
 
13 
 
Total  
 
139 
 
95 
 
3 
 
92 
 
Several reasons have contributed to the high response rate recorded in 
this study. One of the reasons is the influence of an introductory letter 
from my supervisor (see Appendix A). This letter, which is written on a 
letter headed paper of the Robert Gordon University, clearly emphasise 
the importance of the research as having not only educationally exciting 
but also an important economic consequences for Nigeria. This 
encouraged the respondents to partake in the survey. 
The appealing nature of the questionnaire is also another reason that led 
to the high response rate achieved (see Appendix C). The questionnaire 
was accompanied by a cover page which states, among other things: the 
objective of the research, procedure for answering the survey questions, 
and a guarantee of confidentiality for respondents. Similarly, in order to 
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make it easier for the respondents to read the questions, each question 
in each section was separated from the other with a blank line and also 
typed in a 12 font size.  
Furthermore, enough time was given to the respondents to answer the 
questionnaire. A period of three weeks with frequent follow-up through 
telephone calls and personal visits encouraged the respondents to 
complete the questionnaire. Motivated with this approach, some of the 
respondents, on completion of a questionnaire, gave the researcher 
telephone calls to come over and collect the completed questionnaire. 
The cooperation from officers‘ in-charge of research in the institutions 
surveyed also helped in raising the response rate. With the help of these 
officers, the questionnaires were distributed to the right persons for 
completion. 
6.2.1 Data check  
The first step taken in the analysis is to ensure the integrity of the data 
by checking the accuracy of the data coding and entry. This was done by 
going through all the returned questionnaires and checking them against 
the data entered into the SPSS program file. There were about five cases 
in which the data were entered wrongly. For example, entering a value of 
22 instead of 2 in a cell or in some cases a variable was jumped and its 
value entered in the next immediate variable cell. The identification of 
these errors informed the decision to crosscheck the entire returned 
questionnaire over and over again against the corresponding data on the 
computer file. All the errors were uncovered and accordingly corrected  
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6.2.2 Missing values  
After a thorough analysis of the responses for missing values, 17 cases  
(representing 18.48% of total number of cases) were found to have 
missing values ranging from 1 to 6 values (see Table 6.2). These missing 
values constitute less than 1% of the total responses55.  
In order to handle the missing data, Little‘s MCAR test was run to 
ascertain the randomness of the missing values. The test revealed a Chi-
square = 856.398 (DF=805, Sig=.102). Because the significant value 
(0.102) is greater than 0.05 alpha value, the data in this study are 
indeed MCAR (i.e., no identifiable pattern exists to the missing data). As 
a result the mean estimation technique is used to complete the missing 
data56.  
Table 6.2: Pattern of cases with Missing value 
 
Cases 
 
3 
 
4 
 
11 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
25 
 
28 
 
35 
 
46 
 
49 
 
56 
 
73 
 
75 
 
76 
 
Missing 
Values 
 
3 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
6.3 Demographic characteristics of respondents  
Three demographic characteristics of the respondents were surveyed, 
namely: place of work, occupation, and years of working experience. 
These characteristics were initially thought to be useful for the analysis. 
However, after careful consideration of the fact that emerged from the 
                                                          
55 There were 59 variables and 92 cases in all, implying a total of 5428 responses. Of 
these 37 cells were left unanswered. This translates to 0.68% of the total responses 
(37/5428). 
56
 The reasons for adopting the mean estimation technique is given in Section  5.6.3.3 
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field work which suggests that occupation and years of working 
experience were not determinants of the respondents‘ knowledge of tax 
system design and administration these two characteristics were not 
used in the analysis. Nonetheless, the response frequencies of all the 
three demographic characteristics are reported in Table 6.3 below.  
Table 6.3: Frequency of respondents’ demographic characteristics  
Place of Work Frequency Percentage 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 15 16.30 
Federal Inland Revenue Service 13 14.13 
Central of Bank of Nigeria 10 10.87 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources 7 7.61 
Multinational Oil Companies 6 6.52 
Accountant General‘s office 6 6.52 
Auditor General‘s office 7 7.61 
Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative 
4 4.35 
National Assembly 11 11.96 
Higher Institution of Learning 13 14.13 
Total 92 100.0 
 
Working experience in years Frequency Percentage 
Less than 5 years 12 13.04 
5 to 9 years 27 29.34 
10 to 14 years 24 26.09 
15 to 19 years 8 8.70 
20 to 24 years 7 7.61 
Greater than 24 years 14 15.22 
Total 92 100.0 
 
 
 
Occupation Frequency Percentage 
Accountant 16 17.39 
Auditor 11 11.96 
Tax Official 14 15.22 
Law Maker 5 5.43 
Lecturer 13 14.13 
Engineer 13 14.13 
others 20 21.74 
Total 92 100.0 
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6.4 Main findings of the study  
In this section, the six hypotheses developed for the study are tested. 
Hypothesis testing is a process that comprises of five steps: ―i) 
assumptions making; ii) stating the research and null hypotheses and 
selecting alpha; iii) selecting the sampling distribution and specifying the 
test statistic; vi) computing the test statistic and v) making a decision 
and interpreting the results‖ (Lean-Guerrero and Frankfort-Nachmias, 
2011:166).  
The assumptions to be made, according to Lean-Guerrero and Frankfort-
Nachmias (2011), are those relating to the level of measurement of 
variables, population distribution, sampling methods and sample size, 
among others. For the purpose of this study, the assumptions relating to 
all these aspects were discussed in Chapter 5.  
The sections that follow present a descriptive analysis of the frequency 
distribution of the respondents‘ responses with a view to determine the 
overall perceptions of the respondents in relation to each of the 59 
variables employed in the study.  At 5% level of significance57, Mann-
Whitney tests were run to determine if any differences exist between the 
respondents groups. The resultant differences were analysed using 
crosstabulation tests. 
 
                                                          
57 The choice of a level of significance in a research is a subjective task (Stigler, 2008). In 
the academic world, Christoffersen (2002) noted, a significant level of 1%, 5%, or 10% is 
normally used. However, for many applications, a 5% level of significant is chosen 
(Stigler, 2008). 
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6.4.1 Appropriateness of Nigerian petroleum tax system in 
balancing the interests of the government and the MOCs 
This section relates to the first hypotheses of the study. The hypothesis, 
which is to be tested using the responses to five statements relating to 
section B of the research instrument, is restated as follows:  
H11:  Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair representation of the 
interests of the government and the MOCs. 
 
Designing a tax system that reconciles the interests of the government 
and that of the investors requires the understanding and the application 
of at least two concepts, one of which, according to Andrews-Speed 
(2000), is economic rent. Thus, guided by the choice of economic rent as 
a framework, the study sought the respondents‘ views on each of the five 
statements relating to hypothesis H11 with a view to determining 
whether the Nigerian petroleum tax system has fairly captured the 
interests of the government and those of the MOCs. 
Table 6.4 shows the frequencies and percentages of the respondents‘ 
views on the suitability of the objectives of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system. There were a total of 92 responses for each of the five 
statements.  
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  Table 6.4: Descriptive frequencies relating to petroleum tax 
objectives 
 
     Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, 
D=Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in 
brackets are percentages 
 
Statements M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
i) Equity in the distribution of oil 
revenue between the 
government and the MOCs 
 
3.18 
 
3.50 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
 
20 
(21.7) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
39 
(42.4) 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
92 
(100) 
ii) Yearly increase in government 
share of petroleum revenue 
 
2.26 
 
2.00 
 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
35 
(38.0) 
 
12 
(13.0) 
 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
 
3 
(3.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
iii) Influence of tax incentives on 
MOCs investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit 
 
2.13 2.00 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
54 
(58.7) 
 
12 
(13.0) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
2 
(2.2) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Accelerated depreciation 
 
 
2.77 3.00 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
31 
(33.7) 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Guaranteed profit 
margin for MOCs 2.20 2.00 
 
19 
(20.7) 
 
47 
(51.1) 
 
17 
(18.5) 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
2 
(2.2) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Offsetting of new project 
costs with income of ongoing 
projects 
 
2.40 
 
2.00 
 
17 
(18.5) 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
92 
(100) 
iv) Distribution of tax revenue 
among the tiers of government 
in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 
 
1.98 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
39 
(42.4) 
 
 
33 
(35.9) 
 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 State government 
 
 
 
3.46 
 
4.00 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
40 
(43.5) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Local government 
 
 
 
3.50 
 
4.00 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
41 
(44.6) 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
v) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system: 
 Tax incentives package 
to investors 
 
 
 
 
2.12 
 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
 
 
 
49 
(53.3) 
 
 
 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
 
 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
 
 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Allocation of part of the 
oil production to multinational oil 
companies 
 
2.39 
 
2.00 
 
19 
(20.7) 
 
39 
(42.4) 
 
19 
(20.7) 
 
9 
(9.8) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Guaranteed minimum 
rate of return to multinational oil 
companies 
 
2.43 
 
2.00 
 
12 
(13.0) 
 
43 
(46.7) 
 
26 
(28.3) 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Compensation of 
investors for any increase in 
risks 
2.65 2.00 
 
11 
(12.0) 
 
36 
(39.1) 
 
25 
(27.2) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
92 
(100) 
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6.4.1.1 Equitable distribution of oil revenue between the 
government and the MOCs   
This section sought the respondents‘ views on equity in the distribution of 
oil rent between the government and the MOCs.  The respondents‘ views 
were asked because producing nations are faced with the challenges of 
designing a fair and equitable tax regime that strikes a balance between 
their needs and that of the investors (Otto, 2000). The main reason for 
such difficulty is because: 
 ―In matters of mining taxation, governments rarely believe that 
companies pay too much tax; companies rarely believe that they pay 
too little tax; and citizens rarely believe that they actually see 
tangible benefits from the taxes that are paid.‖ (Otto et al, 2006:xi) 
From Table 6.4, it can be seen that the respondents did not share the 
same opinion. 30% of the respondents agreed that there was an 
equitable distribution of oil rent between the government and the MOCs, 
while 50% disagreed and the remaining 20% were neutral. Given these 
diverse views about how equitable revenue is distributed between the 
Nigerian government and the MOCs operating in the country, Mann-
Whitney tests were run to determine the differences between the groups. 
The result is presented in Table 6.5 below.   
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Table 6.5: Mann-Whitney tests for equitable distribution of 
petroleum rent 
Mann-Whitney tests 
Groups C N1 F M1 A1 A2 N2 N3 
M1 .029  .026   .027   
M2  .021  .003 .032  .016 .010 
   
 Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 0.05 
(i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), 
A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office 
(AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of learning 
(HIL).     
 
The MOCs differed with five groups, namely; NNPC, MPR, AGF, NEITI and 
NASS. Two-third (i.e. 67%) of the respondents from the MOCs agreed 
that the distribution of petroleum rent between the government and the 
MOCs was equitable. This position was contrary to the 60%, 85%, 50%, 
75% and 72% disagreement respectively held by the respondents from 
the NNPC, MPR, AGF, NEITI and NASS. These five groups are 
government agencies and, therefore, their disagreement might not be a 
surprise because it is consistent with the position in the literature that 
government across oil producing nations ―rarely believe that companies 
pay too much tax‖ (Otto et al., 2006: xi).  Accordingly, it could be argued 
that the Nigerian government was not satisfied that there was an 
equitable distribution of oil rent between it and the MOCs as 
demonstrated by the various petroleum policy reforms undertaken in the 
country over the years as discussed in Section 3.2.   
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From the findings above, it could be argued that there was no equity in 
the distribution of oil rent between the government and the MOCs. 
Hence, the research hypothesis H11 above is not accepted for this 
statement. 
6.4.1.2 Yearly increase in government share of petroleum 
revenue   
As most oil producing countries heavily depend on revenue from crude oil 
(see Table 2.2), these countries always ―look for opportunities in the oil 
sector to enhance government revenue‖ (Adedipe, 2004:2). Thus, this 
statement was tested in order to ascertain whether, in the opinion of the 
respondents, Nigeria‘s share of revenue from crude oil is increasing 
yearly.  
Of the 92 respondents, 62 (representing 67%) of them were in 
agreement that the government share of oil rent was increasing year by 
year. Thus, on average (mean = 2.26), the respondents were in 
agreement. However, since 13% of the respondents were neutral and 
20% were in disagreement, Mann-Whitney tests were run to determine if 
any differences exist between the groups. Table 6.6 presents the results.   
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Table 6.6: Mann-Whitney tests for yearly increase in government 
share of petroleum revenue  
Mann-Whitney tests 
Groups F C A1 A2 N2 N3 H 
N1 .000 .002 .014   .040 .015 
F    .012 .009 .004 .008 
C    .036 .018 .014 .023 
 
   Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 0.05 
(i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
             ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), 
A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office 
(AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of learning 
(HIL).   
 
   
From Table 6.6, the NNPC differed from five groups, namely: FIRS, CBN, 
AGF, NASS, and HIL. A cross tabulation of the differences revealed that 
53% of the respondents from the NNPC disagreed that the government 
share of petroleum revenue was increasing year by year. This finding 
contrasts vividly with the 100%, 90%, 83%, 73% and 77% agreed 
responses recorded from the FIRS, CBN, AGF, NASS, and HIL 
respectively. The NNPC‘s disagreement was quite unexpected because 
being the nation‘s only national oil company through which the 
government regulates and participates in the oil industry, it is expected 
that it should have an adequate knowledge of the yearly increase in the 
government‘s share of petroleum rent. However, since it neither collects 
nor accounts for revenue from crude oil disposal, it might not be in a 
privileged position of knowing the trend of government‘s revenue from oil 
rent compared to the CBN, FIRS, and AGF who are respectively 
responsibilities for the collection, custody and accounting for government 
revenue from crude oil disposal (see Section 3.6.2).   
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The NASS, unlike the NNPC, agreed that the government share of 
petroleum revenue was increasing year by year. As the representative of 
the people, parliaments across the world ensure ―budget best matches 
the nation‘s needs with the available resources‖ by focusing on areas that 
need to be exploited or improved upon (Krafchik and Wehner, 1998). 
This yearly exercise clearly gives the NASS the opportunity to better 
understand the trend of the government share of revenue from crude oil.  
The test results also revealed that the FIRS and the CBN differed with 
four other groups, namely: AGO, NEITI, NASS, and HIL. The differences 
here, however, relate to the extent of agreement as all the groups 
agreed: 57% of the respondents from the AGO agreed while 100% and 
90% from the FIRS and CBN respectively agreed. This agreement 
suggests that Nigeria‘s share of oil revenue changes as circumstances in 
the oil sector changes and this concurs with the argument that a 
petroleum tax system that is designed to capture economic rent tends to 
increase government take when economic rent increases, and reduces 
government take when economic rent decreases (Nakhle, 2008).  
Second, a comparison of the FIRS and CBN with NEITI revealed that the 
first 50% of the respondents from NEITI agreed while other 50% 
disagreed. NEITI as an institution was established to promote due 
process and transparency in the Nigerian extractive industry by 
conducting annual audit of the industry. So far, after eight years of 
existence, NEITI was only able to publish two audit reports. This might 
suggests that it was not having all the information it required in 
preparing its annual audit work. Where information is not adequate, the 
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available information may only be ―applicable to a number of tasks being 
performed‖ (O‘Reilly, 1982:756) and, as such, it is likely that persons 
performing different tasks within the same unit might well be differently 
informed. This might be the reason why the NEITI respondents did not 
share the same view.  
Third, a comparison of the FIRS and the CBN with the NASS revealed 
that 73% of the respondents from the NASS, as against the 100% and 
90% agreement from the FIRS and CBN, agreed that the government 
share of revenue from petroleum rent increases yearly. As most of the 
respondents from the NASS were law makers, their knowledge of the 
yearly trend of government revenue from petroleum is likely to be 
different to that of their counterparts from the FIRS and the CBN who are 
respectively responsible for the assessment and collection of taxes 
accruing to the government and maintenance of offshore bank account 
into which the MOCs pay all petroleum taxes due to the government (see 
Section 3.6.2).  
On a general note, the evidence above suggests that the government 
share of revenue from petroleum taxation was increasing year by year. 
Therefore, in relation to this statement, hypothesis H11 is accepted.   
6.4.1.3 Influence of petroleum tax incentives on MOCs investment 
decisions  
Tax incentives are a very important aspect of petroleum taxation. Since 
governments across most oil producing nations do not have the technical 
and financial capability to carry on exploration and production (E&P) 
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activities, they turn to MOCs who have both the financial and technical 
strengths needed for the E&P of petroleum resources by offering them 
incentive packages purposely designed to attract investment (Anenih, 
2003).  Effectively, this helps the governments to achieve their desires 
for increased foreign direct investments while at the same time making 
the investment atmosphere economically attractive to the MOCs. In this 
way, the interests of both the government and the MOCs are captured in 
the tax system. This underscores the testing of this statement.  
Table 6.7: Mann-Whitney tests for influence of petroleum tax 
incentives on MOCs investment decisions 
 
a) Investment tax credit  
 
                 Groups N1 M1 M2 N3 H 
                      F .008 .020 .036 .002 .023 
 
b) Accelerated depreciation 
 
                 Groups M1 M2 N2 N3 H 
                      F .001 .035 .005 .023 .039 
 
c) Guaranteed profit margin 
 
                 Groups M2 A2 
                     N3 .033 .033 
 
d) Cost Consolidation 
 
                 Groups F A2 H 
                      C .036 .021 .024 
   
    Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
            ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), 
A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office 
(AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of learning 
(HIL).     
 
From Table 6.4, 72 (78%) of the total respondents from all groups 
agreed that investment tax credit influences the MOCs‘ investment 
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decisions. Of the remaining 20 (22%), 12 (13%) respondents were 
neutral, and 8 (9%) disagreed. With a mean score of 2.13 and median 
score of 2.00, the respondents, on average, were in agreement that 
investment tax credit influences investment decisions. An investigation 
into the differences between the groups in relation to the influence of 
investment tax credit on investment decisions revealed five differences 
(see Table 6.7). These differences, which relate to the extent of the 
agreement, were between the FIRS and five other groups, namely: 
NNPC, MPR, MOCs, NASS, and HIL. While 100% of the respondents from 
the FIRS agreed that investment tax credit influences investment 
decisions, only 80%, 86, 50%, 64% and 69% of the respondents 
respectively from the NNPC, MPR, MOCs, NASS and HIL agreed. This 
overwhelming agreement is not a surprise because investment tax credit, 
as a form of relief, has the effect of directly reducing the amount of taxes 
to be paid by the MOCs and empirically, just like any other incentive, has 
been found to be significant factors in influencing investment decisions 
(Allen and Wells, 2001). 
In terms of accelerated depreciation, out of the 92 respondents 41 (45%) 
respondents agreed 24 (26%) disagreed and 27 (29%) were neutral. 
This distribution of response indicates the existence of differences among 
the groups. Mann-Whitney tests revealed five differences run (see Table 
6.7).  Again the differences here were also between the FIRS and five 
other groups, namely: MPR, MOCs, NEITI, NASS and HIL. First, 77% of 
the respondents from FIRS agreed while 71% of their counterparts from 
the MPR were neutral. The FIRS were likely to agree not only because it 
was the nation‘s institution responsible for the formulation of tax 
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regulations but also because tax incentives have empirically proved to be 
effective in attracting investments (Allen and Wells, 2001). The MPR, on 
the other hand, might be aware that tax incentives are effective in 
attracting FDI inflows but their neutral view suggested their reservation 
in the case of Nigeria as empirical evidence has shown that tax incentives 
are not an important consideration in investment decisions among firms 
operating in Nigeria (Hakam, 1996).   
Second, in the case of the MOCs there was an equal distribution of the 
respondents‘ views among agreed, disagreed and neutral positions. The 
MOCs, having operated in many oil producing countries, might be 
expected to know that tax incentives do not always lead to an increase in 
FDI. This is because empirical evidence has shown that tax incentives 
have the potential of both increasing FDI (Allen and Wells, 2001) and 
decreasing FDI (Mooij and Ederveen, 2003 and 2005). In spite of this 
inconsistency in findings, it is, nevertheless, established that tax 
incentives, of which accelerated depreciation is one, are often provided to 
attract FDI (Fletcher, 2002).  
Third, none of the respondents from NEITI agreed that accelerated 
depreciation influences investment decisions, instead 50% of them 
disagreed and 50% were neutral. The possible reason that account for 
the 50% disagreement was that many firms in Nigeria use accelerated 
depreciation incentive to engage in what is called ―accounting 
engineering‖ (Nlerum, 2011)58. As a result, old assets appreciate in value 
                                                          
58 The term ―accounting engineering‖ refers to the practice in which firms, under the 
cover of accelerated depreciation allowance, write off so much value of their assets in 
order to declare losses and also valuate obsolete stocks that worth nothing (see Nlerum, 
2011).   
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even if they are worthless. This view might be that the respondents, as in 
the case of the MOCs, had the understanding that tax incentives do not 
necessarily lead to an increase in FDI.  
Fourth, the HIL had a mixed response: 46% agreed, 31% neutral and 
23% disagreed. Thus, the same argument made for MOCs views also 
applies here. 
Guaranteed profit margin is also a special incentive offered by the 
Nigerian government to the MOCs. 72% of the total respondents agreed, 
19% were neutral and 9% disagreed. On average, the respondents were, 
therefore, in agreement that this incentive influences investment decision 
of the MOCs. This view confirms Allen and Wells (2001) findings that tax 
incentives positively impact on MOCs‘ investment decisions and in 
particular the fact that it has succeeded in reducing the tax burden of the 
MOCs (see Khan, 1994).    
From Table 6.7, only two differences relating to guaranteed profit margin 
between the groups were recorded. A cross analysis of the differences 
revealed that all the three groups agreed that guaranteed profit margin 
influences investors investment decisions. While 100% of the NASS 
respondents agreed, 67% and 71% of the respondents from the MOCs 
and AGO agreed respectively. The respondents‘ agreements implied that 
the government motive of providing the incentive to reduce the MOCs tax 
burden and stimulate inward investments, as discussed in Section 3.2, 
was a right decision.  
Offsetting the costs of new projects from the incomes of ongoing projects 
(i.e. cost consolidation) is another incentive given by many oil producing 
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nations. Descriptive statistics of the respondents‘ views on this incentive 
revealed about 59% of the respondents were in agreement. With a mean 
score of 2.40 and a median score of 2.00, the result suggests that cost 
consolidation is an incentive that influences MOCs investment decisions in 
Nigeria. This view further validates Allan and Wells‘s (2001) findings 
referred to earlier. Mann-Whitney tests results for the differences 
between the groups are presented in Table 6.7.  
A cross tabulation of the differences indicated that 100% of the 
respondents from the CBN agreed that cost offset influences the MOCs 
investment decisions while only 46%, 57% and 54% of the respondents 
from the FIRS, AGO and HIL agreed. These differences in agreement 
rates were partly accounted for by the neutral position taken by about 
one-third of the respondents from the FIRS, AGO and HIL.  
In summary, a majority of the respondents agreed that all the four 
incentives tested influence the investment decisions of the MOCs.  These 
agreements confirm the position in the literature that tax incentives are 
significant determinants of FDI (see Allen Wells, 2001). The agreements 
also confirm Olabisi‘s (2009) empirical findings that tax incentives are an 
important requirement for Nigeria‘s economic growth and development.  
Although there were some differences between the groups, it is evident 
that most of the differences were in relation to the strength of agreement 
between the different groups. Therefore, the research hypothesis H11 
stated above is accepted in relation to these statements.  
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6.4.1.4 Distribution of tax revenue among the three tiers of 
government in Nigeria 
This is the fourth statement relating to hypothesis H11. In this regard, 
the respondents‘ views were sought on whether the three tiers of 
governments in Nigeria (i.e. Federal, State, and Local) are satisfied with 
the formula for sharing revenue from petroleum taxation59,60.  Petroleum 
revenue (and indeed all other revenue) that accrue to Nigeria is shared, 
on a monthly basis, among the three tiers using a revenue sharing 
formula.  
The rationale for asking this question was based on the realisation of the 
importance of revenue sharing among the components parts in a federal 
state as Watts (1970:46) argues thus:  
―Federal finance is an extremely important and controversial subject 
because: first, it affects the allocation of administrative responsibility 
because the financial resources available will place limits on the 
scope of administration which either level of government is able to 
sustain. Second, it affects the political balance because whichever 
level of government has the major financial resources, finds its hands 
the means of political control. Third, it is significant also because the 
assignment of fiscal and expenditure powers will use these 
instruments to control the economy‖  
An analysis of the overall mean and median scores of the groups 
revealed a mean of 1.98 and a median score of 2.00 under Federal 
government tier, indicating that all the groups have strong views that the 
Federal government is satisfied with the way revenue from petroleum is 
                                                          
59 Nigeria‘s current revenue sharing formula is: Federal government; 48.5%, State 
government; 24%, Local governments; 20%, and special fund; 7.5%. 
60 Revenue sharing formula in Nigeria is designed and revived, at least every five years, 
by the Nigerian Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission. This Commission 
is an autonomous body and does not receive direction from any person or authority in the 
discharge of its duties (RMAFC, 2012).  
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shared. This view represents the views of 78% of the respondents. The 
Mann-Whitney tests between the groups revealed only a single difference 
between the groups and that was between the FIRS and NEITI (Table 
6.8).  
     Table 6.8: Mann-Whitney Tests for Revenue Distribution 
among the three Tiers of Government in Nigeria 
 
a) Revenue distribution to Federal government 
 
                  Groups N2 
                      F .006 
 
b) Revenue distribution to Local governments 
 
                   Groups M1 M2 A2 N3 
                       F  .044  .025 
                      M2   .012 .006 
                      N2 .036  .038 .027 
 
Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 0.05 
(i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
          ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), 
A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office (AGO), 
N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N3 = 
National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
 
Analysis of the differences revealed that 100% of the respondents from 
the FIRS agreed that the Federal tier was satisfied with the way oil 
revenue was shared among the three tiers of the Nigerian government. 
On the other hand, 50% of the NEITI respondents agreed and other 50% 
disagreed. While it might be argued that the NEITI respondents based 
their disagreement on the financial difficulties the Federal government 
was facing61, it is not enough to justify that the Federal government was 
                                                          
61 The Nigerian government was financially constrained in the last few years. This made 
the government to take various measures of improving its financial position including the 
widely criticised removal of petrol products subsidy. 
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not satisfied as it was receiving 48.5% of revenue that accrues to the 
federation (see Table 3.1).  
A look at the median scores reported for both the State and Local 
governments revealed that the groups‘ responded in the opposite 
direction to that of the Federal government. With less than 25% 
agreement and almost 57% disagreement response rates, the 
respondents were of the view that both the State and the Local 
governments were not satisfied with the way revenue from petroleum tax 
is shared. This might be due to the fact that the States, particularly those 
from the oil producing regions, have for many years been clamouring for 
a review of the revenue formula and have been publicly voicing their 
views (Kalu, 2012). There are currently 36 States in Nigeria and all of 
them put together get only 24% share of the total revenue (see Table 
3.1).  
Mann-Whitney tests between the groups in respect of the State 
government showed no difference in the opinion between the groups. 
However, in relation to the Local government, seven differences were 
revealed between the groups. From Table 6.8, the FIRS differed from 
MOCs and NASS. The FIRS and the MOCs responded in different 
directions. 54% of the respondents from the FIRS disagreed that the 
Local governments were satisfied with the distribution of the oil revenue 
while 50% of the respondents from the MOCs agreed. The views of the 
MOCs might not be appropriate because of the serious agitation by state 
and local governments in the country, in recent years, for new revenue 
allocation formula to replace the existing one which has been described 
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as outdated and out of tune with the current realities of Nigeria 
(Economic Confidential, 2011).  
The FIRS and the NASS, on the other hand, differed in the strength of 
disagreement. 54% of the FIRS respondents disagreed while 90% of the 
respondents from the NASS disagreed. As law makers who represent 
their localities62, their strong disagreement might be an indication of their 
desire toward ensuring that the sharing formula is reviewed to balance 
the interests of all the three tiers of governments. This argument is 
consistent with the outcome of the recent debate by the NASS on the 
need to review the existing revenue formula (Fabiyi, et al., 2012). 
On a general note, since the findings above indicated that both the State 
and Local governments were perceived not to have been satisfied with 
the current revenue sharing, it could be argued that the distribution of 
revenue among the three tiers of government was not satisfactory. 
Hence, the research hypothesis H11 is rejected in relation to this 
statement.    
6.4.1.5 International competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system 
This section tests the fifth statement of hypothesis H11.  Respondents‘ 
views on the international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system in four different areas were sought: i) tax incentive packages to 
investors; ii) allocation of part of oil production to MOCs; iii) guaranteed 
                                                          
62 The NASS in Nigeria comprises of two chambers: the Senate and the House of 
Representative. It comprises of 109 senate members and 260 House of representative 
members. Each state of the federation is represented by 3 senate members and an 
appropriate number of house of representative members depending on the number of 
local governments in each state.  
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minimum rate of return to MOCs; and iv) compensation of investors for 
any increase in risks.  
Most oil producing nations do not have the technical and financial 
capacity to undertake E&P activities, and as such, they turn to the MOCs 
for investment in such activities (Anenih, 2003). Given this constraint 
and the enormous investment opportunities open to the MOCs, producing 
nations have no choice other than to make their tax regimes more 
competitive by providing investors with incentive packages such as those 
mentioned above.   
First, in relation to tax incentive packages to the MOCs, 78% of the 
respondents agreed that the incentive packages positively impacted on 
the international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system.  
Although 11% of the respondents disagreed, the mean score of 2.12 
suggests that the respondents, on average were in agreement. Tests for 
the differences between the groups are summarised in Table 6.9. 
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  Table 6.9: Mann-Whitney tests for international competitiveness 
of the Nigerian petroleum tax system 
 
a) Tax incentive package to investors 
 
Groups F C M2 A2 N3 H 
F   .047  .043  
M1 .003 .006  .021  .049 
 
b) Guaranteed minimum rate of return to the MOCs 
 
                   Groups N1 M2 A2 
                        N3 .045 .013 .008 
 
    Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
            ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
None of the respondents from both the FIRS and MOCs disagreed that 
Nigeria‘s petroleum tax incentive package has an impact on the 
international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. This 
possibly explains why there are currently eighteen MOCs operating in 
Nigeria with some being established as far back as 1937 (NIPC, 2012). 
However, while 100% of the respondents from the FIRS agreed, only 
50% of their counterparts from the MOCs agreed, with the remaining 
50% being neutral. As the MOCs have operating experiences in many oil 
producing countries across the world, the neutral view expressed by the 
50% respondents could suggest their reservation concerning the relative 
competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. It could equally 
well be that they did not feel they had the necessary information to 
express a positive opinion. 
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Second, just as in the case of tax incentive packages, the overall 
response median score (2.00) of the respondents indicates that, on 
average, the respondents were in agreement that allocation of part of oil 
production to the MOCs positively impacts on the international 
competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. This view 
confirms the MOCs preference for PSC earlier discussed in Section 2.5.2 
and further explains that Nigeria‘s move toward PSC is a right policy 
choice. The Mann-Whitney tests conducted to determine if any 
differences exist between the groups revealed no differences at the alpha 
value of 5% set for the study.  
The third incentive package tested is the provision of guaranteed 
minimum rate of return to the MOCs. In this case, 55 respondents, 
representing 60% of the total respondents, agreed that the provision of 
guaranteed minimum rate of return to the MOCs was positive on the 
international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. The 
rapid increase in the number of MOCs operating in Nigeria coupled with 
the discovery of important oil fields, such as Chota and Nnwa-1 oil fields 
following the introduction of the incentive in 1977 (see Frynas, 2000)63 
suggest that the respondents‘ agreement was a call for the government 
to timely revise the incentive as deemed appropriate64. An investigation 
of the differences between the groups disclosed three statistically 
significant differences. 
                                                          
63 Chota and Nnwa-1 oil fields were discovered in 1998 and 1999 respectively by Conoco 
and Statoil oil companies. The two fields have oil reserves of 60 and 200 million barrels 
respectively  
64 From 1977 to 1991 the guaranteed minimum margin to the MOCs in Nigeria was 
revised three times: 1977 ($0.80), 1982 ($1.60), 1986 ($2.00), and 1991 ($2.50)(see 
Frynas, 2000).  
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From Table 6.9, it can be seen that the NASS views differed from those 
of NNPC, MOCs and AGO. Further, 90% of the respondents from the 
NASS agreed that a guaranteed minimum rate of return improves the 
international competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system while 
about 40% of the respondents from the NNPC and MOCs disagreed. One 
of the possible reasons for the disagreed view among the respondents 
from the NNPC and MOCs was that guaranteed minimum rate of return, 
as tax petroleum incentive, is provided by producing nations to cushion 
the effects of any possible oil crisis. As such, it could be argued that it is 
only competitively effective when there is a global oil crisis and hence the 
respondents‘ disagreement. However, in the case of Nigeria, as discussed 
in Section 3.2, although the incentive was mostly fashioned during the oil 
glut of the 1980s, the resultant discovery of important oil fields and 
government‘s continued use of the incentive is an indication that the 
incentive may be positively impacting on the competitiveness of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system. 
Fourth, on compensation of the MOCs for any increase in their risks, the 
statistics showed that 51% of the respondents agreed that compensation 
for an increase in risk impacts positively on the international 
competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. A comparison for 
the differences between the groups revealed only one statistically 
significant difference between the NASS and the HIL who held 55% 
disagreement and 69% agreement respectively. The agreement by the 
HIL was not a surprise given the vast knowledge they have on issues 
relating to petroleum E&P activities. Petroleum E&P is a high risk 
business characterised by high geological and financial risks (Suslick, 
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2009) and because of this the MOCs are continuously faced with the 
decisions of allocating their scare resources. Thus, any increase in the 
geological and financial risks of the MOCs that is not compensated by the 
host country might lead to diversion of investments to other countries.   
Based on the findings above, it could be argued that all the four incentive 
packages were perceived to be positive in impacting on the international 
competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. Hence, in relation 
to this statement, the research hypothesis H11 is accepted.   
6.4.2 Suitability of the Nigerian petroleum tax instruments in 
meeting the objectives set for the tax system     
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, petroleum tax instruments are applied in 
order to achieve set petroleum tax objectives. In this section, the 
research hypothesis H12, which is restated below, is tested on five 
different petroleum tax instruments employed in Nigeria: i) bonuses and 
fees; ii) royalty; iii) income tax; iv) participation; and v) production 
sharing. These instruments, as discussed in Chapter 3, are the main 
petroleum tax instruments employed in Nigeria. Therefore, an insight 
into the effectiveness of these instruments is important for determining 
whether Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system has the appropriate tax 
instruments capable of meeting the nation‘s petroleum tax objectives. 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments are suitable for achieving the 
objectives set for the petroleum tax system. 
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Table 6.10 below presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents‘ 
views on the appropriateness of the tax instruments in achieving the 
nation‘s petroleum tax objectives. 
Table 6.10: Descriptive frequencies relating to Nigeria’s 
petroleum tax instruments 
 
       Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, 
D=Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in 
brackets are percentage 
 
From Table 6.10, 59 respondents, representing 64% of the total 
respondents, agreed that bonuses and fees were effective in achieving 
the objectives of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. On the other hand, 
only 15% of the respondents disagreed. With a mean score of 2.33 and a 
median score of 2.00, the respondents, on average, agreed that bonuses 
and fees were effective in achieving Nigeria‘s petroleum tax objectives. 
On individual levels, eight differences were recorded between the groups 
(Table 6.11).   
Statement M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
Effectiveness of petroleum tax 
instruments  
 Bonuses and fees 
2.33 2.00 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
41 
(44.6) 
 
19 
(20.7) 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
1 
(1.1) 
 
92 
(100) 
 
 Royalty 
 
2.14 2.00 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
46 
(50.0) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
 
 Income tax  
 
2.33 2.00 
14 
(15.2) 
49 
(53.3) 
14 
(15.2) 
15 
(16.3) 
- 
- 
2 
(100) 
 
 Participation 
 
2.65 3.00 
15 
(16.3) 
27 
(29.3) 
30 
(32.6) 
15 
(16.3) 
5 
(5.4) 
92 
(100) 
 
 Production sharing  
 
2.51 2.00 
20 
(21.7) 
33 
(35.9) 
17 
(18.5) 
16 
(17.4) 
6 
(6.5) 
92 
(100) 
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Table 6.11: Mann-Whitney tests for suitability of Nigerian petroleum tax 
instruments in achieving Nigeria’s petroleum tax objectives 
 
a) Bonuses and fees  
 
               Groups F C A1 A2 N2 N3 
                   N1 .003  .049  .014  
                   M1 .001 .010  .008 .011 .027 
 
b) Royalty 
 
               Groups N1 M1 M2 N3 
                    F .014 .020 .041 .049 
 
c) Income tax 
 
               Groups N1 F C M1 N3 
                   A2 .018 .018 .023 .026 .028 
                   N2 .039  .026 .028  
 
d) Participation 
 
               Groups F M1 A2 N3 
                   M1 .039    
                   N2  .023 .032 .030 
 
e) Production sharing 
 
Groups C M1 M2 A2 N2 N3 H 
N1   .044  .044   
F  .015 .004 .043   .046 
N2 .047 .014 .007 .031  .040 .016 
 
   Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
            ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), 
A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office 
(AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), 
N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of learning 
(HIL).     
 
 
From Table 6.11, the first set of differences were between the NNPC and 
three groups, namely; FIRS, AGF and NEITI in which only 47% of the 
respondents from the NNPC agreed that bonuses and fees were effective 
in achieving tax objectives while 92%,67% and 100% of the respondents 
from the FIRS, AGF and NEITI agreed. With a 43% disagreed response 
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rate, the MPR differed from the FIRS, CBN, AGO, NEITI and NASS that 
respectively had 92%, 70%, 86%, 100% and 64% agreed response 
rates. As the analysis in Section 6.4.1.5 revealed that, based on the 
perceptions of the ―experts‖ surveyed, the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system is internationally competitive, the agreement expressed by the 
respondents from the FIRS, CBN, AGF, AGO, NEITI and NASS is arguably 
the perceived wisdom because the position of the literature on bonuses is 
that they are usually effective in areas where competition is keen among 
the MOCs (Sunley et al., 2002).  
In terms of royalties, the distribution shows that 75% of the total 
respondents agreed while about 10% disagreed. On average, as 
indicated by the mean result of 2.14, the respondents were in agreement 
that royalties were effective in achieving Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
objectives. Mann-Whitney tests for the differences between the groups 
revealed that the FIRS differed from four other groups, namely; NNPC, 
MPR, MOCs, and NASS (Table 6.11).  
First, the FIRS differed from the NNPC and MOCs in strength of 
agreement. The FIRS held a 100% view that royalty was an effective tax 
instrument in achieving tax objectives while the NNPC and MOCs 
respectively held 60% and 83% agreed responses. On the other hand, 
although the MPR and the NASS had agreed to some extent, they 
differed from the FIRS by holding 42% and 27% disagreed responses. 
Although those respondents who disagreed might have based their views 
on the basis of the fact that the MOCs are resistance to the use of 
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royalties by host countries (Sunley et al., 2002)65, their views might not 
be correct because royalty is considered as a factor payment similar to 
factor payments for capital and labour input (Conrad et al., 1990) and is 
paid to the government as soon as production starts (Sunley et al., 
2002). Thus, the view that royalties are effective in achieving Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax objective is arguably the most correct view.  
The effectiveness of income tax in achieving the objectives set for 
petroleum tax system in Nigeria was agreed to by 69% of the total 
respondents. With a mean score of 2.33, the respondents were convinced 
that income tax, just like bonuses and royalty, was an effective 
instrument for achieving tax objectives. At group level, there were, 
however, some differences between the groups. These differences are 
presented in Table 6.11.  
First, the AGF shared different views with the NNPC, FIRS, CBN, MPR, 
and NASS. The differences between the AGF and three of the groups - 
NNPC, CBN and NASS - relate to the extent of agreement: 83% of the 
respondents from AGF agreed while 60%, 60% and 73% of the 
respondents from NNPC, CBN and NASS agreed respectively. In 
comparison with the MPR, on the other hand, the difference was due to 
the mixed opinion held by the MPR: 43% agreed and 29% disagreed. 
Similarly, an analysis of the differences between the NEITI had and the 
NNPC and CBN revealed that the differences were due to strength of 
agreement in which NEITI held 100% agreed views while the NNPC and 
the CBN each held 60% agreed views. Income tax is creditable against 
                                                          
65 MOCs dislike the use of royalties because royalties are only allowed as deductible 
expenses for income purposes but are not allowed as tax credits at the MOCs home 
countries‘ income tax (Sunley et al., 2002).  
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the income tax levied in the MOCs‘ home country (Sunley et al., 2002). 
As such, the MOCs expect to be taxed in the host country otherwise they 
might be heavily taxed in their home country. Hence, the 
appropriateness of the respondents‘ agreed view. 
The respondents‘ view on participation was mixed with 46% agreed, 33% 
neutral and 21% disagreed. With a mean score of 2.65, it appears the 
respondents on average were neutral. Some of the groups, however, 
differed between themselves (Table 6.11). 
First, an investigation of the differences revealed that the respondents 
from the MPR and FIRS differed in that 43% of the respondents from the 
MPR disagreed that participation was an effective instrument in achieving 
tax objectives while 54% of their counterparts from the FIRS agreed.  
Second, NEITI shared different view with the MPR, AGO and NASS with 
75% of its respondents in agreement while 43% and 43% of the 
respondents from the MPR and AGO in disagreement. The MPR, AGO and 
NASS arguably disagreed because the country is moving toward PSC in 
recent years (Asiodu, 2009). However, as discussed in Section 3.5.1, the 
Nigerian government, through the NNPC has been participating in six JV 
contracts with the MOCs and collectively these JVs account for over 95% 
crude oil production in Nigeria. In addition, since there is no evidence 
suggesting that the government has the intention of relinquishing its 
stake in the JV contracts, it is appropriate to argue that the agreed view 
by the FIRS and NEITI were most correct.  
In relation to production sharing, 58% of the total respondents agreed 
that it was an effective instrument in achieving the tax objectives while 
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24% disagreed. However, as indicated by a median score of 2.00, the 
respondents were on average in agreement. An investigation of the 
differences between the groups revealed some differences. First, the 
NNPC differed from NEITI in strength of agreement: 67% of the 
respondents from the NNPC agreed while 100% from NEITI agreed. A 
possible reason for their agreement could be Nigeria‘s trend toward PSC. 
Second, none of the MOCs‘ respondents agreed that production sharing 
was effective, instead 67% of them decided to be neutral. Since most of 
the Nigeria‘s PSCs are with the existing MOCs operating in Nigeria who 
are in JV agreements with the government (see Section 1.2), the MOCs‘ 
neutral view might not be a suggestion of the ineffectiveness of the PSCs 
but rather an admittance of some ethical issues surrounding the award of 
the PSCs as questioned in Section 1.2. Hence, the agreed view that 
Nigeria‘s PSCs were effective in achieving Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
objectives is arguably the most correct.     
Overall, the analysis above revealed that, from the respondents‘ 
perception, Nigeria‘s petroleum tax instruments were effective in 
achieving Nigeria‘s petroleum tax objectives. Thus, the research 
hypothesis H12 is accepted in relation to this statement.  
6.4.3 Nigeria’s administrative plan for petroleum tax matters  
In this section, the third hypothesis was tested. The hypothesis, which is 
restated below, is based on three main aspects of Nigeria‘s 
administrative plan for petroleum tax matters, namely; 
comprehensiveness, flexibility, and cost effectiveness of administration. 
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H13: Nigeria has in place a sound administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters. 
 
Respondents‘ views on the administrative plan for petroleum tax matters 
were sought for a number of reasons.  First, the establishment of a 
comprehensive tax administration system is one of the most serious and 
difficult problems that developing countries face (Edwards, 1991). Thus, 
respondents‘ opinions in this respect are very important in understanding 
the administrative effectiveness of Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system. 
Second, flexibility is very important in the administration of the 
petroleum tax system because of the volatility of the global oil 
environment. Flexibility will allows changes to be made in good time, 
thus, avoiding the difficulties of making relevant massive reforms to the 
tax system in the long run. Third, cost effectiveness is a core 
requirement for a sound administrative system and leads to cost savings 
to the government. 
Descriptive statistics of the respondents‘ views on the administrative plan 
for petroleum tax matters are summarised in Table 6.12 
 Table 6.12: Descriptive frequencies relating to Nigeria’s 
administrative plan for petroleum tax matters 
Statement M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is: 
 Comprehensive 
 
 
 
 
3.01 
 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
 
 
25 
(27.2) 
 
 
 
25 
(27.2) 
 
 
 
26 
(28.3) 
 
 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 
 Flexible  
 
2.65 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(9.8) 
 
36 
(39.1) 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
2 
(2.2) 
 
92 
(100) 
 
 Cost effective  
 
 
3.26 
 
3.00 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
22 
(23.9) 
 
22 
(23.9) 
 
26 
(28.3) 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
92 
(100) 
 
Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree, 
SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in brackets are 
percentages 
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From Table 6.12, 33 (36%) of the total respondents agreed that the 
administrative plan of the Nigerian petroleum tax matters was 
comprehensive while 25 (27%) remained neutral, and 34 (37%) 
disagreed. However, on average, both the mean (3.01) and the median 
(3.00) indicate that the respondents were neutral. A number of 
differences were, however, reported between the groups (Table 6.13).  
Table 6.13: Mann-Whitney Test results for Nigeria’s 
administrative plan for petroleum tax matters 
 
a) Comprehensiveness of Nigerian administrative plan for petroleum 
tax matters 
 
Groups F C M2 A1 A2 H 
N1 .036 .030  .021  .009 
M1 .024 .028 .019 .013 .032 .008 
N2 .050  .021 .019 .047 .028 
N3 .002 .007 .003 .002 .004 .002 
 
b) Flexibility of Nigerian administrative plan for petroleum tax matters 
 
Groups F C A1 A2 N2 H 
N1 .043 .037 .009 .041 .021 .002 
 
c) Cost effectiveness of Nigerian administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
 
              Groups F H 
                 N1 .029 .012 
                 M1 .034 .015 
 
 
   Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 0.05 (i.e. 
p≤.05) are shown in the table   
              ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland Revenue 
Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant 
General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H 
= Higher Institution of learning (HIL).   
 
From Table 6.13, the NNPC, with 60% of its respondents in 
disagreement, differed from four groups, namely: FIRS, CBN, AGF, and 
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HIL who held 46% (agreed), 60% (agreed), 50% (neutral), and 69% 
(agreed) views respectively. Similarly, the MPR and NASS, with 57% and 
91% disagreement respectively, differed from six other groups out of 
which four were those that disagreed with the NNPC.  The other two 
groups were the MOCs and AGO who respectively held 67% and 43% 
neutral response. Furthermore, just like the NNPC and MPR, the NEITI 
held 75% disagreement, making it different from the FIRS, CBN, and 
AGF. One of the possible reasons for the disagreed view might be the 
ongoing plan by the government to reform the Nigerian petroleum 
industry via the PIB as noted in Section 1.2. This might not be a valid 
reason because governments, from time to time, undertake reform 
programmes in order to make their tax systems in tune with existing 
realities in the global oil industry. The neutral views, on the other hand, 
expressed by the MOCs and AGO might be an indication that the existing 
tax plan was comprehensive as evidence has shown that the MOCs were 
in stiff resistance for the passage of the nation‘s petroleum industry bill 
(PIB)66. Therefore, the agreement expressed by the FIRS, CBN, and HIL 
is arguably correct because the review in Section 3.6 clearly 
demonstrates that Nigeria‘s petroleum tax administrative system has 
adequately captured all the requirements for petroleum tax 
administration as reviewed in Section 2.6.1 through 2.6.3.   
Flexibility is the second aspect of the administrative plan tested in which 
six differences were recorded. These differences were between the NNPC 
and six other groups. About 50% of the respondents from the NNPC 
                                                          
66 The PIB has been with the National Assembly since 2008, but as a result of pressure 
from the MOCs for the removal of certain sections of the bill which the government is still 
contemplating on, it has not yet been passed (Alike, 2011). 
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disagreed that the administrative plan was flexible while 50%, 67%, 
57%, 75 and 77% of the respondents from the CBN, AGF, AGO, NEITI 
and HIL agreed respectively. Flexibility allows for adjustments to be 
made to tax systems in line with changing circumstances. In Nigeria, 
significant changes have been made in recent years to the tax system 
that repealed obsolete provisions and simplified the complex ones 
(Oloyede, 2012). This possibility suggests that adequate provisions were 
in place that allows changes to be made when necessary. Hence, the 
view that the administrative plan was flexible is argued to be most 
appropriate.      
In terms of cost effectiveness, four differences were recorded. The first 
two differences were between the FIRS and two groups: NNPC and MPR 
in which the FIRS held 39% disagree and 39% neutral views that the 
administrative plan was cost effective while 73% and 72% from the 
NNPC and MPR disagreed respectively. The remaining two differences 
were between the HIL and the NNPC and MPR in which 62% of the 
respondents from the HIL agreed. Since the FIRS is the main tax 
institution in Nigeria that is vested with the responsibility for the 
assessment and collection of all taxes due to government, it is well 
positioned to know the cost effectiveness of the administrative plan, and 
hence it could be argued that the neutral response expressed by its 
respondents was an indication of cost ineffectiveness of the tax system. 
This is consistent with the position of the Technical Committee on 
Nigerian National Tax Policy that high tax administration costs is one of 
the major challenges facing Nigeria (see McKerchar and Evans, 2009).  
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In summary, based on the findings above, it was the perception of the 
respondents that the administrative plan of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system was comprehensive and flexible but not cost effective. Therefore, 
the hypothesis (H13) that Nigeria has in place a sound administrative 
system for petroleum tax matters is accepted for being comprehensive 
and flexible and rejected for being cost effective. 
6.4.4 Implementation processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system   
Implementation of petroleum tax regimes based on economic rent is 
often faced with difficulties (Guj, 2012). Since the worth of a tax regime 
rest on how well it is implemented, it is, therefore, imperative that 
producing nations put in place all necessary measures to ensure that 
these difficulties are overcome. Thus, in this section the effectiveness of 
the implementation processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax system were 
tested using research hypothesis H14. The hypothesis, which is based on 
four statements, is restated below. 
  H14: The implementation processes for Nigeria’s petroleum tax system 
are effective. 
 
Table 6.14 below presents descriptive frequencies of the respondents 
views on the four statements tested. 
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Table 6.14: Descriptive statistics relating to implementation 
processes for Nigeria’s petroleum tax system 
 
 
     Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, 
D=Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in 
brackets are percentages 
 
 
 
Statements M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
i) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 
 
2.51 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
20 
(21.7) 
 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
 
22 
(23.9) 
 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Financial support  
2.70 
 
2.00 
 
11 
(12.0) 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
17 
(18.5) 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 
2.40 
 
2.00 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
43 
(46.7) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
1 
(1.1) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
 
2.39 
 
2.00 
 
20 
(21.7) 
 
39 
(42.4) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
ii) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies: 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 
 
1.96 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
28 
(30.4) 
 
 
47 
(51.1) 
 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 
2.05 
 
2.00 
 
28 
(30.4) 
 
41 
(44.6) 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
- 
- 
 
92 
(100) 
 Central Bank of Nigeria  
1.68 
 
2.00 
 
43 
(46.7) 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
2 
(2.2) 
 
- 
- 
 
92 
(100) 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 
2.16 
 
2.00 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
50 
(54.3) 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
1 
(1.1) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
 
2.30 
 
2.00 
 
22 
(23.9) 
 
40 
(43.5) 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
14 
(15.2) 
 
3 
(3.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
iii) Features of Nigerian petroleum 
tax agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 
 
2.70 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
 
24 
(26.1) 
 
 
27 
(29.1) 
 
 
26 
(28.3) 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Good information system 2.95 3.00 
4 
(4.3) 
34 
(37.0) 
22 
(23.9) 
27 
(29.3) 
5 
(5.4) 
92 
(100) 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ information 
systems 
 
3.27 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
17 
(18.5) 
 
30 
(32.6) 
 
28 
(30.4) 
 
12 
(13.0) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Access to national 
petroleum database  
 
3.22 
 
3.00 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
24 
(26.1) 
 
22 
(23.9) 
 
28 
(30.4) 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
92 
(100) 
iv) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 
2.82 
 
3.00 
 
9 
(9.8) 
 
34 
(37.0) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 
2.83 
 
3.00 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
17 
(18.5) 
 
27 
(29.3) 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
 
3.15 
 
3.00 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
31 
(33.7) 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
11 
(12.0) 
 
92 
(100) 
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6.4.4.1 Government support for effective administration of 
petroleum tax system   
This section sought respondents‘ views on government support for 
effective administration of the petroleum tax system through: i) 
recruitment of required staff; ii) financial assistance; iii) staff training and 
development; and iv) improvement of staff welfare. Government support 
in these areas is particularly important because having an effective tax 
administration means generating more revenue, preventing the need for 
the introduction of higher tax rates, and facilitating an easy way to 
administer tax laws (Atta-Mills, 2002).  
From Table 6.14, 57 (62%) out of the total 92 respondents agreed that 
the government was supportive in recruiting the required staff for 
petroleum tax administration while 27 (29%) disagreed, and the 
remaining 8 were neutral. On average, the respondents were in 
agreement as indicated by a median score of 2.00. However, 
investigation of the differences between the groups revealed a number of 
differences (Table 6.15). 
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Table 6.15: Test results for government supports for effective 
administration of Nigerian petroleum tax system 
                 Mann-Whitney Tests  
 
a) Recruitment of required staff 
 
             Groups C A1 H 
               N1 .049 .010 .033 
                F .038 .011  
               M2 .027 .017 .028 
 
b) Financial support 
 
           Groups N1 F M1 M2 N2 
                A1 .037 .033 .011 .016 .037 
                H   .023 .029  
 
c) Training and development of staff 
 
           Groups C M1 A1 A2 H 
               N1   .049 .033 .006 
                F .044 .042 .044 .030 .006 
 
d) Improvement of staff welfare 
 
            Groups N1 F M2 N3 
                A1 .030 .013 .042 .014 
 
     Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
             ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
Eight differences were recorded under staff recruitment. The first three 
differences were between the NNPC and three other groups, namely; 
CBN, AGF and HIL. The NNPC and all the three groups agreed that the 
government was supportive in recruiting the required staff for the 
administration of the petroleum tax system. However, while 53% of the 
NNPC agreed, 80%, 83% and 84% of the CBN, AGF and HIL agreed 
respectively. Second, the FIRS also differed with the CBN and AGF. 
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However, unlike the NNPC, 54% of the respondents from the FIRS held 
disagreed view. Third, the MOCs differed with the CBN, AGF and HIL. 
While 50% of the respondents from the MOCs disagreed, more than 80% 
of the respondents from the CBN, AGF and HIL were in agreement. In 
spite of the agreements shown by the respondents from the NNPC, CBN, 
AGF, and HIL, it could be argued that the disagreement by the FIRS and 
the MOCs were more appropriate because of two main reasons. First, 
evidence has shown that the Nigeria‘s main tax institution (i.e. FIRS) is 
facing a serious challenge of lack of adequate personnel in its tax 
administrative responsibilities (Salami, 2011). Second, the MOCs have 
seen the staff capacity of many host countries, and this has placed them 
in a better position to understand the relative adequacy of the 
administrative staff strength of the Nigerian petroleum sector.    
Financial support for effective administration of petroleum taxation in 
Nigeria is the second aspect tested. The AGF, with an agreed response of 
83%, differed from the FIRS, MPR, MOCs and NEITI who respectively 
held 54% disagreed, 57% neutral, 50% neutral, and 50 disagreed views. 
The disagreed view of the FIRS is consistent with the argument that 
financing of petroleum tax administration is an area that receives less 
attention from host governments (Calder, 2010). As such, it could be 
argued that there was no adequate financial support for effective tax 
administration in Nigeria.   
Under training and development of staff, the NNPC held 40% agreed 
response, 26% neutral and 34% disagreement. This made it to be 
different from the AGF, AGO and HIL who held 83%, 85% and 84% 
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agreed response rates respectively. Similarly, the FIRS with a mixed 
response of 39% agreed, 15% neutral and 46% disagreement differed 
from the CBN, MPR, AGF, AGO and HIL who held 70%, 71%, 83%, 85%, 
and 84% agreed views. While the five respondents groups might have 
based their agreements on government‘s resolve toward training and 
development revenue staff (Omoigui-Okauru, 2008), the mixed views of 
the FIRS might be appropriate because empirical evidence has shown 
that most of the tax officers in Nigeria do not have up-to-date knowledge 
of doing their job because of lack of periodic training (Abiola and Asiweh, 
2012).  
Improvement of staff welfare was the fourth element of support tested, 
and the result revealed only four differences between the AGF and four 
other groups, namely, NNPC, FIRS, MOCs and NASS. All the groups 
agreed that the government was supportive of improving petroleum tax 
administrative staff. However, while 83% of the respondents from the 
AGF agreed, 55%, 62%, 50% and 46% of the respondents from the 
NNPC, FIRS, MOCs and NASS respectively agreed. Government in Nigeria 
has shown commitment over the years in ensuring that the welfare of 
revenue staff is improved. A good example is the recent improvement in 
the remuneration of revenue staff through the approval of new salary as 
well as the provision of loans to staff to purchase houses (Omoigui-
Okauru, 2008). This might be the reason for the agreed views expressed 
by all the respondents‘ groups.    
The above findings, therefore, suggest the following: i) poor staff 
recruitment ii) poor financial support iii) inadequate staff training and 
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development and iv) improved staff welfare. Improving staff welfare 
clearly motivates staff to achieve higher performance levels, but the 
overall administrative goal could only be achieved if the required number 
of staff are recruited and are given the necessary financial support to 
perform their duties. Since the findings have shown that the government 
was not supportive in these areas, it is logical to conclude that the 
research hypothesis H14 is rejected in respect of government support for 
petroleum tax administration in Nigeria.  
6.4.4.2 Adequacy in the finance of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies 
There are five agencies responsible for the administration of petroleum 
tax matters in Nigeria. These are: i) Federal Inland Revenue Service; ii) 
Department of Petroleum Resources; iii) Central Bank of Nigeria; iv) 
National Petroleum Investment Management Services; and v) Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources. The respondents‘ views were asked on the 
adequacy of government finance to these agencies. Financing tax 
administration through agencies is very important because it leads to 
strong incentives to increase revenue collection (Von Haldenwang, 2010), 
which is particularly important to Nigeria as it heavily depends on oil 
revenue collections. Accordingly, the research hypothesis H15 is tested.    
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Table 6.16: Mann-Whitney tests for adequacy in the finance of 
Nigeria petroleum tax agencies 
 
a) Federal Inland Revenue Services 
          Groups F C M1 M2 N3 
             H .002 .001 .001 .008 .004 
 
b) Department of Petroleum Resources 
         Groups F A1 A2 N3 H 
             N1  .015 .023 .002  
             M1     .043 
             N2 .030 .019 .035  .006 
             N3  .011 .014  .002 
 
c) Central Bank of Nigeria 
          Groups N1 N3 
             H .044 .036 
 
d) National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
         Groups N1 M1 M2 A2 
             A1 .016    
             H .005 .045 .044 .036 
 
e) Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
          Groups N1 F C M1 M2 N3 
              C .015 .034  .006   
             A1 .019 .030  .013  .015 
             A2    .038   
             H .002 .005 .016 .002 .047 .002 
 
     Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table   
             ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
From Table 6.14, the respondents, with a mean score of between 1.68 
and 2.30, agreed that all the agencies were adequately financed by the 
government. The differences between them are presented in Table 6.16. 
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There were five differences between the groups relating to FIRS. These 
differences, which relates to the extent of agreement, were between the 
HIL, which held 100% agreed response, and the FIRS, CBN, MPR, MOCs 
and NASS that respectively held 85%, 70%, 86%, 68%, and 91% agreed 
responses.  
In relation to the DPR, a number of differences were recorded. First, the 
NNPC with 60% agreement differed in strength of agreement from the 
AGF and AGO who held 100% and 86% agreed response respectively. 
Second, the MPR‘s also differed from the NASS in the strength of 
agreement with 71% agreed response as against NASS‘s 64% 
agreement. Third, the NEITI with 50% disagreement differed from the 
FIRS, AGF, AGO and HIL that respectively held over 85% agreement.  
Regarding the CBN, the HIL differed from the NNPC and NASS. While 
100% of the respondents from the HIL agreed that the CBN was 
adequately financed, 86% and 90% of the respondents from the NNPC 
and NASS agreed respectively.  
Under NAPIMS, the AGF held 100% agreement that the NAPIMS was 
adequately financed as against 60% agreement from the NNPC.  
Similarly, the HIL, with 84% agreement differed, on one hand, from the 
MPR and AGO that held agreed response of 71% each and the MOCs who 
held 67% neutral response, on the other hand.  
Many differences were recorded between the groups concerning the MPR. 
First, the CBN, AGF and HIL held 90%, 83% and 92% views that the MPR 
was adequately financed while only 53% and 62% of the NNPC and FIRS 
agreed. Second, the MOCs and NASS with 50% and 64% agreement 
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respectively differed from the HIL. While all these differences were due to 
strength of agreement, the MPR differed from the CBN, AGF, AGO and 
HIL with a mixed response of 29% each for agreement, neutral and 
disagreement.  
It is clear from the above analysis that most of the respondents‘ held the 
perception that government finance for all the five administrative 
agencies was adequate. The groups‘ agreements might be based on the 
relatively large budgetary allocations to these agencies over the years 
(Budget of the Federation, 2012). This suggests the government‘s desire 
for making these agencies effective in order to boost revenue generation 
consistent with the argument that financing tax administration through 
agencies leads to strong incentives to increase revenue collection (Von 
Haldenwang, 2010). Hence, the research hypothesis H14 is accepted in 
relation to this statement.  
6.4.4.3 Possession of required features by Nigerian petroleum tax 
administrative agencies for ensuring successful 
administration   
This section sought the respondents views as to whether the Nigerian 
petroleum tax agencies possess four important features that are 
fundamental for ensuring successful administration: i) appropriate 
number of petroleum tax professionals; ii) good  information systems; iii) 
an information system that is linked to other agencies‘ information 
systems; and iv) access to a national petroleum tax database. In order to 
extensively capture the respondents‘ views on this aspect, space was 
provided in the questionnaire to enable the respondents to make any 
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additional comments on any of the agencies. The additional comments, 
which came from very few respondents, were not captured as variables 
in the code sheet for reasons stated in Chapter 5 and are, therefore, 
presented and analysed here.  
These features are particularly important to the success of administering 
agencies. First, the presence of appropriate tax professionals is 
fundamental in making the MOCs fully understand and comply with the 
nation‘s petroleum tax regulations67. Second, good information systems 
enable tax administrative agencies to reduce processing times, make 
rapid adjustments to administrative procedures, and grant greater 
flexibility to operations, all of which translate into increased effectiveness 
(Gutierrez, 2002). Third, information system interconnectivity, Gutierrez 
(2002) further noted, enables immediate access to each other‘s database 
and the immediate crossing of transactions for verification, for example. 
Fourth, access to a national database allows the agencies to have a 
complete picture of the nation‘s petroleum system and, where necessary, 
make adjustments to the records on their database. 
From Table 6.14, the respondents were on average neutral in respect of 
all the four features. First, only 42% of the respondents were in 
agreement that an appropriate number of petroleum tax professionals 
exist in Nigeria‘s petroleum tax administrative agencies. With 29% of the 
respondents being neutral and another 28% disagreeing, the overall 
median score turns out to be 3.00 (neutral). Second, in terms of good 
information systems, the result also showed 41% agreed, 24% neutral 
                                                          
67 Tax professionals give advice on various tax matters and are not meant to be 
accountants only. They could be lawyers, auditors, or economists and each of which may 
be subject to independent regulations of his/her profession. 
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and 35% disagreed. This distribution led to a mean score of 2.95 and a 
median score of 3.00 meaning the respondents were again neutral as to 
the existence of good information systems in those agencies. Third, with 
a third (33%) of the respondents chosen to be neutral and only 24% in 
agreement, the respondents‘ perception of the existence of 
interconnectivity of information system among the groups resulted in 
mean and median scores of 3.27 and 3.00 (neutral). Fourth, access to 
national petroleum database was also no different from the three other 
features. The respondents consistently maintained a neutral position with 
a median score of 3.00.  
The overall neutral positions of the respondents are further confirmed by 
the various comments the respondents made on the issue. One 
respondent, while expressing his/her view about the existence of 
database in the administrative agencies commented thus: 
―I do not think that there is a comprehensive petroleum tax database 
maintained by any of the agencies.‖   
This uncertainty about the existence of an appropriate database made 
some respondents conclude that Nigeria‘s drive for an appropriate 
petroleum tax system is far from being attainable. A respondent from the 
CBN, for example, asserted that:  
―We lack an adequate database on daily petroleum production in 
Nigeria. We can‘t have an appropriate petroleum tax regime without 
a credible database.‖ 
Similarly, while a majority of the respondents did not comment on the 
presence of an appropriate number of petroleum tax professionals, a 
respondent from FIRS summed up the respondents neutral position thus:  
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―The Federal Inland Revenue Service is perhaps the only agency 
amongst the listed that boast an appropriate number of petroleum 
tax professionals‖ 
Just as in the case of all the variables above, Mann-Whitney tests were 
run to determine the differences between the groups (Table 6.17) 
Table 6.17: Mann-Whitney tests for required features for ensuring 
administrative success 
 
a) Appropriate number of petroleum tax professionals 
 
             Groups N1 C M1 A1 N3 H 
                 C .038  .014  .008  
                 M2  .002  .030  .038 
 
b) Good information system 
 
              Groups A1 A2 N3 H 
                 N1 .008  .039 .019 
                 M1 .011 .050 .043 .031 
                 N2 .016 .047 .038 .032 
 
c) Interconnectivity of information system 
 
Groups N1 C M1 M2 N2 N3 H 
A1 .010    .016 .015  
N2  .040 .014 .048    
 
d) Access to national petroleum database 
 
Groups C M1 M2 A1 A2 N3 H 
N1 .025   .026 .031  .021 
A1  .038    .019  
A2  .047    .034  
N2 .017  .048 .017 .017 .025 .019 
H  .045    .038  
     
 Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) 
are shown in the table  
             ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland Revenue 
Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s 
office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).   
 
  
The CBN, in relation to an appropriate number of tax professionals, 
differed from the NNPC, MPR and NASS. The CBN held 80% agreed 
response while the NNPC and MPR held mixed responses of between 29 
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and 33% for agree, neutral and disagree. The MOCs, on the other hand, 
were 50% neutral and 50% disagreed. This made it to be different from 
the AGF and HIL that held 67% neutral and 60% agreed responses 
respectively. Although 80% of the respondents from the CBN agreed, it is 
difficult to argue that there were an appropriate number of petroleum tax 
professionals as most of the other groups, who are equally administrative 
agencies, held mixed responses. This argument is consistent with 
Ewenpu (2010) and Odusola (2006) findings that inadequate professional 
manpower is one of the major problems that tax authorities in Nigeria 
are facing in service delivery.  
Possession of a good information system is also another feature that is 
required for successful administration of the tax system. Under this 
feature, the NNPC differed from the AGF, NASS and HIL. 60% of the 
respondents from the NNPC disagreed while 67%, 62% and 46% of the 
AGF, HIL and NASS agreed respectively. The MPR and the NEITI, with 
71% and 75% disagreement, also differed from the AGF, AGO, NASS and 
HIL. Most developing countries, unlike their developed counterparts, do 
not have a good database for tax matters. This is also true in relation to 
Nigeria as a study conducted by Abiola and Asiweh (2012) revealed that 
Nigeria does not possess a comprehensive database for tax matters.       
In terms of interconnectivity of the information system of the 
administrative agencies, 67% of the respondents from the AGF agreed 
that the information systems were interconnected. In contrast, 53%, 
100% and 55% of the respondents from the NNPC, NEITI and NASS 
disagreed. On the other hand, the NEITI respondents differed from five 
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groups, namely; CBN, MPR, and MOCs who held 50% agreed, 71% 
neutral, 50 neutral respectively. Going by Abiola and Asiweh‘s (2012) 
findings that Nigeria does not have a comprehensive tax database, it is 
difficult to argue that the information systems of the agencies were 
interconnected. This possibly explains the neutral views of the 
respondents.       
The groups recorded greater differences in responses between 
themselves in relation to the agencies access to national petroleum 
database. First, the NNPC, with 53% disagreement, differed from the 
CBN, AGF and HIL which respectively held agreed responses of 60%, 
50% and 54%. Second, the AGF and AGO each differed with the MPR and 
NASS which held 57% and 64% disagreed responses respectively. Third, 
with 100% disagreed view, the NEITI differed from the responses of the 
CBN, MOCs, AGF, AGO, NASS and HIL. Since it was the respondents 
perceived that Nigeria does not have a comprehensive tax database, as 
noted above, it will be difficult to argue that the agencies were effectively 
accessing the nation‘s tax database. Therefore, the disagreement by the 
NNPC, MPR, NASS, and NEITI is more appropriate.    
From the findings above it could be argued that the neutral views of the 
respondents were indications of lack of all the four features by Nigerian 
petroleum tax agencies for effective administration. Hence, the 
hypothesis H14 is rejected in relation to this statement.      
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6.4.4.4 Relationship and capacity of Nigeria’s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies  
In this section, the respondents‘ views on the relationship and capacity of 
the petroleum tax agencies in Nigeria relating to: i) effective team work; 
ii) detection of non-compliance; and iii) prosecution of companies for 
non-compliance were tested. As in section 6.4.2.4, space was allowed for 
the respondents to make free comments on any of the agencies.     
The rationale for asking this question is: 
First, teamwork is imperative where more than one agency is vested with 
responsibility of administering a tax system because it leads to improved 
service delivery, joint problem solving and increased understanding and 
trust between or among the agencies (Atkinson et al, 2007).  
Second, an understanding of the abilities of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
administrative agencies in the detection of non-compliance with tax 
regulations is important for meeting the needs of the nation because 
evidence has shown that the estimated revenue loss worldwide as a 
result of non-compliance with tax regulations is substantial and is seen to 
inflict a real cost on society as a whole (Collins et al, 1990; Andreoni et 
al, 1998).  
Third, prosecution of defaulters is an important tool for ensuring that 
defaulters are punished and a signal to other players in the industry of 
the consequences of non-compliance. 
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From Table 6.14, 47% of the total respondents agreed that the 
petroleum tax agencies were working as an effective team. Of the 
remaining percentage, 20% were neutral while 33% disagreed. Overall, 
the groups were neutral (mean = 2.82 and median = 3.00). Similarly, 
the respondents expressed mixed views in relation to the agencies‘ 
ability to detect non-compliance with tax regulations: 48% agreed, 19% 
were neutral and 33% disagreed. With a mean score of 2.83 and median 
score of 3.00, the respondents were neutral. Furthermore, the 
respondents were also neutral (mean = 3.15) in terms of the agencies‘ 
ability to prosecute the MOCs for non-compliance.  
Table 6.18: Mann-Whitney tests for the functions of Nigeria’s 
petroleum tax administrative agencies 
 
a) Effective team work 
 
                    Groups F C A1 A2 H 
                        M1 .049 .010  .002 .005 
                        M2 .033 .009  .002 .004 
                        N3  .011 .002  .004 
 
b) Detection of non-compliance 
 
                    Groups F C M2 A1 H 
                       N3 .031 .009 .020 .003 .030 
 
c) Prosecution for non-compliance 
 
                   Groups F M1 A1 H 
                       N1 .015  .033 .013 
                       A2 .047   .042 
                       N3 .008 .040 .007 .003 
 
 
     Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
              ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
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From Table 6.18, the MPR and MOCs differed from four groups, namely, 
FIRS, CBN, AGO and HIL. 57% and 67% of the MPR and MOCs 
respectively disagreed that the administrative agencies were working as 
an effective team. On the other hand, 69%, 60%, 86% and 77% of the 
respondents respectively from the four groups agreed. Meanwhile, the 
NASS with 46% neutral and 46% disagreed response differed from the 
CBN, AGF and HIL. Although most of the groups agreed, the 
disagreement by some of the agencies, especially the MPR, being one of 
the administrative agencies, has put the effectiveness of the agencies‘ 
team work into question because effective team work entails, among 
other things; ―a sense of common ownership of the task at hand and 
joint responsibility for its achievement‖ as well as a ―co-ordinated effort 
and planned sharing of tasks evenly across the team‖ (Macmillan, 
2011:5). Since the MPR was disagreeing, it means there was neither a 
sense of joint responsibility nor coordinated effort among the agencies, 
which in turn implies lack of effectiveness in team work among the 
agencies.    
Under detection of non-compliance, 65% of the NASS disagreed that the 
agencies‘ were effective while 54%, 70%, 67%, 83% and 54% of the 
FIRS, CBN, MOCs, AGF and HIL agreed. Other groups, including the 
NNPC and the MPR, that did not differ between themselves shared mixed 
views with not more than 33% of the respondents in each group were 
either in agreement, neutral or in disagreement. The agreement by most 
of the groups might be more correct because Nigeria has recently 
disclosed that it has uncovered $8.8 billion of underpaid royalties which 
had not been detected by the petroleum tax agencies between 1999 and 
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2008 (Olokor, 2012). This evidence, therefore, suggests that the 
petroleum tax agencies were ineffective in the detection of non-
compliance.      
The groups also differed in relation to prosecution of the MOCs for non-
compliance with tax regulations. First, with 53% disagreed response rate, 
the NNPC differed from the FIRS, AGF and HIL which were 62% agree, 
67% neutral and 46% agree respectively. Second, the NASS with 64% 
disagreed response rate also differed from the FIRS, AGF and HIL. Third, 
the AGO differed from the FIRS and HIL with 57% disagreed view.  
Although, on average, the groups were neutral, there was no evidence 
suggesting that the MOCs were being prosecuted for non-compliance in 
Nigeria despite the reported cases of tax evasion (Ezigbo, 2010; Olokor, 
2012). Hence, agencies might not be effective in prosecuting the MOCs.   
From the findings above, it is evident that the administrative agencies 
were not working as an effective team and did not have the capacity to 
detect and prosecute the MOCs for non-compliance with tax regulations. 
Hence, the hypothesis H14 is rejected in relation to this statement.   
6.4.5 Petroleum tax compliance  
This part of the analysis relates to hypothesis H15. The hypothesis, which 
was developed on two statements, is restated below:  
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating to the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system are adequate. 
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Table 6.19 presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents‘ views 
on the two statements relating to the adequacy of the compliance 
mechanisms of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. 
 
Table 6.19: Descriptive statistics relating to adequacy of the 
control mechanisms of the Nigerian petroleum tax system 
  
Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree, 
SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in brackets are 
percentages 
 
6.4.5.1 Features designed to assist petroleum tax compliance           
This section tested the respondents‘ views on whether the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system possesses features that can assist in compliance 
with tax regulations. Specifically, six features were tested: i) a clear 
statement of the purpose of the tax regulation; ii) capacity for regular 
Statements M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
i) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax regulation 
 
2.42 
 
2.00 
 
12 
(13.0) 
 
48 
(52.2) 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
9 
(9.8) 
 
5 
(5.4) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax regulations 2.75 3.00 
9 
(9.8) 
35 
(38.0) 
20 
(21.7) 
26 
(28.3) 
2 
(2.2) 
92 
(100) 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 
2.84 3.00 10 
(10.9) 
32 
(34.8) 
19 
(20.7) 
25 
(27.2) 
6 
(6.5) 
92 
(100) 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
2.35 2.00 24 
(26.1) 
35 
(38.0) 
13 
(14.1) 
17 
(18.5) 
3 
(3.3) 
92 
(100) 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum taxation 
experts 
2.59 2.00 18 
(19.6) 
31 
(33.7) 
20 
(21.7) 
17 
(18.5) 
6 
(6.5) 
92 
(100) 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil industry 
2.41 2.00 28 
(30.40 
26 
(28.3) 
16 
(17.4) 
16 
(17.4) 
6 
(6.5) 
92 
(100) 
ii) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes.    
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
2.27 2.00 18 
(19.6) 
47 
(51.1) 
12 
(13.0) 
14 
(15.2) 
1 
(1.1) 
92 
(100) 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 
2.32 
 
2.00 
17 
(18.5) 
44 
(47.8) 
20 
(21.7) 
7 
(7.6) 
4 
(4.3) 
92 
(100) 
 Penalties for late payment 2.40 2.00 26 
(28.3) 
31 
(33.7) 
11 
(12.0) 
20 
(21.7) 
4 
(4.3) 
92 
(100) 
231 
 
review of the tax regulation; iii) capacity for timely review of the tax 
regulation; iv) existence of a database for petroleum taxes paid; v) 
adequate numbers of government petroleum taxation experts; and vi) 
tax officials‘ adequate knowledge of the oil industry.  
These attributes are important for effective compliance with any tax 
system. First, a clear statement of purpose is fundamental because the 
effectiveness of tax regulations is enhanced if its wordings are: i) 
meaningful; ii) intelligible; and iii) well thought out and organised 
(Thuronyi, 1996). Thuronyi (1996) further noted that the easier the tax 
regulations are understood, the lower will be the costs of compliance for 
tax administrators. Second, regular and timely review of tax regulations 
has the potential of improving tax administration to make it more 
responsive and reliable (Ogbonna and Ebimobowei, 2012).  Third, the 
presence of a database for petroleum tax paid is essential in tracking 
MOCs tax payments records. Not only that, it also allows the 
administrative agencies to manage mass information relating to 
petroleum taxes paid. Fourth, the adequacy of government petroleum 
taxation experts is fundamental in ensuring that attempts by the MOCs 
to legally avoid compliance with tax regulations are uncovered and timely 
dealt with. Fifth, tax officials‘ sound knowledge of the petroleum industry 
will arguably raise the MOCs‘ conscience in their dealings with revenue 
agencies. 
From Table 6.19, 65% of the respondents were of the view that Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax system has a clear statement of purpose while 15% of 
them disagreed. This gave a mean score of 2.42 (agreed). The 
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respondents‘ view on the tax system‘s capacity for a regular review was 
mixed: 44 out of the 92 respondents, representing 48%, agreed, 20 
(22%) neutral and 28 (30%) disagreed. Overall the respondents were 
neutral (median = 3.00). Similarly, the tax system‘s capacity for timely 
review indicated an overall mean score of 2.84 and a median score of 
3.00 as suggested by respondents mixed view of 46% agreed, 21% 
neutral and 33% disagreed. Furthermore, 64% of the respondents 
agreed that there was a database of taxes paid in place while 22% of 
them disagreed. On average, the respondents were in agreement 
(median = 2.00). 
Table 6.20 presents the Mann-Whitney tests results for the differences 
between the respondents groups relating to all the features designed to 
assist compliance with the petroleum tax regulations.  
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Table 6.20: Mann-Whitney tests for features designed to assist 
petroleum tax compliance 
 
a) A clear statement of  purpose of the tax regulation 
         Groups F C M2 A2 N2 N3 H 
            N1 .013    .014  .029 
            M1 .017 .023  .030 .009 .031 .017 
            N2  .033 .040     
 
b) Capacity for regular review of the tax regulation 
         Groups N1 C M1 A1 A2 N2 H 
             N1  .002  .005 .004 .037 .000 
              F .012  .043 .046    
             M1  .011  .016  .015  .003 
             N3    .016   .038 
 
c) Capacity for timely review of the tax regulation 
 
Groups N1 F C M1 M2 A2 N3 H 
N1   .032  .038 .018  .027 
M1   .044  .028 .015  .036 
A1 .007 .033  .016   .018  
 
d) Database for petroleum taxes paid 
 
         Groups N1 A1 A2 
              F .046 .030  
              N3   .044 
 
e) Tax officials‘ adequate knowledge of the oil industry 
 
           Groups F 
               N2 .031 
     
     Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).    
  
A number of differences were recorded between the groups regarding 
Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system‘s clear statement of purpose (Table 
6.20). First, with 47% agreed response, the NNPC differed in strength of 
agreement from the FIRS, NEITI and HIL who were 85%, 100% and 77% 
in agreement respectively. Second, the MPR held a 71% neutral view 
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making it different from the FIRS, CBN, AGO, NEITI, NASS and HIL, all of 
which held more than a 65% agreed response rate. For a tax system to 
have a clear statement of purpose it must be readable, relevant, and 
rigorous (Luttman, 2006)68. All these features are arguably met by the 
Nigeria petroleum tax system as evident from the review in Chapter 3.   
In terms of a tax system‘s capacity for a regular review, there were also 
some differences between the groups (Table 6.20). First, 53% of the 
NNPC disagreed while 70%, 83%, 71, 75% and 69% respectively of the 
CBN, AGF, AGO, NEITI and HIL agreed. Second, the FIRS, with 62% 
agreed view, differed from the NNPC and MPR who were 53% and 57% in 
disagreement respectively. The disagreement by the NNPC and MPR 
might not be appropriate because, over the years, as discussed earlier in 
Section 3.2, series of reforms were made in Nigeria, and currently a bill, 
called ―petroleum industry bill (PIB)‖, for the amendment of the existing 
regulations is before the national assembly.  
An investigation of the differences between the groups relating to the 
capacity of the tax system for a timely review revealed that the NNPC 
and MPR held 47%, and 57% disagreement that the tax system has the 
capacity for timely review. On the other hand, the CBN, MOCs, AGO, HIL 
and AGF held more than 60% agreement that the system has the 
capacity for a timely review. Considering the fact that the government‘s 
desire for a holistic overhaul of the nation‘s petroleum sector via the PIB, 
which started since 2008, is still being debated in National Assembly, it 
                                                          
68 A tax system is readable if it is concise and easily understood, it is relevant if it is 
directly related to substantive issues in the tax system, and rigorous if it meticulously 
follow the principles of sound design and implementation (Luttman, 2006).         
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could be argued that the tax system lacks the capacity for a timely 
review. 
The differences relating to database of taxes paid indicated that the FIRS 
and AGF held 85% and 67% agreed views while the NNPC held a 40% 
disagreed response. As the FIRS and AGF are the two institutions in 
Nigeria that are respectively responsible for collection and disbursement 
of the nation‘s funds (see Section 3.6.2), it can be argued that their 
agreement was appropriate because without a database for taxes paid it 
would be difficult, particularly for the AGF, to ascertain the correct 
amount collected in a given month.  
In terms of tax official‘s adequate knowledge of the oil industry, 59% of 
the respondents agreed while 24% disagreed. With a mean of 2.41 and a 
median score of 2.00, the respondents were averagely in agreement. 
Mann-Whitney tests for the difference between the groups‘ revealed only 
one difference between the NEITI and FIRS in which 50% of NEITI 
disagreed as against 84% agreement by the FIRS.  
From the findings above, it is clear from the perception of the 
respondents that the Nigerian petroleum tax system has a clear 
statement of purpose, capacity for regular review, database for taxes 
paid, and tax officials with adequate knowledge of the petroleum 
industry. It was, however, the view of respondents that the tax system 
lacks the capacity for a timely review. Therefore, except for capacity for 
timely review, the research hypothesis H15 is accepted with regard to 
this statement.  
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6.4.5.2 Tax policies for fast payment of petroleum taxes in 
Nigeria  
This section analyse the respondents opinions on the effectiveness of 
three petroleum tax policies in ensuring prompt payment of petroleum 
taxes. These policies were: self-assessment of tax liabilities, monthly 
instalment payments of tax liabilities, and penalties for late payment. 
This question is important for at least three reasons. First, the 
responsibility for calculating relevant tax liability and meeting the 
requirement for payment are shifted, under self-assessment, to the 
taxpayer (Barr et al, 1977). Knowledge of how this encourages 
compliance is important for meeting the objective of this study. Second, 
monthly instalment payment of tax liabilities reliefs the MOCs from 
excessive cash outflow but at the same time reminds them of their 
obligation to pay within 30 days or be fined. Respondents view on the 
effectiveness of policy is important to this study. Third, imposition of 
penalties is a common tool for encouraging compliance. How effective 
penalties for late payments in Nigeria in encouraging compliance is also 
important to this study.  
The descriptive statistics of the respondents from Table 6.19 indicates 
that 71% of the respondents agreed that Nigeria‘s self-assessment 
system was effective in ensuring compliance with the petroleum tax 
regulations. This gave a mean score of 2.27 (agreed). The respondents, 
just as in relation to self-assessment, were in agreement that the 
monthly instalment payment of tax liabilities was an effective mechanism 
for ensuring compliance with tax regulations. Under penalties for late 
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payment, 62% of the respondents agreed while 26% disagreed. With a 
mean score of 2.40, the respondents, on average, agreed that penalties 
were effective mechanisms for prompt payment of tax. Differences 
between the groups are presented in Table 6.21. 
Table 6.21: Mann-Whitney tests for tax policies for fast payment 
of petroleum taxes 
 
a) Self-assessment of tax liabilities 
 
               Groups N1 M2 N3 
                   F .008 .026 .010 
                   A1 .027 .031 .018 
                   A2 .046 .036 .026 
 
b) Monthly instalment payments of tax liabilities 
 
                Groups N1 C N3 
                    C .037   
                   M2  .021 .049 
 
c) Penalties for late payment 
 
Groups N1 F C M2 A2 N3 H 
M1  .027  .015   .026 
M2   .036  .029   
A1 .028 .006 .018 .004  .013 .006 
         
      Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
From Table 6.21, the differences between the groups for self-assessment 
revealed that the FIRS, AGF and AGO each differed from the NNPC, MOCs 
and NASS. The differences relate to the strength of agreement in which 
more than 80% of the respondents from the FIRS, AGF and AGO agreed 
as against 53%, 50% and 55% agreed response held respectively by the 
NNPC, MOCs and NASS. The agreed view of the respondents might be 
238 
 
based on the findings that the practice of self assessment in Nigeria 
resulted not only in increase in revenue collection but also in effective 
partnership between the taxpayers and the tax officials (Onyegbule, 
2012) consistent with self assessment‘s main objective of encouraging 
voluntary compliance and efficient tax administration (Palil, 2010).  
Three differences were reported between the groups in terms of monthly 
instalment payment of tax liabilities. The first difference, which relates to 
strength of agreement, showed that the CBN held 90% agreed view while 
the NNPC held 53% agreed view. The other two differences were 
between MOCs and the CBN and NASS. 67% of the respondents from 
MOCs were neutral while 90% and 82% respectively from the CBN and 
NASS agreed. All petroleum taxes due to the government were first paid 
by the MOCs into an offshore account maintained by the CBN (see 
Section 3.6.2). Therefore, the CBN‘s agreement was a confirmation that 
MOCs were paying their tax liabilities.  
A number of differences were found between the respondents in terms of 
penalties for late payment of taxes. First, the MPR shared different views 
with the FIRS, MOCs and HIL: 86% of the respondents from the MPR 
agreed while about 50% of the respondents from each of the three 
groups disagreed. Second, the MOCs disagreed with the CBN and AGO 
who held 80% and 85% agreed views. Third, with 100% agreed 
response, the AGF held a different view with the NNPC who held 47% 
agreed, 27 neutral, and 27% disagreed view. Although penalties for late 
payment of taxes are employed across the world, in the case of Nigeria 
there is arguably no evidence suggesting that the MOCs were penalised 
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for late payment of tax liabilities.  This might suggests that the penalties 
were effective in making the MOCs comply with tax regulations.  
On the basis of the findings above, it can be concluded that the 
respondents perceived all the three policies to be effective in encouraging 
fast payment of petroleum taxes. Hence, hypothesis H15 is accepted in 
relation to this statement.      
6.4.6 Flexibility of the Nigerian petroleum tax system  
This section tested the sixth hypothesis of the study (i.e. hypothesis 
H16). Specifically, the analysis relates to section five of the study 
questionnaire in which the respondents‘ views were asked on the ability 
of the Nigerian petroleum tax system to adjust to changes in conditions 
in the industry that were likely to affect the credibility of the tax system.  
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is reactive to changes in 
factors that significantly affect tax matters     
 
Descriptive statistics of the five statements relating to the flexibility of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system as covered by hypothesis H16 are 
presented in Table 6.22. 
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Table 6.22: Descriptive statistics relating to flexibility of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system 
 
      Note: i) M=Mean, Md=Median, SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, 
D=Disagree, SD= Strongly Disagree, TR=Total Responses ii) All figures in 
brackets are percentages 
 
 
 
Statements M Md SA 
 
A 
 
N 
 
D 
 
SD 
 
TR 
i) Capacity to adjust to the following 
situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  in 
other countries 
2.83 3.00 
 
8 
(8.7) 
 
35 
(38.0) 
 
20 
(21.7) 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
6 
(6.5) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Increase in investors risk of 
making loss 
2.98 3.00 
3 
(3.3) 
27 
(29.3) 
33 
(35.9) 
27 
(29.3) 
2 
(2.2) 
92 
(100) 
ii) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government take 
when the profitability of oil companies‘ 
increases 
 
2.10 
 
2.00 
 
 
30 
(32.6) 
 
 
37 
(40.2) 
 
 
13 
(14.2) 
 
10 
(10.9) 
 
2 
(2.2) 
 
92 
(100) 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil companies‘ 
decreases 
2.90 3.00 12 
(13.0) 
29 
(31.5) 
19 
(20.7) 
20 
(21.7) 
12 
(13.0) 
92 
(100) 
iii) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by tax 
officials 
 
 
 
2.60 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
 
39 
(42.4) 
 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
 
18 
(14.6) 
 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Underreporting of production 
volume by multinational oil companies 2.89 3.00 16 
(17.4) 
 
29 
(31.5) 
12 
(13.0) 
19 
(20.7) 
16 
(17.4) 
92 
(100) 
iv) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the following 
conditions:   
 MOCs fear that government 
might not honour contract terms in the 
long run 
 
 
2.68 
 
 
2.00 
 
 
 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
 
 
 
44 
(47.8) 
 
 
 
 
15 
(16.3) 
 
 
 
 
23 
(25.0) 
 
 
 
 
3 
(3.3) 
 
 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil companies are 
receiving too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
2.39 2.00 20 
(21.7) 
37 
(40.2) 
16 
(17.4) 
17 
(18.5) 
2 
(2.2) 
92 
(100) 
v) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater share of 
oil rent  by communities in the oil 
region 
 
 
2.98 
 
 
3.00 
 
 
 
 
9 
(9.8) 
 
 
 
 
28 
(30.4) 
 
 
 
 
18 
(19.6) 
 
 
 
 
30 
(32.6) 
 
 
 
 
7 
(7.6) 
 
 
 
 
92 
(100) 
 Requests for  compensation  
by communities in the oil region  for 
damages to their environment 
 
2.75 
 
3.00 
 
 
16 
(17.4) 
 
 
29 
(31.5) 
 
 
13 
(14.1) 
 
 
30 
(32.6) 
 
 
4 
(4.3) 
 
 
s92 
(100) 
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6.4.6.1 Capacity to adjust to changes in tax regulations in other 
countries and increase in MOCs risk of making loss 
In this section, the respondents‘ views on the ability of the petroleum tax 
system to adjust itself to changes in two important issues affecting the 
international competitiveness of a Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system were 
asked: i) changes in tax regulations of other countries and ii) increase in 
MOCs risk of making a loss. Respondents‘ views on these issues are very 
important in understanding the relative strength of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system particularly in the developing world where 
governments are doing everything possible to attract as much foreign 
direction investment as possible. 
From Table 6.22, respondents‘ views on changes in tax regulations of 
other countries attracted 47% agreement, 22% neutral and 31% 
disagreement of the total respondents. With mean and median scores of 
2.83 and 3.00 respectively, the respondents were undecided on average. 
Similarly, the respondents were neutral (median = 3.00) in relation to 
the ability of the Nigerian petroleum tax system to adjust to increase in 
MOCs risk of making a loss. 
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Table 6.23: Mann-Whitney tests for changes in tax regulations in 
other countries and increase in MOCs risk 
 
a) changes in tax regulations of other countries 
 
Groups C M2 A1 N3 H 
N1 .018 .016 .026 .005 .012 
 
b) increase in MOCs risk of making loss 
 
                         Groups N1 M1 M2 
                             N3 .025 .026 .032 
         
     Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
 
From Table 6.23, 53% of the NNPC disagreed that the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system has the ability to adjust to changes in tax 
regulations in other countries. This made it to be different from the CBN, 
NASS, HIL and MOCs who respectively held 70%, 73%, 62% and 50% 
agreed views. As discussed in Section 2.4.1, designing a tax regime 
requires the understanding of the system in other countries. A tax 
system that is far out in line with what is obtained in other countries has 
the potential of making the MOCs divert their investments elsewhere 
(Daniel, 2004). As evidence has now shown that many MOCs are 
operating in Nigeria, it could be argued that the Nigerian tax system is 
sensitive to changes in tax regulations in other countries.  
Differences between the groups in relation to the ability of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system to adjust to increase in MOCs risk of making loss 
revealed that the NASS differed from the NNPC, MPR and MOCs. 55% of 
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the respondents from the NASS perceived that the tax system has the 
ability to adjust to investors‘ risk of making a loss. On the other hand, 
53% and 71% of the NNPC and MPR were neutral while the MOCs were 
67% in disagreement. The disagreement by the MOCs might not be 
correct because, as discussed in Section 3.2, the government had taken 
many steps, including the provision of guaranteed minimum profit, to 
ensure that the MOCs‘ exposure to risk of making loss is reduced. Hence, 
it could be argued that the tax system was responsive to the increase in 
the risk of the MOCs. 
On the basis of the above analysis, the research hypothesis H16 is 
accepted for both changes in tax regulations of other countries and for an 
increase in MOCs risk of making a loss. 
6.4.6.2 Nigerian petroleum tax’s ability to adjust government 
share of petroleum for changes in the profitability of the 
MOCs.  
In this section, the respondents‘ views were sought on the ability of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system to increase government take when the 
profitability of the MOCs‘ increases and vice versa. This question is 
important because having this flexibility built-in into the tax system is 
likely to address the controversies surrounding profit sharing which Otto 
et al (2006:Xi) put thus:   
―In matters of mining taxation, governments rarely believe that 
companies pay too much tax; companies rarely believe that they pay 
too little tax; and citizens rarely believe that they actually see 
tangible benefits from the taxes that are paid‖. 
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Analysis of the median scores and response frequencies revealed an 
interesting finding. With a positive response of over 73% of the total 
respondents and a median score of 2.00, the groups were of the opinion 
that the Nigerian petroleum tax system has the capacity of increasing 
government share of petroleum revenue as the profitability of the MOCs 
increases. This is consistent with the evidence that as petroleum fiscal 
system matures the revenue regimes become more progressive (Sunley 
et al, 2002).  
Mann-Whitney tests to determine the differences between the groups are 
presented in Table 6.24.  
Table 6.24: Mann-Whitney tests for petroleum tax’s ability to 
adjust government share of petroleum revenue  
 
a) increase in government take when the profitability of oil companies‘  
increases 
                             Groups N1 C N3 
                                 A1 .016 .015 .011 
 
b) decrease in government take when the profitability of oil companies‘ 
decreases  
 
                               Groups C M1 A1 N3 
                                   N1 .037 .007 .037 .043 
                                   M2  .026   
                                   A2 .033 .006 .034 .043 
 
 
      Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).  
    
From table 6.24, the AGF differed from the NNPC, CBN and NASS. While 
100% of the respondents from the AGF were of the view that increases in 
MOCs profitability results to increase in government share of oil revenue, 
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only 47% of the respondents from the NNPC agreed. In the past few 
decades, the Nigerian government, through the NNPC, has renegotiated 
a number of its petroleum contracts with the MOCs with a view to getting 
more share of the MOCs profit69. As such, it can be argued that the tax 
system, through contract renegotiation, had increases the government 
share of revenue as the profitability of the MOCs increase, especially as a 
result of increase in the price of crude oil. 
In terms of the relationship between decrease in government‘s share of 
oil rent and decrease in MOCs‘ profitability, the respondents were not 
sure (median=3.00) as to whether the nation‘s petroleum tax system has 
the ability to decrease government share of petroleum revenue as the 
profitability of the MOCs decreases. Analysis of the differences between 
the respondents showed some differences. First, 67% of the NNPC 
disagreed that a decrease in MOCs‘ profitability caused a decrease in 
government takes while 60%, 72% and 64% of the CBN, MPR, and NASS 
respectively agreed. Second, 67% of the MOCs disagreed that a decrease 
in MOCs‘ profitability caused a decrease in government take while 72% of 
the MPR agreed. The difference in views between the MOCs and MPR 
might not be a surprise. This is because ―in matters of mining taxation, 
governments rarely believe that companies pay too much tax; companies 
rarely believe that they pay too little tax…‖  (Otto et al., 2006: Xi). 
However, decrease in profitability of the MOCs influences their 
investment decisions. Thus, in order to retain them, producing nations 
                                                          
69 Over the past decades the prices of crude oil has been on increase. For example 
between 1986 and 2011, the price of crude oil rose from an annual average of $15.5 in 
1986 to $94.88 in 2011 (EIA, 2012). This apparently increased the profitability of the 
MOCs. In a bid to capture some part of the MOCs‘ profit, some producing nations, of 
which Nigeria is one, renegotiate existing contracts.  
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offer attractive incentives such as guaranteed minimum rate of return 
which Nigeria offered the MOCs during the oil glut of 1970s (see Section 
3.2). This, by implication, reduced the government share of the oil rent. 
In this regard, government share of oil rent decreases as the profitability 
of the MOCs‘ decreases. 
From the analysis above, the respondents perceived that the Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax system has the ability to adjust to changes in the 
profitability of the MOCs. Hence, the H16 is accepted in relation to this 
statement.   
6.4.6.3 Detection of fraudulent practices and underreporting of 
production volume 
In this section, respondents‘ views were sought on the effectiveness of 
the control measures of the Nigerian petroleum tax system in the 
detection of fraudulent practices by tax officials and underreporting of 
production volume by MOCs. Effective fraud detection saves a lot of 
revenue for the nation and also strengthens the contractual relationship 
between the government and the MOCS.  
Analysis of the median score and response frequency for fraudulent 
practices by tax officials revealed a score of 2.00 and a positive response 
frequency of 59%, meaning that the groups agreed that the control 
mechanisms of the nation‘s petroleum tax system were effective in the 
detection of fraudulent practices by the petroleum tax officials.  Similarly, 
in terms of underreporting of production volume by the MOCs, the groups 
were 49% in agreement that control mechanisms were effective in the 
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detection of any underreporting of by the MOCs. Differences between the 
respondents are presented in Table 6.25.  
Table 6.25: Mann-Whitney tests for fraudulent practices and 
underreporting of production 
 
a) Fraudulent practices by tax officials 
                                   Groups N1 A2 
                                        F .047  
                                        A1 .013 .019 
 
b) Underreporting of production volume by multinational oil companies 
Groups C M2 A1 
N1 .045 .010 .007 
H  .015 .011 
     
      Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
From Table 6.25, 77% and 100% of the respondents from the FIRS and 
AGF agreed that the tax system was capable of detecting officials‘ 
fraudulent practices while respondents from the NNPC were 33% neutral 
and 40% in disagreement. The agreed view of the AGF and FIRS that the 
tax system was capable of detecting fraudulent practices of tax officials 
might not be correct. This is because empirical evidences have shown 
that the major problem in tax administration in Nigeria that has remain 
unsolved is the corrupt practices of tax officials in implementing the tax 
system (see Ayua, 1996).  
The differences between the groups on the statement that the Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax system has the ability of detecting underreporting of 
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production volume by the MOCs revealed that the NNPC, with 73% 
disagreement differed from the CBN, MOCs and AGF who held 70%, 83% 
and 83% agreed views respectively. However, since it is clear that 
Nigeria has not kept an accurate record of oil production in its nearly 50 
years of E&P activities (Ezigbo, 2010), it will be difficult to conclude that 
the tax system has the ability of detecting underreporting of oil 
production.      
From the analysis above, it can be argued that the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system neither has the ability to detect fraudulent practices by tax 
officials nor underreporting of production volume by MOCs. Hence, 
research hypothesis H16 is rejected in relation to this statement. 
6.4.6.4 Ability of the Nigerian petroleum tax system to cope MOCs 
fear and public concerns 
In this section, the respondents views on the ability of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system to cope with two main issues were sought: i) 
multinational oil companies fear that the government might not honour 
contract terms in the long run and ii)   public concern that multinational 
oil companies are receiving too great a share of the oil revenue. This 
question is important because of the significance of these two issues in 
the success of a nation‘s petroleum tax system. First, the long-term 
nature of petroleum contracts, which makes them exposed to distraction 
from unexpected events, is likely to put the parties in doubt as to the 
continuity of the contracts agreement. In this regard, Waelde and Kolo 
(2003:1) emphases as follows:   
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―The longer-term an agreement and the more exposed to geological, 
commercial and political risk, the more it becomes vulnerable to 
external events. Such events can make the operation of the contract 
partially impracticable or, from a commercial and financial 
perspective, no longer viable for one party. One consequence is for 
the parties to terminate the agreement or one party to withdraw‖ 
Second, in many jurisdictions the perception amongst the general public 
is that the MOCs are receiving too great share of oil revenue. For 
example, the payment of high dividends by the MOCs is seen as a way in 
which the petroleum resource, which belongs to the community, is being 
under taxed (see Osmundsen, 2008).  
From Table 6.22, 55% of the respondents agreed that the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is flexible to cope with the MOCs‘ fear that the 
government might not honour contract terms in the long run. On 
average, the respondents were in agreement (median = 2.00). On the 
other hand, 62% of the respondents were of the view that the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system has the ability to cope with the public concern that 
the MOCs were receiving too great a share of the oil revenue. Thus, with 
a mean score of 2.39 and a median score of 2.00 the respondents on 
average were in agreement.  
Mann-Whitney tests results for the differences between the groups are 
presented in Table 6.2 
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Table 6.26: Mann-Whitney tests for MOCs fear and public 
concerns 
 
a) Multinational oil companies fear that government might not honour 
contract terms in the long run 
 
                                   Groups F M1 
                                       M2 .016 .014 
 
b) Public concern that multinational oil companies are receiving too 
great a share of the oil revenue 
 
Groups C M1 A2 
M2 .047 .037 .019 
N2   .048 
      
      Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).    
 
  
From Table 6.26, 100% of the MOCs agreed that the tax system has the 
ability to cope with the MOCs‘ fear that the government might not honour 
contract terms in the long term. This made it to be different from the 
FIRS and MPR who respectively held 54% and 43% disagreed response. 
In spite of the long period of contractual relationship between the 
government and the MOCs, there was no evidence to prove that the 
Nigerian government was not meeting up to its contractual obligations 
with the MOCs operating in the country. Rather the government is keen 
in creating conducive atmosphere for the MOCs to continue operating in 
Nigeria (Oyedele, 2012). This possibly was the reason for the MOCs‘ 
agreement.        
In relation to public concern that multinational oil companies are 
receiving too great a share of the oil revenue, the MOCs differed with the 
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CBN, MPR and AGO. 100% of the respondents from the MOCs agreed 
that the tax system has the capacity to cope with the public concerns 
while the CBN held 50% agreed views. The MPR, on the other hand, held 
a view of 29% agreed, 43% neutral and 28% disagreed. Since the 
general public across oil producing countries, including Nigeria, hold the 
view that the MOCs are receiving too great a share of the oil rent 
(Osmundsen, 2006), it will be difficult to argue that Nigeria‘s petroleum 
tax system has the capacity to contain the public concern.  
6.4.6.5 Government’s reaction to requests for greater share of oil 
rent and compensations for environmental damages by 
communities in the oil region 
The views of the respondents were sought on how the government reacts 
to the requests of the communities in the oil region for: i) greater share 
of oil rent and ii) compensation for damages to their environment. 
Understanding of government‘s reaction to these requests is important in 
explaining whether government‘s attention or lack of it is a cause, for 
example, to the militancy that is taking place in the Niger Delta oil 
producing region of Nigeria. 
An analysis of the overall median scores revealed a score of 3.00 
(neutral) for both requests. The position of the groups in this aspect of 
the survey is quite surprising considering the severity of militancy that is 
going on in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Nevertheless, the 
respondents might have chosen to be neutral because of the political 
sensitivity of the issues.  
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Table 6.27: Mann-Whitney tests for oil communities’ request for 
greater share of oil rent  
a) Request for greater share of oil rent 
Groups N1 F C H 
F .050    
M1 .033 .003 .013 .022 
      
     
      Note: i) Only Mann-Whitney test results with p- values of less than or equal to 
0.05 (i.e. p≤.05) are shown in the table  
               ii) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil 
Companies (MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor 
General‘s office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher 
Institution of learning (HIL).     
 
There were no differences between the groups concerning the oil 
communities‘ request for compensation for damage to their environment. 
However, five differences were found between the groups for 
communities‘ request for a greater share of oil rent. The first difference 
was between the FIRS and the NNPC in which 77% of the FIRS agreed 
that the government was reactive to the communities request for greater 
share of oil rent, while only 20% of the NNPC agreed with about 50% of 
them neutral. The remaining four differences were between the MPR and 
three other groups, namely; NNPC, FIRS, CBN and HIL. 86% of the MPR 
disagreed while 77% and 60% of the respondents FIRS and CBN agreed. 
Over the years, the Nigerian government has reacted to the request of 
the oil communities in so many ways. The creation of the ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs is a good example in recent years70. Accordingly, the 
                                                          
70 The Niger Delta is the oil producing region of Nigeria and, as discussed earlier, has 
been neglected for long. The administration of late Umar Yar‘Adua, in response to the 
request of the oil communities, established the Ministry of Niger Delta in order to tackle 
the challenges of infrastructural development, environmental protection and youth 
empowerment in the region (Odiakose, 2008).  
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agreed view that the government was appropriately reacting to the 
request of the oil community is arguably the most appropriate.  
In summary, despite the differences between the groups, it is clear from 
the evidence above that the government was reacting appropriately to 
the requests of the oil communities. Therefore, in relation to this 
statement, the research hypothesis H16 is accepted.   
6.5 Summary of the main findings   
The above sections presented analyses and interpretations of the data 
gathered on the perception questionnaire administered to the 
respondents. Specifically, six hypotheses relating to the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system were tested. The following sections present the 
summaries of the findings. 
6.5.1 Findings on the appropriateness of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system in representing the interests of the government 
and the MOCs 
The analysis revealed that the respondents were of the view that the tax 
system was robust in achieving yearly increase in government share of 
oil revenue, adequate in tax incentives packages necessary for the 
attraction of foreign direct investments, and sound in terms of 
international competitiveness. The tax system was, however, found to be 
inappropriate in the distribution of oil revenue between the government 
and the oil majors and also among the three tiers of government. These 
findings suggest a number of implications 
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First, the perceived inequity in the distribution of oil revenue suggests 
that the government should review the tax system in order to create a 
sense of fairness between it and the MOCs. Second, the perceived yearly 
increase in government share of petroleum revenue suggests the 
government has been making an annual increase in its spending. This is 
because a positive relationship was found to exist between increase in 
tax revenue and government spending (Loganathan and Taha, 2007). As 
more money is available for spending, the government is likely to 
prioritise its spending in order to boost economic growth by putting 
money into people‘s pockets (Mitchell, 2005).  
Third, the positive impact of tax incentives on MOCs has the effect of 
achieving government‘s desire for more foreign direct investments. 
Therefore, the government should sustain these incentives because any 
attempt to withdraw these incentives is likely to put the multinational oil 
companies‘ investment decisions to a hold.  Fourth, the perceived 
unsatisfactory distribution of revenue among three tiers of government 
implies the need for the government to adhere to its policy of periodic 
review71 of the nation‘s revenue sharing formula in order to make it more 
acceptable by all the three tiers. The dissatisfaction, particularly by the 
oil producing states, if allowed to continue, will worsen the crises in the 
Niger Delta region of the country. This has potential implication of putting 
                                                          
71  The Nigerian constitution (1999) empowered the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and 
Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) to ―to review from time to time, the revenue allocation 
formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities. 
Provided that any revenue formula which has been accepted by an act of the National 
Assembly shall remain in force for a period of not less than five years for the 
commencement of the act‖.  
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the investments of the MOCs at risk which in turn affects crude oil 
production in the country.  
Fifth, as the tax system was perceived to be internationally competitive, 
there is the likelihood that new MOCs will enter into the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. Therefore, government should come up with a policy 
that will allow newcomers into the industry and at the same time 
improve its relationship with the existing MOCs. In addition, it should 
also formulate policies that will encourage healthy competition among 
the enlarged MOCs operating in the industry.  
6.5.2 Findings on the suitability of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
objectives in achieving the objectives set for the tax system  
The respondents perceived that all the tax instruments employed were 
effective. Hence, the hypothesis that the ―Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
instruments are suitable for achieving the objectives set for the 
petroleum tax system‖ is accepted.  
The perceived effectiveness of these instruments corroborates the 
findings that Nigeria‘s oil revenue share was increasing year by year. It 
also confirms the international competitiveness of the Nigerian tax 
system because it was an indication of the MOCs‘ confidence in the 
design of the nation‘s instruments. Accordingly, a policy should be put in 
place to achieve a higher level of effectiveness of these instruments by 
making them adjustable to changing circumstances in the global oil 
industry.     
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6.5.3 Findings relating to Nigeria’s administrative system for 
petroleum tax matters 
Three main aspects of Nigeria‘s administrative system for petroleum tax 
matters, namely, comprehensiveness, flexibility, and cost effectiveness 
of administration were tested. The aim was to ascertain whether, in the 
opinion of the respondents, that the three aspects were sound. It was 
found that the respondents perceived the administrative plan of the tax 
system to be comprehensive and flexibility but was not cost 
effectiveness. Hence, the hypothesis (H13) that Nigeria has in place a 
sound administrative system for petroleum tax matters is accepted for 
being comprehensive and flexible and rejected with regard to being cost 
effective. 
The findings that the administrative plan was comprehensive suggest 
that it was wide-ranging but not free from loopholes. According to 
National Education Association (2011:2), loopholes are: 
 ―provisions in the tax law – or lack thereof – that allow corporations 
to avoid their responsibility of paying their fair share for the privilege 
of doing business in a given jurisdiction and for the use of public 
services‖.  
As loopholes encourage tax avoidance72, the implication is that 
continuous review of the administrative plan is required to close all 
loopholes identified. This will save the government revenue loss.  
 
 
                                                          
72 Tax avoidance is a legal means of reducing tax payable (Bowler, 2009). 
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Similarly, since the administrative plan was perceived flexible but cost 
ineffective, the government should embark on a cost-benefit-analysis of 
the plan with a view to identify those administrative aspects whose costs 
outweigh their benefits and then use the flexibility of the plan to discard 
them. In this way, the government will be saved from incurring costs 
that are avoidable and also obviates the need for massive unplanned 
review in the future.   
 6.5.4 Findings on the effectiveness of the implementation 
processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax system 
A number of findings were made in this respect, and the results suggest 
that the respondents were not convinced that the implementation 
processes of the tax system were effective. First, the study revealed that 
government support for the recruitment of required staff was poor. 
Second, all the tax administrative agencies were adequately financed by 
the government. Third, the findings revealed that the administrative 
agencies did not possess the required feature for successful 
administration of the tax system. Fourth, the respondents also perceived 
that the agencies were not working as an effective team and did not have 
the capacity to detect and prosecute the multinational oil companies‘ for 
noncompliance with tax regulations. On a general note, therefore, the 
hypothesis (H14) that the implementation processes for Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax system are effective is rejected. 
The findings above indicate a number of issues that require policy 
measures. First, the perceived poor support for recruitment of required 
staff can lead to poor administration because the staff available may not 
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be enough to accomplish the task at hand. Therefore, policy makers 
should ensure that recruitment policies are strictly adhered to.   
Second, the findings revealed that there was a perception that all the 
administrative agencies were adequately financed by the government. 
The implication here is that the agencies would do everything possible to 
achieve desired targets, or may conceal failure to achieve targets, 
because any unjustified administrative lapses may not be an excuse for 
failure.  
Third, the agencies perceived lack of features for effective administration 
can seriously undermine their performance no matter how adequate they 
were financed. There should, therefore, be a policy in place that channels 
part of finance of the agencies for the acquisition and maintenance of the 
required administrative features. 
Fourth, the agencies‘ perceived inability to work as an effective team 
could be due to lack of clarity of goal (Larson and LaFasto, 1989). 
Government should redefine the team‘s goal to make it clearer and 
acceptable to the agencies. This can be achieved through active 
participation of the agencies in the goal setting process as noted by 
Pearson (1987).  
Fifth, the perceived incapacity of the administrative agencies in the 
detection and prosecution of the MOCs for noncompliance with tax 
regulations has called into question the authority of the agencies over the 
multinational oil companies. As there was no compelling evidence that an 
MOC was prosecuted in Nigeria for noncompliance with tax regulations, in 
spite of the reported cases of tax evasion (Oduniyi, 2004), it implies that 
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the administrative agencies were not exercising their administrative 
authority on multinational oil companies. The tax agencies should be 
adequately empowered to perform their administrative role without fear 
or favour.   
6.5.5 Findings on the effectiveness of measures put in place to 
ensure compliance with petroleum tax regulations   
The analysis revealed that the respondents perceived that Nigerian 
petroleum tax system has a clear statement of purpose and capacity for 
regular review but lack the capacity for timely review. Similarly, the 
respondents were of the view that the tax system has in place a 
database for petroleum taxes paid, adequate number of government 
petroleum taxation experts, and also tax officials that have adequate 
knowledge of the oil industry. Furthermore, the respondents perceived 
that all the policy measures put in place to ensure prompt payment of 
petroleum taxes were effective. Hence, the research hypothesis H15 is 
rejected for timely review of the tax system and accepted for all the 
other measures. 
The implication of these findings is fourfold. First, the tax system‘s 
perceived clear statement of purpose suggests that compliance costs for 
petroleum tax administration were low in Nigeria. This is because the 
easier the regulations are understood, the lower the costs of compliance 
for the tax administrators (Thuronyi, 1996). Thus, more revenue should 
accrue to the government. 
Second, the respondents‘ perception of the tax system‘s capacity for 
regular review means that the tax system is responsive to changing 
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circumstances (Ogbonna and Ebimobowei, 2012). The government 
should, as a matter of policy, maintain a culture of reviewing the tax 
system at a defined regular internal. Care should, however, be taken to 
ensure that the system‘s stability is not undermined. Stability of the tax 
system, as discussed in Section 2.2, is an important characteristic that 
affects the multinational oil companies‘ confidence in government 
commitment towards petroleum contracts. 
Third, the respondents‘ perception of the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system‘s inability to trigger a timely review suggests government‘s 
inadequate consultations in its reform decisions. This is evidenced by the 
stiff resistance shown by the multinational oil companies on the proposed 
reform of the industry via the Petroleum Industry Bill which has been 
lingering since 2002 (Alike, 2011). The government should, therefore, 
make a wide consultation across the stakeholders in the industry, 
particularly the multinational oil companies, before embarking on a 
reform agenda.  
Finally, the implication of the effectiveness of the policy measures for 
prompt payment of petroleum taxes is that the government is assured of 
the receipt of its share of oil revenue. This is important because it will 
assist the government in meeting its transformation agenda.  
6.5.6 Findings on the flexibility of the tax system in coping with 
changes in factors that significantly affect tax matters     
The analysis revealed that there was a perception that the tax system 
has the ability to adjust to changes in tax regulations across oil 
producing nations and also capable of coping with the multinational oil 
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companies‘ fear of increase in risk of making losses. In terms of the 
relationship between government take and multinational oil companies 
profitability, the respondents perceived that the tax system has the 
ability to increase government take when the profitability of the 
multinational oil companies increases and vice versa. Furthermore, it was 
the perception of the respondents that the tax system was not effectively 
designed to detect both the fraudulent practices of tax officials and 
underreporting of production volumes by the multinational oil companies. 
The respondents believed that the tax system was effective in coping 
with the multinational oil companies‘ fear on issues relating to contract 
terms but not effective in coping with the public concerns. On 
government‘s reactions to oil communities‘ requests for oil rent and 
compensation for environmental damages, the respondents‘ were in 
agreement.  
The perceived ability of the tax system to adjust to changes in the tax 
systems in other countries confirms the findings on international 
competitiveness of the tax system discussed in Section 6.4.1.5. This 
entails the possibility of more multinational oil companies coming to 
operate in Nigeria. Hence, government should create conducive operating 
environment for both existing and prospective multinational oil 
companies. 
The findings on the relationship between government‘s take and 
multinational oil companies‘ profitability imply that the tax system was 
flexible73. As flexible tax systems becomes stable due to changes in 
                                                          
73 A flexible tax system provides the host government with enough share of economic 
rent under different conditions of the investors‘ profitability (Tordo, 2007).  
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markets and project conditions (Tordo, 2007), renegotiation of contracts 
between the government and the multinational oil companies might be 
limited.  
The perceived ineffectiveness of the tax system to detect both the 
fraudulent practices of tax officials and underreporting of production 
volumes by the multinational oil companies has the potential of causing 
the government a huge revenue loss. Government should reinvigorate its 
anticorruption agencies to make them more responsive in the discharge 
of their duties74. This will go a long way in curing the corrupt practices in 
the industry.  
The findings that the government was reactive to the request of the oil 
communities for both oil rent and compensation for environmental 
damage suggest that the government has the intention of containing the 
militancy in the oil producing region of the country. Government should, 
therefore, continue to show appropriate attention to the communities‘ 
requests as this has an impact on petroleum operations in the country. 
6.6 Synthesis of findings   
This study has presented the results of ―A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation into the Design and Implementation of an Appropriate Tax 
Regime: an Evaluation of Nigeria‘s Petroleum Taxation Arrangements‖. 
The empirical approach adopted was to seek the perceptions of a range 
of experts on Nigeria‘s petroleum tax system and to supplement their 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
74 Nigeria has anti-corruption agencies: i) Economic and financial crimes commission 
(EFCC) which is empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalise economic and 
financial crimes and ii) Independent corrupt practices and other related offences (ICPC) 
which is mandated to prohibit and prescribe punishment for corrupt practices and other 
related offences.  
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observations through engagement with the literature and by framing the 
conclusions against both the literature and the theoretical framework 
adopted. There were clear limitations associated with this approach. The 
limitations relate to whether the ―experts‖ really have the appropriate 
knowledge of the petroleum tax system in Nigeria and whether they are 
representative of the population of ―experts‖ from which they were 
drawn. On this latter point every effort was made to seek assurances and 
advice from a range of individuals in positions of authority in Nigeria‘s oil 
and gas taxation sector. For details of this process see Section 5.4.1. On 
the basis of their input and by subsequent interrogation of the available 
information of the groups selected, there are reasonable grounds to 
support the view that the ―experts‖ do have the requisite knowledge and 
are representative of their groups (see Section 5.4.2). The methodology 
still has the severe limitation that doubts will always exist about the care 
taken by individuals completing a fairly lengthy questionnaire and more 
importantly whether they are objectively answering the questions asked. 
This limitation was evident from the outset, but it was precisely this point 
that could prove to be important for the conclusions that could emerge 
from the analysis. On balance there was enough of a trend evident from 
the responses to form a view, however tentative, regarding the 
acceptance or rejection of the various hypotheses that had been derived 
and tested (see Section 5.3).  These conclusions were presented to the 
same individuals who had advised on the real ―expertise‖ of the selected 
sample groups for comment on the apparent legitimacy of them and on 
whether the conclusions were in accord with their own perceptions of the 
situation. In the main they were happy to accept that the findings 
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appeared to reflect the reality of the situation. Again this evidence is 
weak and has to be interpreted with caution regarding the 
―objectiveness‖ of even these individuals; did they also have their own 
agenda in answering in a positive way to the questions asked?  
As mentioned above these limitations were evident from the outset. 
Accepting that there does exist such a group of influential petroleum tax 
―experts‖ it seemed reasonable to conclude that they would have been 
influential in devising the petroleum tax system and influential in its 
operational impact. Evidence for this is available in the literature (see 
Alike, 2011; Igbikiowubo.2010; Ojo, 1984). The literature also revealed 
that there was a range of views regarding the efficacy of the petroleum 
tax system in Nigeria (see Ogbonna, 2012; Lukman, 2010). It thus 
seemed interesting to ascertain if the ―experts‖ had different views on 
the questions in the questionnaire and if that might shed light on the 
differences in opinion evident in the literature. Thus a potential 
significant finding from the research undertaken might relate to the 
different goals and objectives that the ―experts‖ would want from the 
revenue obtained from the petroleum tax system in Nigeria. And would 
these differences be reflected in the different responses to the 
questionnaire? If that were the case the weak conclusions drawn relating 
to the hypotheses that has been tested might even become a secondary 
finding. If there are tensions and different motivational factors present 
amongst the groups of ―experts‖ then that could well account for the 
theme emerging in the literature relating to the lack of efficacy of the 
petroleum tax system in Nigeria. This could be an important finding. It 
was for this reason that the perception questionnaire instrument was 
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used for data gathering. It would provide evidence relating to the 
differing views of the ―experts‖. This rationale has been referred in 
Section 5.4.3. An analysis of the potential motivating factors for the 
actions of each group was presented in Section 5.4.1.  
It is interesting to associate this ex ante analysis of the possible goals of 
each group (drawn from the literature and deduced from the theoretical 
basis for the study) with a summary of the main differences in responses 
of each group. 
Table 6.28 below presents an aggregated summary of the material 
differences of each group to the questions addressing each hypothesis. 
The interplay between each group and the possible reasons for the 
differences were discussed were discussed in Section 6.4.  
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Table 6.28: Summary of Differences among Stakeholder 
Groups 
 
Hypotheses 
Stakeholder Groups 
N1 F C M1 M2 A1 A2 N2 N3 H 
H11: Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
system is a fair 
representation of the 
interests of the government 
and the MOCs. 
M 
- 
A 
64% 
A 
70% 
 
 
 
M 
- 
A 
50% 
A 
57% 
A 
50% 
M 
- 
A 
59% 
A 
58% 
H12:   H12: Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
instruments are suitable for 
achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax 
system 
A 
56% 
A 
83% 
A 
66% 
M 
- 
N 
50% 
A 
76% 
A 
60% 
A 
90% 
A 
54% 
A 
64% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a 
sound administrative plan 
for petroleum tax matters 
D 
60% 
M 
- 
 
A 
50% 
D 
53% 
A 
50% 
A 
50% 
M 
- 
D 
50% 
D 
55% 
A 
69% 
 
H14: The implementation 
processes for Nigeria‘s 
petroleum tax system are 
effective 
M 
- 
A 
60% 
A 
69% 
M 
- 
M 
- 
A 
74% 
A 
62% 
M 
- 
 
M 
- 
A 
73% 
 
H15: The compliance 
mechanisms relating to the 
Nigerian petroleum tax 
system are adequate 
M 
- 
A 
70% 
A 
73% 
M 
- 
 
 
A 
50% 
 
A 
73% 
A 
67% 
A 
58% 
A 
63% 
A 
66% 
H16: The Nigerian petroleum 
tax system is reactive to 
changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax 
matters     
M 
- 
A 
56% 
A 
61% 
M 
- 
 
A 
63% 
A 
59% 
M 
- 
A 
55% 
A 
64% 
A 
51% 
 
      Note: i) N1 = Nigerian national petroleum corporation (NNPC), F = Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), C = Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), M1 = 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR), M2 = Multinational Oil Companies 
(MOCs), A1 = Accountant General‘s office (AGF), A2 = Auditor General‘s 
office (AGO), N2 = Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI), N3 = National Assembly (NASS), and H = Higher Institution of 
learning (HIL).  
     ii) A = Agreement, N = Neutral, D = Disagreement, M = Mixed 
response  
     iii) Agreed, Neutral and Disagreed views used are those that are 50% 
and above  
 
From Table 6.28 it can be seen that there were major differences and 
that indeed they can be linked to the ex ante identification of possible 
differences. For example, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
had a mixed view to suggestions relating to the tax system‘s fair 
representation of the interests of the government but was positive in its 
response to suggestions relating to the suitability of the tax instruments 
in meeting the objectives set for the tax system. This is consistent with 
its goals of improving the nation‘s oil subsector because holding a mixed 
view suggests the need for further compromise between the government 
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and the multinational oil companies in order to make the tax system 
more representative of their interests. The Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources, on the other hand, held mixed view to most of the 
suggestions possibly because it does not see the government receiving 
enough revenue from its petroleum contractual agreement. Similarly, the 
Higher Institutions Learning, as expected, was positive in all its 
responses. This is consistent with the ex ante arguments made in Section 
5.4.1 relating to this group. These results suggest that there are tensions 
between these influential groups. It is uncertain what the precise 
consequences are for the future design and operation of the Nigerian 
petroleum fiscal system. The one group that has the most differences of 
opinion with the other groups is Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. 
This is important given the key role that Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation plays in the oil and gas sector.       
One possible conclusion from this finding is that if there is to be progress 
in making the petroleum tax system more efficient and effective then the 
policy makers need to take into account the influence of each of these 
groups in setting that policy and to assess what their motives are for 
doing so. Further the regulators need to assess the impact of the 
different groups in operationalising the petroleum tax system in Nigeria. 
This clearly requires further research to be undertaken. This finding and 
conclusion may be important for the future success of the petroleum tax 
system in Nigeria in generating the revenue that will help Nigeria meet 
its goals and objectives. It therefore, arguably, justifies the approach 
adopted in thesis in using a perception questionnaire as the basis for 
generating data. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter presented an analyses of data gathered for the study. The 
aim was to ascertain whether, in the opinions of experts, the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is appropriately designed and implemented to 
meet the needs of Nigeria. The outcome of the analysis, in general, 
suggests that the respondents perceived the tax system was appropriate 
in its design for meeting Nigeria‘s desire for high oil take and an increase 
in foreign direct investments. Specifically, most of the tax objectives and 
instruments were suitable, greater aspects of the tax administration were 
ineffective, compliance techniques were mostly adequate, and the ability 
of the tax system to cope with changing circumstances was positive. 
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Chapter seven 
Summary and conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present a summary of the preceding 
chapters and then conclude the thesis. Accordingly, the rest of the 
chapter is divided into four sections. Section 7.2 presents a summary of 
the entire study. This is followed by section 7.3 which presents the 
conclusions that emerged from the theoretical and empirical 
investigations carried out. Section 7.4 deals with the inherent limitations 
of the study, while section 7.5 deals with recommendations for further 
research.   
7.2 Summary  
This thesis investigated the Nigerian petroleum tax system with the aim 
of ascertaining whether it is appropriately designed to extract the 
benefits desired from the country‗s petroleum contractual arrangements. 
The research was underpinned by the theoretical assumption that 
―economic rent‖ drives most aspects of determining an appropriate 
petroleum tax system. The results reported in the analysis sections 
provide evidence that this assumption was valid    (see Section 4.6)Six 
specific objectives were set (see Section 1.3). These objectives emerged 
from the study‗s research question: 
 ―How well does the Nigerian Petroleum tax regime serve the needs of 
Nigeria?‖ 
In order to achieve the objectives of the study, relevant literature was 
reviewed on petroleum taxation covering issues relating to regime design 
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and implementation. This general review revealed a number of issues 
including the fact that there is no single tax regime that is applicable to 
all nations, implying that each country designs its tax system on the 
basis of its needs and circumstances. More significantly, the review 
revealed that the alignment of the interests of the government and that 
of the MOCs is central to the success of any petroleum tax regime. 
Using the general review as a basis, a review of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system, with emphases on design and implementation, was 
conducted. Like any other oil producing nation, the review revealed that 
Nigeria has as its main petroleum tax objective the desire to ensure that 
maximum revenue is accrued to the government from oil and gas 
activities while at the same time guaranteeing the investors a reasonable 
return on investment. In terms of petroleum tax administration, Nigeria 
also happens to be one of the many countries that adopt a multi-agency 
approach. This might not be unconnected with the desire by most oil 
producing nations to reduce the risk of serious error and collusion 
prevalent with a single administrative agency approach. 
The findings of the literature review informed the decision to adopt 
economic rent theory as a theoretical framework in this study. The 
theory provides a framework for the study of petroleum taxation. The 
most important factor influencing multinational oil companies decision to 
invest in E&P activities in oil endowed nations is the manner in which the 
nation‗s petroleum tax system is designed and implemented. A 
petroleum tax system that is designed to capture economic rent does not 
act as a disincentive to firms to undertake any E&P activity since rent is 
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not a requirement for the continuation or initiation of business 
operations. After a thorough methodological review, Burrell and Morgan‗s 
(1979) sociological research paradigm was perceived to be a widely 
accepted framework that defines the underlying paradigm within the 
context of management and sociological literature. Accordingly, it was 
decided to work within the Burrell and Morgan‗s (1979) interpretive 
paradigm with nominalism, anti-positivism, and voluntarism as 
ontological, epistemological, and human nature, assumptions 
respectively. This position led to the adoption of ideographic 
methodology. Regarding the idea of regulation and radical change as put 
forward by Burrell and Morgan (1979), this study inclined to regulation 
rather than radical change.  
Guided by the chosen paradigm, a questionnaire was designed and used 
to gather the data for the study. The original intention was to triangulate 
using interview and questionnaire but because of the fact that none of 
the respondents agreed to be interviewed the study abandoned the use 
of triangulation. The questionnaire was constructed and first subjected to 
two pilot tests before it was administered to the respondents. The data 
gathered were analysed using nonparametric statistics of Mann-Whitney 
tests informed by descriptive statistics. Specifically, the analysis involved 
an examination of respondents‗ opinions on four areas relating to the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system: i) objectives the tax system is designed 
to achieve; ii) the manner in which the tax system is administered; iii) 
the effectiveness of polices put in place to ensure compliance with the 
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tax regulations; and iv) the extent to which the tax system is flexible 
enough to cope with changing circumstances. 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
One limitation of the study is that different respondent groups may be 
better informed about different parts of the study questionnaire. This 
limitation was mitigated, however, by attempting to ensure the only 
persons with the right expertise filled the questionnaire.   
As with any other questionnaire-based research, there is the intrinsic 
difficulty of using a questionnaire as an instrument of research. As 
indicated in Chapter 5, there were delays in responses, respondents 
complaining of lack of time, and in some cases respondents simply 
refusing to fill the questionnaires they had agreed to complete. All these 
circumstances posed serious threats to the data collection exercise.  
However, in order to minimise the impact of this problem, a collection 
date was agreed with the respondents. Where questionnaires were not 
ready for collection on agreed dates, new dates were set for collection. In 
addition to collection dates, the researcher also gave several telephone 
calls to the respondents and also paid several visits to the respondents‘ 
places of work.  
Furthermore, the use of a questionnaire as the only research instrument 
in the study limits the opportunity for enjoying the benefits associated 
with triangulation, such as the desire to overcome the weaknesses of a 
single-method research. In this research, realising the importance of 
finding plausible and credible explanations for the results as the main 
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goal of all research, the researcher painstakingly identified all the 
reliability and validity threats associated with the study and minimised 
them accordingly (see Chapter 5). 
Another limitation relates to whether the ―experts‖ really have the 
appropriate knowledge of the petroleum tax system in Nigeria and 
whether they are representative of the population of ―experts‖ from 
which they were drawn. On this latter point every effort was made to 
seek assurances and advice from a range of individuals in positions of 
authority in Nigeria‘s oil and gas taxation sector (see Footnote 42 for 
details). 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
The literature reviewed and analyses of the surveyed data have led to 
the emergence of several conclusions in this thesis. First and foremost, 
the thesis concludes that it is very difficult to make a single petroleum 
tax system that serves the needs of different countries. Countries differ 
in so many respects including cost and geological structures. These 
differences make it to be paramount for countries to tailor their fiscal 
regimes in a way that is attractive to the multinational oil companies.  
Similarly, it is also the conclusion of this thesis that at the heart of 
Nigeria‘s petroleum tax regime is the desire to capture as much revenue 
as possible for the government. This is consistent with the assertion that 
since host governments are the owners of the petroleum resources, the 
greater share of the economic rent should accrue to them (Crowson, 
2004). Again the respondents‘ perception that the distribution of 
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petroleum revenue in Nigeria between the government and the 
multinational oil companies is disproportionate further supports this 
conclusion. 
Furthermore, it is the conclusion of this thesis that the implementation 
processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax system is weak and requires 
further improvement. This conclusion is based on the perceived: i) cost 
ineffectiveness of the tax system, ii) administrative agencies lack of 
required features for successful administration, iii)  tax agencies inability 
to work as an effective team; and iv) tax agencies inability to detect and 
prosecute those multinational oil companies that fail to comply with the 
tax rules. All these issues are paramount to administrative effectiveness 
and, therefore, call for their improvement. 
Moreover, the thesis concludes that the Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
effective in ensuring compliance with petroleum tax regulations. This 
conclusion is based on the results of the analysis of the respondents‘ 
perceptions on the effectiveness of measures put in place in Nigeria to 
ensure that tax regulations are complied with. Overall the respondents 
perceived that all the measures including a clear statement of tax 
purpose, adequacy of government tax officials, and prompt payment 
policies were in place and effective. 
It is also the conclusion of this thesis that the Nigerian petroleum tax 
system lacks the capacity for timely review. This conclusion is based on 
the respondents‘ perception about the Nigerian petroleum tax system‘s 
incapacity for a timely review as discussed in Section 6.5.3. Supporting 
the respondents‘ view is the apparent inability of the nation‘s parliament 
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to pass the Petroleum Industry Bill (Alike, 2011). The bill, which has the 
main aim of devising a new fiscal regime for the Nigerian petroleum 
industry, proposes changes affecting provisions relating to companies 
income tax, rents and royalties, and Nigerian hydrocarbon tax. 
In terms of ability to adjust to changes in tax regulations across oil 
producing nations, the respondents were of the view that the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system has that ability. Against this background, the 
thesis concludes that the Nigerian petroleum tax system is sensitive to 
changes in tax regulations across oil producing countries. This position is 
buttressed by the willingness on the part of the Nigerian government for 
a holistic reform of the nation‘s petroleum fiscal regime via the proposed 
petroleum industry bill.  
7.5 Further research    
The previous sections provide some evidence calling for further research 
that could be seen as a possible extension of the present study. The 
paragraphs below underline some of the areas requiring further research. 
First, in response to the inequity in the distribution of oil revenue 
between the Nigerian government and the multinational oil companies 
evidenced by the respondents‘ perceptions in this study, it is 
recommended that  further research be undertaken to investigate 
possible other means that would lead to fairer distribution of oil rent 
between the government and the multinational oil companies. Fairness in 
the distribution of oil revenue is at the heart of all petroleum contractual 
relationships between the government and the multinational oil 
companies. Where the multinational oil companies, for instance, are 
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convinced that there is equity in the distribution of revenue between 
them and the government, there is the likelihood that they may increase 
the pace of their Exploration and Production activities which is a 
fundamental requirement of all oil producing nations. 
Second, further research is also recommended in the area of the 
implementation processes of the Nigerian petroleum tax system. The 
present research reveals that the administration of the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is cost ineffective. It also reveals that the 
administrative agencies were neither working as an effective team nor 
have the ability to detect and prosecute those multinational oil 
companies that fail to comply with tax rules. While this finding has met 
the objective of this study, it would be interesting to undertake further 
research in order to uncover the reasons why the tax system behaves 
that way. 
Third, in recent years Nigeria is shifting its focus from Joint Venture 
contracts to Production Sharing Contracts. The main reason advanced in 
the literature is that the government is finding it difficult to meet its Joint 
Venture cash calls commitment. While it is logical to believe that such an 
attempt is in order considering the financial needs of Nigeria, it is, 
however, not enough to warrant such a shift given the broad range of 
Nigeria‘s petroleum tax objectives. Accordingly, a further research is 
recommended to investigate the impact of Nigeria‘s current shift from 
Joint Venture contracts to Production Sharing Contracts on the nation‘s 
petroleum tax objectives. 
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Fourth, further research is needed to identify the general public‘s views 
on how oil revenue should be shared between the government and the 
multinational oil companies. The present study found that the 
respondents were of the view that the Nigerian petroleum tax system 
was ineffective in coping with public concerns on issues relating to 
revenue sharing between the governments and the multinational oil 
companies. While this finding is adequate for the purpose of this study, a 
further research in this aspect may put the government in a position to 
effectively capture the public views on how the revenue should be shared 
in the nation‘s tax policies. 
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Appendix B  
(Codification of Questionnaire Response) 
 
Variable Variable Label Value 
Sec1Q1 Place of work * 
Sec1Q2 Occupation ** 
Sec1Q3 Working experience in years *** 
Sec2Q1a Equity in income distribution 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q1b Increase in government share of oil revenue 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q2a Investment tax credit 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q2b Accelerated depreciation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q2c Guaranteed profit margin to investors 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q2d Cost consolidation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q3a Federal government 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q3b State government 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q3c Local government 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q4a Tax incentives to investors 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q4b Allocation of part of oil produced to MOCs 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q4c Guaranteed minimum rate of return to investors 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q4d Compensation of investors for increase in risks 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q5a Bonus/fees 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q5b Royalty 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q5c Income tax 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q5d Participation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec2Q5e Production sharing 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q1a Comprehensive admin plan 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q1b Flexible admin plan 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q1c Cost effective admin plan 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q2a Recruitment of required staff 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q2b Financial support 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q2c Training and development of staff 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q2d Improvement of staff welfare 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q3a Federal inland revenue service 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q3b Department of Petroleum Resources 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
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Sec3Q3c Central bank of Nigeria 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q3d National petroleum investment management 
services 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q3e Ministry of petroleum resources 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q4a Appropriate number of petroleum tax officials 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q4b Good information system 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q4c Linked information system 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q4d Access to national petroleum database 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q5a Effective team work 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q5b Effectiveness in detecting non-compliance 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec3Q5c Prosecution of companies for non-compliance 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q1a Clear purpose of tax regulation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q1b Capacity for regular review of tax regulation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q1c Capacity for timely review of tax regulation 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q2a Database for petroleum tax paid 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q2b Adequate number of government petroleum 
taxation experts 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q2c Tax official's knowledge of the oil industry 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q3a Self assessment of tax liabilities 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q3b Monthly instalment payments for tax liabilities 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec4Q3c Penalties for late payment 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q1a Changes in tax regulation in other countries 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q1b Increase in investors risk in making loss 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q2a Increase in govt take caused by increase in the 
profit of MOCs 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q2b Decrease in govt take caused by decrease in the 
profit of MOCs 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q3a Detection of fraudulent practice by tax officials 1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q3b Detection of underreporting of production by 
MOCs 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q4a MOCs fear that govt. might not honour contract 
terms in the long term 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q4b Public realisation that MOCs are receiving too 
great a share of the oil revenue 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q5a Request for greater share of oil rent by 
communities in the oil region 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
Sec5Q5b Requests for compensation by communities in oil 
region for damage to their environment 
1=SA,2=A,3=N,D=4, 
SD=5 
 
Note:   *1=NNPC, 2=FIRS, 3=CBN, 4=MPR, 5=MOCs, 6=AGF, 7=AGO, 8=NEITI, 9=NASS, 10=HIL 
             **1=Accountant, 2=Auditor, 3=Tax official, 4=Law maker, 5=Lecturer, 6=Lawyer, 
7=Engineer, 8=Others 
             ***1=<5 years, 2=5-9 years, 3=10-14 years, 4=15-19 years, 5=20-24 years, 6=>25 
years 
             ^^SA=Strongly agree, A=Agree, N=Neutral, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly disagree 
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Appendix C 
(Research Questionnaire) 
 
June, 2011 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a research scholar based in Robert Gordon University, the UK‘s number 
one modern university. My research speciality is petroleum taxation and my 
desire is to make a contribution to improving the petroleum taxation system 
in Nigeria. I have designed a questionnaire which should enable me to base 
my research findings on the opinions of experts in the field.   
I know that you have real expertise in this area and your contribution would 
be invaluable to the study. I would be grateful if you can spare the 10-15 
minutes it would take to fill in the attached questionnaire. If you participate I 
would be happy to let you have a summary of my findings in due course, if 
you wish to see them. Instructions for completing the questionnaire can be 
found on the form itself.  
Please be assured that your participation is voluntary and that strict 
confidentiality will be maintained with respect to your responses to the 
questionnaire. All information you provide will be kept in a secure location; 
only group results will be documented. 
Should you have any questions at any time about the survey or procedures, 
you can contact me on +447795672510 or by email at these email 
addresses; a.k.kyari@rgu.ac.uk, adamkyari@yahoo.com.  
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Adam Konto Kyari   
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Section One 
(Demographic Characteristics of Respondents) 
 
Please tick as appropriate; 
1) Place of Work: 
1) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation  
2) Federal Inland Revenue Service  
3) Central Bank of Nigeria  
4) Ministry of Petroleum Resources  
5) Multinational Oil Company  
6) Accountant General‘s Office  
7) Auditor General‘s Office  
8) Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  
9) National Assembly  
10) Higher Institution of learning  
 
 
2) Occupation: 
 
1) Accountant   
2) Auditor  
3) Tax Official   
4) Law Maker  
5) Lecturer  
6) Lawyer  
7) Engineer  
 
 
If your occupation is not listed, please specify here: 
…………………………………………….. 
 
 
3) Working Experience (in years): 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
<5 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 >25 
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Section Two 
(Nigerian Petroleum tax objectives and Instruments) 
 
Please answer each statement by ticking the appropriate box:  
1) Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the 
following statements: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Distribution of petroleum revenue between the 
government and the oil companies is equitable 
     
b) Government share of revenue from petroleum 
taxation has usually increased year-by-year   
     
 
2)  Please indicate the strength of your agreement that each of the 
following incentives helps to increase multinational oil companies‘ 
investment in the Nigerian oil industry:  
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Incentives 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Investment tax credit      
b) Accelerated depreciation      
c) Guaranteed profit margin for multinational oil 
companies 
     
d) Offsetting of new projects‘ costs with the income 
of ongoing projects  
     
 
3) Please indicate the strength of your agreement that the following tiers 
of government in Nigeria are satisfied with the manner in which revenue 
from petroleum taxation is shared: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Federal government      
b) State governments       
c) Local governments       
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4) Please indicate the strength of your agreement that each of the 
following elements increases the international competitiveness of the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Tax incentive packages to investors       
b) Allocation of part of the oil production to 
multinational oil companies 
     
c) Guaranteed minimum rate of return to 
multinational oil companies 
     
d) Compensation of investors for any increase in 
risks 
     
 
1) Each of the following petroleum tax instruments is effective in 
capturing an appropriate higher share of oil rent to the government: 
 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Bonuses/fees      
b) Royalty      
c) Income tax      
d) Participation      
e) Production sharing      
 
 
 
 
 
Section Three 
(Administration of Nigerian Petroleum tax System) 
Please answer each statement by ticking the appropriate box.  
1) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for petroleum tax matters is: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Comprehensive       
b) Flexible      
c) Cost effective      
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2) Government helps support effective administration of the petroleum 
tax system through providing:   
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Recruitment of required staff       
b) Financial support      
c) Training and development of staff      
d) Improvement of staff welfare      
 
3) Each of the following petroleum tax administrative agencies in Nigeria 
is adequately financed: 
 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
 
4) Each of the petroleum tax agencies identified in statement 3 above 
has the following features:    
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Appropriate number of petroleum tax 
professionals  
     
b) Good  information system      
c) Information system that is linked to other 
agencies‘ information systems 
     
d) Access to National petroleum tax database       
 
If you wish to make any additional comments on any of the agencies, 
please write them in the space below: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  .................................................................................................. 
 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Federal Inland Revenue Service      
b) Department of Petroleum Resources      
c) Central Bank of Nigeria      
d) National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services 
     
e) Ministry of Petroleum Resources      
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5) All of the five petroleum tax administrative agencies identified in 
statement 3 above:  
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Work as an effective team      
b) Are effective in detecting non-compliance          
c) Prosecute companies for non-compliance       
 
If you wish to make any additional comments on any of the agencies, 
please write them in the space below: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
................................................................................................... 
 
Section Four 
(Petroleum tax compliance) 
Please answer each statement by ticking appropriate box. 
1) The Nigerian petroleum tax system possesses each of these 
attributes: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) A clear statement of the purpose of the tax 
regulation 
     
b) Capacity for regular review of the tax regulation      
c) Capacity for timely review of the tax regulation      
 
 
2) The presence of the following features in the petroleum tax system 
assists compliance with the Nigerian petroleum tax regulations:    
  1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 
5=Strongly Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Database for petroleum taxes paid      
b) Adequate numbers of government petroleum taxation 
experts  
     
c) Tax officials‘ adequate knowledge of the oil industry       
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3) Each of the following tax policies helps achieve fast payment of 
petroleum taxes in Nigeria. 
  1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 
5=Strongly Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Self-assessment of tax liabilities       
b) Monthly instalment payments for tax liabilities       
c) Penalties for late payment      
 
 
 
Section Five 
(Flexibility of the Nigerian Petroleum Tax System) 
Please answer each statement by ticking the appropriate box:  
1) The Nigerian petroleum tax system has the capacity to adjust to each 
of the following situations: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Changes in tax regulations  in other countries      
b) Increase in investors risk of making loss       
 
2) The Nigerian petroleum tax system is designed to: 
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Increase government take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
     
b)Decrease government take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ decreases  
     
 
3) The control mechanism in the Nigerian petroleum tax system is likely 
to detect:  
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Fraudulent practices by tax officials       
b) Underreporting of production volume by 
multinational oil companies 
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4) The Nigerian petroleum tax system is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
   1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 
5=Strongly Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Multinational oil companies fear that government 
might not honour contract terms in the long run  
     
b) Public concern that multinational oil companies 
are receiving too great a share of the oil revenue    
     
 
 
5) The Nigerian government reacts appropriately to:  
1= Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neutral, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly 
Disagree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
a) Requests for a greater share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil region 
     
b) Requests for  compensation  by communities in 
the oil region  for damages to their environment 
     
 
 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix D                  
 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the government 
and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among the 
tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the international 
competitiveness of the Nigerian petroleum 
tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate of 
return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors for 
any increase in risks 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
1 
3 
4 
4 
 
6 
2 
1 
 
 
4 
 
6 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
11 
4 
6 
3 
 
5 
2 
3 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
2 
5 
4 
7 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
 
4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
 
 
5 
 
7 
 
0 
2 
1 
1 
 
1 
7 
8 
 
 
0 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
2 
4 
3 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
15 
15 
15 
 
15 
15 
15 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
Total  38 
19% 
56 
29% 
39 
20% 
40 
21% 
22 
11% 
195 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments are   
suitable for achieving the objectives set for the 
petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing 
 
 
 
0 
2 
1 
2 
3 
 
 
7 
7 
8 
5 
7 
 
 
3 
5 
3 
4 
2 
 
 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
1 
0 
0 
3 
1 
 
 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
Total  8 
11% 
34 
45% 
17 
23% 
11 
15% 
5 
6% 
75 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound administrative 
plan for petroleum tax matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for petroleum 
tax matters is comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for petroleum 
tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for petroleum 
tax matters is cost effective  
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
6 
 
2 
 
7 
 
6 
 
6 
 
2 
 
1 
 
5 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
Total  0 
0% 
7 
16% 
11 
24% 
19 
42% 
8 
18% 
45 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for Nigeria’s 
petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development of staff 
 
 
0 
1 
0 
 
 
8 
7 
6 
 
 
3 
2 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
4 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
15 
15 
15 
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 Improvement of staff welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of petroleum tax 
agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum Managements 
Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of petroleum 
professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked to 
other agencies‘ information 
systems 
 Access to national petroleum 
database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax administrative 
agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting non-
compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for non-
compliance 
2 
 
2 
1 
 
5 
 
0 
1 
 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
0 
6 
 
9 
8 
 
8 
 
9 
7 
 
 
4 
 
3 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
2 
 
3 
5 
 
2 
 
4 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
7 
 
6 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
3 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
2 
 
 
5 
 
7 
 
6 
 
3 
 
6 
 
5 
 
3 
2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
2 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
5 
15 
 
15 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
15 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
Total  19 
8% 
83 
35% 
60 
25% 
54 
22% 
24 
10% 
240 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating to the 
Nigerian petroleum tax system are adequate 
a) Features designed to assist compliance: 
 A clear statement of  purpose of 
the tax regulation 
 Capacity for regular review of the 
tax regulations 
 Capacity for timely review of the 
tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum taxes 
paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum taxation 
experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate knowledge 
of the oil industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of petroleum 
taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax liabilities 
 Monthly instalment payments for 
tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
5 
 
 
7 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
5 
 
3 
 
7 
 
7 
2 
 
 
2 
 
7 
 
6 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
4 
 
 
2 
 
7 
 
5 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
1 
 
5 
 
4 
4 
 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0 
 
2 
0 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
 
15 
15 
Total  17 
13% 
34 
26% 
33 
24% 
33 
24% 
18 
13% 
135 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that significantly 
affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the following 
situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  in 
other countries 
 Increase in investors risk of 
making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is designed 
to achieve an: 
 Increase in government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take when 
the profitability of oil companies‘ 
decreases 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
4 
1 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
 
 
5 
 
8 
 
 
3 
1 
 
 
6 
 
5 
 
3 
7 
 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
 
15 
15 
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  Federal Inland Revenue Services 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by tax 
officials 
 Underreporting of production 
volume by multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to cope with the following 
conditions:   
 MOCs fear that government 
might not honour contract terms 
in the long run 
 Public concern that multinational 
oil companies are receiving too 
great a share of the oil revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater share of 
oil rent  by communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  compensation  by 
communities in the oil region  for 
damages to their environment 
 
2 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
2 
1 
 
 
9 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
5 
 
5 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
4 
 
3 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
3 
4 
 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
15 
15 
 
 
15 
 
 
15 
 
15 
 
 
15 
Total  19 
13% 
30 
20% 
41 
27% 
43 
29% 
17 
11% 
150 
100% 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
 
1 
8 
 
 
 
6 
2 
3 
2 
 
 
9 
0 
0 
 
 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
5 
 
 
 
7 
8 
6 
4 
 
4 
5 
1 
 
 
8 
 
5 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
4 
0 
 
 
0 
3 
4 
5 
 
0 
1 
5 
 
 
0 
 
4 
 
4 
 
 
6 
 
5 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
2 
 
0 
7 
7 
 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
13 
13 
 
 
13 
13 
13 
13 
 
13 
13 
13 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
13 
Total  39 
23% 
69 
41% 
36 
21% 
22 
13% 
3 
2% 
169 
100% 
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H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are  suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
 
3 
5 
1 
1 
5 
 
 
9 
8 
10 
6 
6 
 
1 
0 
0 
5 
1 
 
0 
0 
2 
1 
1 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Total  15 
23% 
39 
60% 
7 
11% 
4 
6% 
0 
0% 
65 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
4 
 
2 
 
 
 
4 
 
6 
 
5 
 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
5 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
Total  3 
8% 
11 
28% 
15 
38% 
10 
26% 
0 
0% 
39 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
4 
5 
 
3 
 
1 
 
5 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
5 
3 
 
5 
 
8 
 
9 
 
7 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
 
1 
7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
8 
 
7 
 
8 
 
 
 
0 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
2 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
0 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
 
7 
6 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
5 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
3 
 
4 
 
4 
 
 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
13 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
13 
13 
13 
13 
 
 
13 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
Total  24 
12% 
99 
48% 
20 
10% 
57 
27% 
8 
3% 
208 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
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a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
6 
 
 
5 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
4 
 
2 
 
 
8 
 
7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
4 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
4 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
4 
 
4 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
0 
 
5 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
13 
Total  36 
31% 
46 
39% 
11 
9% 
22 
19% 
2 
2% 
117 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the 
following situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
5 
 
3 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
1 
 
7 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
7 
 
3 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
13 
 
13 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
335 
 
 
Central Bank of Nigeria 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1 
 
3 
 
0 
 
13 
Total  20 
15% 
53 
41% 
17 
13% 
32 
25% 
8 
6% 
130 
100% 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit 
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
 
 
1 
7 
 
 
 
5 
3 
2 
2 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
 
4 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
 
 
4 
2 
 
 
 
3 
3 
5 
8 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
7 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
0 
 
 
2 
4 
3 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
4 
1 
 
 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
 
 
1 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
10 
10 
 
 
 
10 
10 
10 
10 
 
 
10 
10 
10 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
10 
 
10 
 
10 
Total 33 
25% 
56 
45% 
21 
16% 
13 
10% 
7 
4% 
130 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty 
c) Income tax 
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing 
 
 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
 
 
 
5 
7 
6 
4 
3 
 
 
3 
1 
4 
1 
3 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Total 8 
16% 
25 
50% 
12 
24% 
5 
10% 
0 
0% 
50 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
10 
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petroleum tax matters is flexible 
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
3 
 
2 
2 
 
3 
0 
 
1 
10 
 
10 
Total 8 
27% 
7 
23% 
7 
23% 
6 
20% 
2 
7% 
30 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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10 
 
 
10 
 
10 
 
 
10 
 
10 
 
10 
Total 40 
25% 
70 
44% 
25 
16% 
22 
14% 
3 
1% 
160 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
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 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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2 
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7 
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1 
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0 
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0 
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10 
 
10 
10 
Total 19 
21% 
47 
52% 
13 
15% 
9 
10% 
2 
2% 
90 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters 
a) Capacity to adjust to the 
following situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions: 
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue 
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total 17 
17% 
44 
44% 
18 
18% 
15 
15% 
6 
6% 
100 
100% 
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Ministry of Petroleum Resources  
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
 
0 
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0 
0 
2 
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0 
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0 
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0 
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0 
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7 
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7 
7 
7 
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7 
7 
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7 
 
7 
 
7 
Total  12 
13% 
25 
27% 
21 
23% 
27 
30% 
6 
7% 
91 
100% 
 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
 
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
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0 
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7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Total  1 
3% 
10 
29% 
 
10 
29% 
9 
25% 
5 
14% 
35 
100% 
 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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Total  0 
0% 
3 
14% 
7 
33% 
6 
29% 
5 
24% 
21 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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7 
Total  11 
10% 
37 
33% 
30 
27% 
30 
27% 
4 
3% 
112 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
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 Penalties for late payment  
4 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
7 
Total  13 
21% 
10 
16% 
18 
29% 
20 
32% 
2 
2% 
63 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the 
following situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  10 
14% 
13 
19% 
22 
31% 
22 
31% 
3 
5% 
70 
100% 
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   Multinational Oil Companies 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
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6 
6 
6 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
Total  12 
15% 
27 
35% 
23 
29% 
10 
13% 
6 
8% 
78 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
 
 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
 
 
 
2 
5 
2 
0 
0 
 
 
3 
1 
2 
5 
4 
 
 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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6 
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Total  3 
10% 
9 
30% 
15 
50% 
3 
10% 
0 
0% 
30 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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Total  2 
11% 
7 
39% 
5 
28% 
3 
17% 
1 
5% 
18 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
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 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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Total  12 
13% 
27 
28% 
35 
37% 
13 
14% 
9 
9% 
96 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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Total  0 
0% 
27 
50% 
17 
32% 
5 
9% 
5 
9% 
54 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the 
following situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
6 
343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  10 
17% 
28 
46% 
7 
12% 
12 
20% 
3 
5% 
60 
100% 
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Accountant General’s Office 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
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Total  26 
33% 
19 
24% 
16 
21% 
10 
13% 
7 
9% 
78 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
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Total  19 
63% 
4 
13% 
2 
7% 
2 
7% 
3 
10% 
30 
100% 
 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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Total  2 
11% 
7 
39% 
8 
44% 
0 
0% 
1 
6% 
18 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
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 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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6 
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6 
 
6 
Total  39 
41% 
32 
33% 
20 
21% 
5 
5% 
0 
0% 
96 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
6 
6 
Total  28 
51% 
12 
22% 
8 
15% 
3 
6% 
3 
6% 
54 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the 
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following situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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6 
Total  19 
32% 
16 
27% 
15 
25% 
9 
15% 
1 
1% 
60 
100% 
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Auditor General’s Office 
 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
 
 
0 
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1 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
2 
0 
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1 
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2 
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4 
3 
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4 
0 
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2 
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0 
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1 
4 
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0 
0 
0 
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0 
1 
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7 
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7 
7 
7 
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7 
7 
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7 
 
7 
 
7 
Total  8 
9% 
37 
41% 
23 
25% 
20 
22% 
3 
3% 
91 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
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1 
1 
0 
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6 
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2 
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1 
0 
2 
2 
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0 
0 
1 
3 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
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7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Total  3 
9% 
18 
51% 
8 
23% 
6 
17% 
0 
0% 
35 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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7 
Total  1 
5% 
7 
33% 
8 
38% 
4 
19% 
1 
5% 
21 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
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 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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0 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
0 
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7 
Total  25 
22% 
45 
40% 
16 
14% 
22 
20% 
4 
4% 
112 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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Total  6 
10% 
36 
57% 
11 
17% 
8 
13% 
2 
3% 
63 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the following 
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situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  3 
4% 
30 
43% 
12 
17% 
20 
29% 
5 
7% 
70 
100% 
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Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
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0 
0 
 
 
0 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
1 
 
 
 
0 
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3 
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0 
1 
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0 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
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4 
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4 
4 
4 
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4 
4 
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4 
Total  0 
0% 
29 
55% 
6 
12% 
11 
21% 
6 
12% 
52 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
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0 
0 
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4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Total  12 
60% 
6 
30% 
2 
10% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
20 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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4 
Total  1 
8% 
3 
25% 
2 
17% 
6 
50% 
0 
0% 
12 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
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0 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
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 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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Total  10 
16% 
16 
25% 
7 
11% 
25 
39% 
6 
9% 
64 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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Total  4 
11% 
17 
47% 
3 
8% 
12 
34% 
0 
0% 
36 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the following 
situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
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in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  5 
13% 
17 
42% 
4 
10% 
13 
33% 
1 
2% 
40 
100% 
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National assembly 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
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0 
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11 
11 
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11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
Total  18 
13% 
66 
46% 
14 
10% 
37 
26% 
8 
5% 
143 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
 
 
 
3 
3 
1 
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0 
0 
0 
 
 
 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
Total  9 
16% 
21 
38% 
12 
22% 
12 
22% 
1 
2% 
55 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible  
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective  
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11 
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11 
Total  0 
0% 
10 
30% 
5 
15% 
14 
43% 
4 
12% 
33 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
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a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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Total  12 
7% 
66 
38% 
42 
24% 
52 
29% 
4 
2% 
176 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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Total  14 
14% 
48 
49% 
14 
14% 
21 
21% 
2 
2% 
99 
100% 
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H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the following 
situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  10 
9% 
60 
55% 
15 
14% 
18 
16% 
7 
6% 
110 
100% 
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Higher Institution of Learning 
Hypotheses SA A N D SD Total 
H11: Nigeria’s petroleum tax system is a fair 
representation of the interests of the 
government and the MOCs. 
a) Equitable distribution of revenue 
b) Increase in government share of 
revenue 
c) Influence of tax incentives on MOCs 
investment decisions: 
 Investment tax credit  
 Accelerated depreciation 
 Guaranteed profit margin 
 Cost offset 
d) Distribution of tax revenue among 
the tiers of government in Nigeria: 
 Federal government 
 State government 
 Local government 
e) Incentives for enhancing the 
international competitiveness of 
the Nigerian petroleum tax system: 
 Tax incentive package to 
investors 
 Allocation of part of the oil 
production to MOCs 
 Guaranteed minimum rate 
of return to MOCs 
 Compensation of investors 
for any increase in risks 
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Total  26 
15% 
73 
43% 
34 
20% 
25 
15% 
11 
7% 
169 
100% 
H12: Nigeria’s petroleum tax instruments 
are suitable for achieving the objectives set 
for the petroleum tax system 
a) Bonuses and fees 
b) Royalty  
c) Income tax  
d) Participation 
e) Production sharing  
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Total  12 
18% 
30 
46% 
9 
14% 
12 
18% 
2 
4% 
65 
100% 
H13: Nigeria has in place a sound 
administrative plan for petroleum tax 
matters 
a) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is 
comprehensive 
b) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is flexible 
c) Nigeria‘s administrative plan for 
petroleum tax matters is cost 
effective 
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Total 6 
15% 
21 
54% 
6 
15% 
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5% 
4 
11% 
39 
100% 
H14: The implementation processes for 
Nigeria’s petroleum tax system are effective 
a) Government support for effective 
administration: 
 Recruitment of required 
staff 
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 Financial support 
 Training and development 
of staff 
 Improvement of staff 
welfare 
b) Adequacy in the finance of 
petroleum tax agencies 
 Federal Inland Revenue 
Services 
 Department of Petroleum 
Resources 
 Central Bank of Nigeria 
 National Petroleum 
Managements Services 
 Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources 
c) Features of Nigerian petroleum tax 
agencies: 
 Appropriate number of 
petroleum professionals 
 Good information system 
 Information system linked 
to other agencies‘ 
information systems 
 Access to national 
petroleum database 
d) Nigeria‘s petroleum tax 
administrative agencies: 
 Work as an effective team 
 Are effective in detecting 
non-compliance 
 Prosecute companies‘ for 
non-compliance 
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Total  63 
30% 
89 
43% 
27 
13% 
24 
12% 
5 
2% 
208 
100% 
H15:  The compliance mechanisms relating 
to the Nigerian petroleum tax system are 
adequate 
a) Features designed to assist 
compliance: 
 A clear statement of  
purpose of the tax 
regulation 
 Capacity for regular 
review of the tax 
regulations 
 Capacity for timely review 
of the tax regulation 
 Database for petroleum 
taxes paid 
 Adequate numbers of 
government petroleum 
taxation experts 
 Tax officials‘ adequate 
knowledge of the oil 
industry 
b) Policies for fast payment of 
petroleum taxes 
 Self-assessment of tax 
liabilities 
 Monthly instalment 
payments for tax liabilities 
 Penalties for late payment 
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Total  25 
21% 
52 
45% 
21 
18% 
18 
15% 
1 
1% 
117 
100% 
H16:  The Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
reactive to changes in factors that 
significantly affect tax matters     
a) Capacity to adjust to the following 
situations: 
 Changes in tax regulations  
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in other countries 
 Increase in investors risk 
of making loss 
b) Nigerian petroleum tax system is 
designed to achieve an: 
 Increase in government 
take when the profitability 
of oil companies‘ increases 
 Decrease government take 
when the profitability of oil 
companies‘ decreases 
c) Control mechanism in the Nigerian 
petroleum tax system is likely to 
detect: 
 Fraudulent practices by 
tax officials 
 Underreporting of 
production volume by 
multinational oil 
companies 
d) The Nigerian petroleum tax system 
is designed to cope with the 
following conditions:   
 MOCs fear that 
government might not 
honour contract terms in 
the long run 
 Public concern that 
multinational oil 
companies are receiving 
too great a share of the oil 
revenue    
e) The Nigerian government reacts 
appropriately to: 
 Requests for a greater 
share of oil rent  by 
communities in the oil 
region 
 Requests for  
compensation  by 
communities in the oil 
region  for damages to 
their environment 
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Total  23 
18% 
43 
33% 
21 
16% 
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25% 
10 
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